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1.1 Motivation: The Curious Case and Multiple Facets of Sovereign Debt
The fiscal costs of a country’s public debt are of crucial importance to all governments. Any
unit of currency that is spent to service interest payments on government bonds is a unit of
currency that cannot be used to finance other expenditures a government may wish to pursue.
Should public debt costs become unsustainable, a country might have to default on its debt
obligations. Between 1970 and 2017, 75 episodes of sovereign debt restructuring occurred
globally, which often entail substantial economic costs (Borensztein & Panizza 2009, Laeven
& Valencia 2018). During the start of the Corona-Pandemic in 2020, so far 102 countries
applied for emergency financing from the IMF to manage their debt (IMF 2020b).
Public debt is an issue with many facets. The controversy starts by arguing whether
the economic costs of public debt outweigh its benefits and how much debt is sustainable, a
discussion that has concerned economists for generations.1
Given that nearly all countries in the world are indebted, a first glance at public debt can
sometimes reveal curious economic characteristics: Whereas Japan’s public debt to GDP ratio
of roughly 235% in 2019 seems to be manageable for the country, the same debt ratio would
likely lead to over-indebtedness and sovereign default for most other nations.2 Furthermore,
while Japan’s last primary fiscal surplus dates back to 1992, Italy has since this time almost
always reported positive primary surpluses, but has nevertheless found its debt sustainability
often times in question. Meanwhile, Ireland had a record fiscal deficit of 32% to GDP in
2010, which was mainly used to bail out the country’s ailing banking sector – a move that
bankrupted Ireland in the process. Finally, whereas rising refinancing costs for Greece almost
pushed the country out of the Eurozone after 2010, Germany has since 2016 experienced
episodes of negative interest rates for newly issued 10-year government bonds – that is,
investors were willing to pay to enter the “safe haven” of German government debt.
1For Adam Smith, government bonds constituted a transfer of the productive group of capitalists to the
rather unproductive group of financial creditors (Smith 1776 [2010]). For Karl Marx, government bonds were
fictitious capital, as it generated returns without being profitable on its own (Marx 1894 [1992]). For a more
modern assessment, see Blanchard (2019)’s AEA presidential address, arguing that the fiscal costs of debt are
lower if safe interest rates are below economic growth rates.
2All data in this paragraph comes from the IMF Fiscal Monitor.
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This thesis will focus on the effects of three key factors – bank distress, commodity prices and
climate change – on the return dynamics of government bonds traded on financial markets.
An additional chapter demonstrates the importance of financial market integration for the
international propagation of business cycles. Together, these four chapters can shed some
light on the “curious characteristics” of government debt and its policy implications.
With an outstanding volume of $45 trillion of marketable central government debt in
OECD countries, the sovereign bond market accounts for a large share of global financial
assets (OECD 2019). Though the market for government debt is therefore deep and liquid,
it is also subject to change and disruptions. Government bonds of economically developed
countries, once considered to be a nearly risk-free investment, have come under increased
scrutiny by market participants. The number of sovereign borrowers with AAA-rating by
Standard & Poor’s has dropped from 20 to only 12 between 2007 and 2017, as the financial and
Eurozone crisis have revealed flaws in the assessment of government bonds as near risk-free
(Financial Times 2017). By contrast, the number of countries rated below investment grade
has risen from 49 to 62. During the Corona-Pandemic, even the market for US Treasuries,
the world’s supposedly most liquid and safest financial asset, experienced severe disruptions
as uncertainty about the pandemic spread (Brookings Institution 2020).
Further controversy comes from ownership questions of sovereign debt. As noted by Arbogast
(2020), a disaggregated ownership structure of public debt holdings, mapping which house-
holds, banks and firms hold which amount of sovereign bonds, is difficult to come by, even
for official debt management offices. This issue can gain political traction, for instance if the
broader public has to bear the costs of government expenditure cuts implemented to service
a group of anonymous bondholders.
In general, having a more international investor base is associated with lower sovereign
bond costs and therefore targeted by public debt managers (Abbas et al. 2014). However,
foreign investors can also be a less stable source of funding that withdraws at the first signs
of economic stress, leading to spiking debt costs (Arslanalp & Tsuda 2014). What for some is
the “enforcement of market discipline” by international investors that require compensation




For the Eurozone, we know from aggregated data that financial integration up to 2007 led
to a more international investor base of government bond holdings (Bruegel 2019). However,
this trend reversed during the Eurozone crisis, as banks stepped in as buyers of sovereign
debt of their home country, particularly in crisis-hit countries, while international investors
withdrew cross-border holdings. A “doom loop” between weak sovereigns and banks emerged.
Consequently, several reform proposals intending to improve the Eurozone architecture aim at
reducing the home bias in sovereign bond exposures of banks through regulatory interventions
(Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). Given that, on the other hand, governments tended to perform
moral suasion on their banks to purchase government bonds, thus stabilizing yields, the issue
of exposure limits has led to fierce political debates (Altavilla et al. 2017).3 In sum, the
sovereign-bank loop became a major determinant in the integration process of the Eurozone
and will be the central theme of the second chapter of this thesis.
Whereas debt costs are important but often manageable for highly-rated countries, debt
burdens can be much more crucial issues for emerging economies. High debt costs bind
fiscal resources that could otherwise be used to fight poverty or foster health and education
systems. Debt reliefs for low-income countries are therefore frequently debated, and as of
1996 managed by the HIPC initiative of the IMF and World Bank (IMF 2020a).
In this context, the ability to service government bond obligations is not only a function
of fiscal expenditure risks, but also of the stability and strength of government revenues.
Countries can become dependent on key revenue sources, which can lead to political and
economic difficulties if the corresponding income streams are outside of government control
like in the case of commodities.
According to UNCTAD (2019), 102 out of 189 countries worldwide were considered
“commodity-dependent” between 2013 and 2017, implying that major parts of their exports
constitute of raw materials. Crucially, 91% of low-income countries fall under this classifica-
tion (UNCTAD 2019). Higher commodity prices have historically often shaped the boom-bust
dynamics of countries, leading first to capital inflows, stronger fiscal positions and expendi-
tures, but triggering crises and sovereign defaults once raw material prices decline (Reinhart
et al. 2016). The discussions on debt standstills or debt reliefs for low-income countries are
3In a panel discussion at the Halle Institute for Economic Research in 2020, one Member of the European
Parliament described the subject of sovereign bond exposure limits for banks in negotiations as “He who must
not be named”, referencing the Harry Potter book series, to highlight the political sensitivity of the issue.
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a direct consequence of their commodity-based economic structure (United Nations 2020).
Hence, Chapter 3 will investigate the implications of commodity prices on sovereign bond
conditions for emerging economies in greater detail.
The analysis of sovereign debt is also related to the integration of financial systems. As
financial markets can propagate business cycle swings, the success of policy responses towards
a common shock critically hinges on the degree of integration between financial systems.
National policies alone might be insufficient to fight common cyclical shocks or market-wide
financial crises. For economically integrated regions such as Europe, supranational approaches
might be a more promising way to prevent business cycle downturns.
For instance, one of the most important supranational measures against business cycle
downturns during the Euro and the Corona-crisis was the ECB’s monetary policy. In general,
central banks in advanced economies have stepped up as major buyers of sovereign debt
through their asset purchase programs known as quantitative easing. The ECB has acquired
Euro Area government bonds worth over 2,000 EUR billion with its public sector purchase
program between 2015 and 2020 and announced further bond purchases through its pandemic
emergency purchase program in 2020 of so far 1,350 EUR billion (ECB 2020a,b).
In the context of the Euro crisis, ECB President Mario Draghi’s 2012 commitment to
do “whatever it takes” was primarily targeted at easing turmoil and lowering premia in the
market for sovereign bonds (Draghi 2012). His announcement calmed bond markets and is
publically often attributed to saving the Euro (Financial Times 2019). Thus, a supranational
response was necessary to address a business cycle downturn in a region of highly integrated
financial markets. The importance of business cycle swings in integrated financial systems
will be the central theme of Chapter 4 of this thesis.
A further topic deals with the repayment of public debt. Government bonds, unlike traditional
loans, are not secured by collateral or other legal enforcement measures like covenants. In
contrast to corporate bonds, asset holders have much more limited claims towards a defaulting
sovereign than a defaulting firm (Panizza et al. 2009). As Eaton & Gersovitz (1981) point out,
nothing prevents governments from defaulting on their debt, except for the damage to their
reputation that would exclude them from further borrowing. Nevertheless, the literature
argues that sovereign debt contracts, especially for emerging economies, require sanctions
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and legal enforcement to make sure countries repay their creditors (Bulow & Rogoff 1989).
However, legal frameworks also have to apply for creditors, as certain investors could otherwise
engage in “holdout” strategies, that is, they refuse to engage in restructuring the debt of a
defaulting sovereign and demand full repayment. Today, these politically highly sensitive
legal issues for countries unable to repay their debt are often managed by “collective action
clauses” attached to sovereign bonds (Panizza et al. 2009).
A novel source of legal questions concerning sovereign bond repayment is posed by climate
change. Governments are increasingly facing legal consequences for not disclosing climate
risks in their sovereign bond disclosures (Bloomberg 2020). As global warming and natural
disasters can lead to a deterioration in the market price of sovereign debt for countries, rating
agencies have started incorporating climate change predictions into their sovereign rating
(Moody’s 2016). Chapter 5 of this thesis will analyze the nexus between climate change and
sovereign creditworthiness in greater detail.
All these observations, though they are partially anecdotal, illustrate the importance to un-
derstand the factors that shape the risks, fiscal costs and sustainability of sovereign debt,
as these issues entail significant implications for monetary policy, economic prosperity and
political stability. What ultimately decides if a country can manage its debt is whether it can
find buyers on financial markets to finance new government bonds, and on the financial con-
ditions they demand.4 Higher interest rates on government bonds can endanger the solvency
of a sovereign, hence the term “sovereign risk”. Since maturing government debt is rarely
repaid permanently, but typically rolled-over by issuing new bonds, the analyzed re-financing
costs are a crucial link between a country’s accumulated debt, its fiscal situation and current
bond market conditions and therefore of central importance for all governments (Buchheit
2020). To identify the economic factors on financial markets that affect sovereign risk, their
economic importance and the channels through which they drive government borrowing costs
is the central research contribution of this thesis.
4Assuming no direct sovereign financing via central banks.
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1.2 Outline and Contribution of this Thesis to the Literature
While the previous observations on the distribution, level, benefits or costs of public debt
sketched out the field on the analysis of sovereign risk, the following section describes in detail
the central contributions of this thesis.
The presented chapters apply panel regressions to empirically investigate key determinants of
sovereign risk. Higher sovereign risk (or declining sovereign creditworthiness), which is defined
as increasing sovereign bond interest rates, implies that it is more expensive for governments
to issue bonds. Previous research has shown that sovereign risk is to large degrees driven
by global factors such as US stock returns or the volatility index VIX (Longstaff et al.
2011). Nevertheless, even after controlling for global factors, country-specific macroeconomic
conditions such as terms of trade variation, trade openness or fiscal balances can affect the
sovereign risk level to a critical degree (Aizenman et al. 2016, Edwards 1984, Hilscher &
Nosbusch 2010). Furthermore, sovereign creditworthiness not only responds to economic news
but is also driven by a country’s political environment (Eichler 2014). Also, sovereign bond
pricing can have psychological elements, as investors can suddenly become more sensitive
towards a country’s economic fundamentals during a crisis, experiencing a “wake-up call”
(Beirne & Fratzscher 2013). Lastly, sovereign bond spreads might also spike excessively
beyond fundamental considerations, especially if financial markets are in states of panic and
overly pessimistic (Aizenman et al. 2013).
Chapter 2 of this thesis adds to the literature by improving the empirical identification of
one of the key drivers of sovereign risk in the Euro Area, i.e. the sovereign-bank loop.
The corresponding paper is co-authored with Stefan Eichler and published in the Journal of
Financial Stability. Bank distress and sovereign distress can reinforce each other, for instance
if expensive bank bailouts weaken the fiscal capacity of the government. The economic
identification of the risk transmissions between banks and sovereigns in the previous literature
is therefore subject to reverse causality and other endogeneity concerns such as unobserved
Eurozone exit risks (e.g. Acharya et al. (2014), Altavilla et al. (2017)).
The chapter contributes to the literature by isolating the bank-to-sovereign distress chan-
nel within the sovereign-bank loop, thus overcoming reverse causality effects. To do so, we
collect stock prices of 132 Eurozone banks from 1999 to 2016 for nine Eurozone member coun-
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tries. We subsequently build asset-weighted bank stock returns for each country that serve
as bank distress measures. In the following, we instrument bank distress using non-Eurozone
stock market returns that are weighted according to the claims of the Eurozone banking
sector towards the respective non-Eurozone country. These exposure shocks, approximating
Eurozone bank losses or asset write-downs in foreign markets, are unlikely to be affected by
domestic sovereign risk variation. We take additional steps to address potentially endogenous
disturbances in the identification by using fixed bank claim data or dropping non-Eurozone
markets that depend heavily on credit from the Euro Area. The resulting foreign exposure
shocks prove to be a strong instrument for Eurozone bank distress.
With this novel identification at hand, we estimate a statistically significant transfer of
instrumented bank distress on sovereign distress. Bank risk was therefore one of the major
causes of the Eurozone crisis, not just a by-product or correlation, which is an important
finding for the literature and policy debate. However, the isolated bank-to-sovereign risk
transmission is significantly smaller than the corresponding OLS regression. This result sug-
gests that reverse causality and other biases are indeed present in the unadjusted estimation
of the sovereign-bank loop.
In an appendix to the second chapter, we also estimate the drivers of the bank-to-sovereign
risk transmission. The corresponding specification refers specifically to the Eurozone crisis
from 2009 to 2016. We find that countries with less stable macroeconomic conditions, im-
paired financial sectors and higher political uncertainty feature a statistically significantly
stronger transfer of bank-to-sovereign distress. All these results are important contributions
to the literature and the political debate on a more sustainable Eurozone architecture.
Chapter 3 of the thesis analyses the role of international commodity prices as one of the key
determinants of sovereign risk for emerging economies. It is co-authored with Stefan Eichler
and Stefan Giessler. While the importance of commodity prices for business cycles is well
documented (see Fernández et al. (2018)), less is known about their impact on sovereign
risk and in particular the drivers of the commodity-sovereign risk relationship. We therefore
contribute to the literature, first, by building a portfolio of weighted commodity price returns,
in which a country’s commodity export shares form the respective weights. This measure
on its own is statistically significant in explaining sovereign risk, which we measure by daily
changes in the Emerging Market Bond Index Spread (EMBI) for a panel of 34 emerging
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economies from 1994 to 2016. The effect also holds when we control for exporters with
world-market power, when taking imported commodities into account or when measuring
export performance as an index instead of a return variable.
Using interaction models, we observe that countries with greater commodity export shares
have a stronger effect of commodity prices on their sovereign risk level. Next to this intuitive
result, we find that energy commodities lead to stronger, while exporting industrial metals
to a weaker commodity dependence. Other commodity-specific characteristics, such as the
price volatility of the commodities or their diversification within the portfolio are of less
importance. Furthermore, we uncover that commodity dependence increases in times of
recessions and when public and private sectors lack fiscal resources. Also, countries with a
more stable repayment history of sovereign debt are subject to lower commodity dependence.
Turning to the policy measures that could mitigate commodity dependence, our results
show that improving institutional quality is associated with statistically significantly lower
effects of commodity prices on sovereign risk. Better institutions could therefore be important
by providing clear ownership rights in the extraction process and by spending the revenues
from commodity exports efficiently. In addition, fostering manufacturing sectors, invest-
ments in physical capital and infrastructure, attracting FDI inflows, opening trade accounts
and accumulating international reserves are all strongly associated with lower commodity de-
pendence. All these results are important extensions to the literature and provide guidance
for policy makers.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of financial market integration on business cycle synchro-
nization in Europe. Co-authored with Julia Schaumburg and Lena Tonzer, the paper ad-
dresses the question if more financial integration leads to converging business cycles (such as
in Imbs (2006)) or diverging business cycle patterns (such as in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013)).
The former explanation could be at work if financial markets transmit shocks across a net-
work of integrated countries, while the latter effect could emerge when a recession in one
country causes lower bank lending to local firms, as integrated financial markets redirect
funding towards economies that are not in crisis.
We collect data on financial integration, measured by cross-border bank claims, for 10 Eu-
ropean countries from 1996 to 2017. Our contribution to the literature consists of a dynamic
spatial network approach. Following Blasques et al. (2016), we construct financial linkages
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between countries as a matrix that reflects time-varying economic distances. Financial inte-
gration among countries is thus not only measured between country-pairs, as in the previous
literature, but for a network of countries. In this way, we take endogenous feedback effects of
countries’ GDP fluctuations into account. A second advantage is that the dynamic modeling
structure estimates a time-varying parameter that approximates the sign and strength of
business cycle co-movement that is due to financial integration and can thus shed a light on
the conflicting result in the previous literature.
We start by investigating the spillover degree of GDP growth for our panel countries.
The dynamic parameter shows graphically that financially more integrated countries tend to
have on average positive business cycle synchronization. However, the effect size depends
crucially on time and industry. During crises periods, such as the financial or the Euro crisis,
financial integration leads to much higher co-movements of European business cycles than
in calmer times. Furthermore, by disentangling overall GDP growth into the value-added of
different industries, we show that business-sensitive sectors such as wholesale & retail trade or
industrial production are driving these results. On the other hand, industries like construction
or agriculture have roughly constant and rather small spillover effects over time. Industries
that are largely nationally regulated such as public administration or arts & entertainment
do not show any signs of dynamic spillovers in our model, which is a reasonable result.
Since we observe on average converging business cycle effects due to financial integration,
in particular in times of crisis, our results suggest that focusing on national approaches to
stabilize business cycles has likely limited effects. Supranational policy measures, such as the
European Banking Union, are thus an important addition to deal with international shocks.
The final Chapter 5 contributes to a novel strand of literature. In this single-authored pa-
per, I show that climate change risks can impair the sovereign creditworthiness of emerging
economies. In face of rising temperatures due to climate change, further warming and increas-
ing weather irregularities can likely lead to a deterioration in the market price of sovereign
debt for countries that are susceptible to these trends (Bank of England 2018).
In this chapter, I link the literature on temperature fluctuations, which shows that higher
temperatures lead to lower GDP growth, firm productivity and political stability (Burke et al.
2015, Dell et al. 2012, Hsiang et al. 2013, Zhang et al. 2018) with the literature on sovereign
bond performance. I draw long-term monthly temperature data since 1901 for a panel of
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54 emerging economies. Next, I calculate the deviation of a country’s observed temperature
since 1994 from the historical average of temperature of this country between 1901 and 1950.
This measure approximates the degree of global warming experienced so far, and averages
around 0.84C which is close to the estimations of the IPCC (2018).
I subsequently regress EMBI data on a monthly frequency from 1994 to 2018 on a coun-
try’s temperature deviation. My results indicate that temperature increases can statisti-
cally significantly impair sovereign creditworthiness, but only for susceptible countries. More
specifically, I find that countries that already have a warm climate suffer significantly more
from further warming with respect to their sovereign risk level. In addition, countries with
a low quality of institutions bear statistically significantly larger sovereign risk burdens from
rising temperatures than nations with better institutions. Stronger institutional quality is
therefore important, for instance when swift and efficient decisions are required after a nat-
ural disaster or to handle the distributional consequences of climate change. Importantly,
the institution-channel and the warmness-channel hold simultaneously, which implies that
all countries can adapt to climate change risks by improving their institutional quality even
after controlling for their general warmness.
In sum, my methodological contribution is, first, to investigate novel channels of sovereign
risk. The impact of banking distress on sovereign risk (Chapter 2) has only gained traction
since the financial and Euro crisis. Chapter 5, analyzing the effects of physical climate risks
on sovereign risk, is indeed one of the first papers in this field.
Second, I strive for consistent and if possible exogenous effects by testing sovereign risk de-
terminants that are outside of government control, such as temperature fluctuations (Chapter
5) or international commodity prices (Chapter 3). In case of the sovereign-bank relationship
in Chapter 2, an instrumental variable approach to isolate the global variation in bank risk
that is outside of government control is applied. I do not claim to derive causal effects like in
quasi-natural experiments, as these are rare on a country-level. Nevertheless, my empirical
specifications address the major threats to a clear statistical inference by appropriate control
variables and fixed effects, alternative specifications and several robustness tests.
Third, the effort for stronger identification is enhanced by applying high-frequency daily
or monthly financial market data. Other than macroeconomic statistics, finance data is
published without delay. Furthermore, it can shed some light on the underlying causes of
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sovereign bond turbulences. For instance, using direct stock data of Irish banks in 2010 can
give a more timely and precise picture to describe Irish sovereign risk than the resulting
32% to GDP fiscal deficit mentioned in the introduction. Moreover, higher data frequencies
reduce endogeneity concerns further, as financial market participants have to treat, for in-
stance, the institutional quality of a country on a given day as fixed, other than in yearly
or quarterly regressions. Lastly, using financial market data motivates the fourth chapter of
this thesis which deals with the synchronization of business cycle fluctuations due to financial
integration.
I derive policy contributions by testing a comprehensive set of macroeconomic, financial, or
institutional channels for the respective sovereign risk relationship, which is informative for
policy makers. For instance, in Chapter 3, I find that the impact of a country’s commodity
performance on sovereign risk can be mitigated if the country improves its institutional
quality and fosters downstream production technologies. The methodology of interaction
regressions used to derive these results have, if correctly applied as described by Brambor
et al. (2006), strong statistical properties that allow for consistent inferences (Bun & Harrison
2019, Nizalova & Murtazashvili 2016).
In sum, this thesis attempts to present consistent and well identified empirical estimations,
that analyze meaningful determinants of sovereign risk, while investigating which politically
relevant channels drive the respective sovereign risk connection.
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A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
In accordance with §10 (3) 4-6 PromO2018, I will describe in the following my individual
contributions to all chapters of this thesis.
For Chapter 2, the main research idea was developed jointly with my co-author Stefan Eichler.
While Stefan Eichler had the initial idea to investigate country-specific bank distress in the
Euro Area in the spirit of Buch & Neugebauer (2011), we both recognized the importance
to apply an instrumental variable approach and that foreign exposure shocks could be an
appropriate candidate. I further worked on strengthening the instrument’s exogeneity, by
applying fixed exposure weights, dropping the most credit-dependent Eurozone borrowers
and by orthogonalizing the instrument with respect to Eurozone-specific variation. We both
agreed to use sovereign bond spreads towards Germany as our dependent variable.
Moreover, I collected all data on sovereign bond spreads, bank stock returns, banks’ for-
eign exposures as well as financial market control variables. Additionally, I conducted all
regressions, both for the benchmark and for the channels of the bank-to-sovereign distress.
Therefore, I was responsible for the specific regression design in terms of fixed effects, win-
sorizing of variables or the choice of control variables, which was finalized in consultation
with Stefan Eichler. We jointly decided to focus on the size difference between the IV and
the OLS estimation as one of the key contributions of the paper. While Stefan Eichler guided
the process, I was responsible for working out the different channels of the bank-sovereign
relationship, and grouping them into macroeconomic, government bond, banking sector and
political categories. In addition, I tested several methodological approaches suggested by
Stefan Eichler on how to best capture the determinants of bank-to-sovereign distress, for
instance, by drawing the quarterly betas of the benchmark regression and applying them
as a new dependent variable. In the end, we jointly decided to apply an interaction model
as the most appropriate method. I also developed all robustness tests, for instance to use
bank-specific shocks as an alternative instrument, since this variation is less affected by trade
shocks or other outside influences. Furthermore, I wrote the first draft of the paper including
tables, graphs and the literature review, to which Stefan Eichler provided valuable comments
and suggestions and re-drafted certain parts.
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Regarding Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Stefan Eichler and Stefan Giessler, the pa-
per’s main idea to test for the effect of commodity prices on sovereign risk, by applying
a country-specific export-weighted commodity portfolio, was already formulated by Stefan
Eichler. However, I contributed to the project’s idea, first, by strengthening the exogeneity
of the baseline effect. I suggested and carried out to lag the export weights by one year to
avoid multicollinearity with the commodity prices, to test for the impact of commodity ex-
porters with world market power and to take the effect of commodity imports into account. I
also implemented a test in which I transformed the commodity performance variable into an
index in the spirit of a difference-in-difference model. While Stefan Giessler collected data on
the commodity exports of every country, my second major contribution to the project was the
collection of all remaining data, i.e. EMBI spreads, commodity prices, control variables and
conditioning variables used to describe the channels of the commodity-sovereign risk relation-
ship. I also matched the commodity export products with the best available corresponding
commodity price and calculated the resulting commodity portfolios. Third, I estimated all
regressions in the paper and tested for different channels driving our benchmark. I also came
up with the idea to test the diversification of the commodity portfolio and its standard devi-
ation of prices as possible drivers. With Stefan Eichler providing feedback, we jointly decided
to group the chapters on the estimated channels into commodity-related, macroeconomic and
policy-related subsections. Fourth, I drafted the first version of the paper including all tables
and graphs, which was supplemented and re-drafted in certain parts by Stefan Eichler. I
conducted an extensive literature review, to which Stefan Eichler and Stefan Giessler both
added several papers to the final version. Also, Stefan Giessler carried out a different method
to estimate the channels of the commodity-sovereign risk relationship, which we, however,
did not use in the final paper.
For Chapter 4, co-authored with Lena Tonzer and Julia Schaumburg, both co-authors had
developed a broad research outline of the paper when I joined the project. The paper should
be an application of Blasques et al. (2016), which is co-authored by Julia Schaumburg, with
respect to financial integration. I started contributing to the project, first, by conducting an
extensive literature review. By doing so, we could work out the conflicting effects of financial
integration on business cycle synchronization in previous papers. Furthermore, my review of
the literature gave us insights on the most appropriate data sources for our paper, for instance
13
Chapter 1
to use the locational banking statistics by the Bank for International Settlement as a measure
for financial integration. Lastly, my overview showed us that, next to the methodological side,
a focus on industrial sector production was, with the exception of one paper, so far lacking
in the literature.
While the model specification of the dynamic spatial approach was handled by Julia
Schaumburg, my second major contribution to the project was the collection of data. I
drew data on financial integration, industrial value added and several control variables such
as productivity growth from different sources. In addition, I constructed the time-varying
matrices that measured financial integration in our network of countries which would directly
feed into Julia Schaumburg’s spatial model. Third, I applied Julia Schaumburg’s code to
estimate the dynamic spatial model. In doing so, I also included the final set of control
variables, which was decided jointly with Lena Tonzer. I tested a vast amount of model
specifications, for which I discussed the results with Lena Tonzer and the technical details of
the model with Julia Schaumburg, who subsequently adjusted the code to determine the most
appropriate specification. We jointly discussed the final results included in the paper, while
the economic interpretation and the embedding of our paper in the literature were headed
by Lena Tonzer and me.
The writing process was shared among all authors, with Lena Tonzer initiating a first
draft. I added several tables of data, results and summary statistics to the paper, as well as
descriptions on the data sources and several comments and redrafts to improve the paper,
which marks my fourth contribution to the project. Further result tables and graphs on
the estimated spillover parameters as well as the model description were provided by Julia
Schaumburg.
Chapter 5 of this thesis is single-authored. Hence, all data collections, estimations and
drafting choices were handled by me. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that I also
developed the research question on climate risks and sovereign creditworthiness on my own.




References to Chapter 1
Abbas, S. A., Blattner, L., De Broeck, M., El-Ganainy, M. A. & Hu, M. (2014), ‘Sovereign
debt composition in advanced economies: A historical perspective’. International Monetary
Fund WP/14/162.
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I. & Schnabl, P. (2014), ‘A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and
sovereign credit risk’, The Journal of Finance 69(6), 2689–2739.
Aizenman, J., Hutchison, M. & Jinjarak, Y. (2013), ‘What is the risk of European sovereign
debt defaults? Fiscal space, CDS spreads and market pricing of risk’, Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance 34, 37–59.
Aizenman, J., Jinjarak, Y. & Park, D. (2016), ‘Fundamentals and sovereign risk of emerging
markets’, Pacific Economic Review 21(2), 151–177.
Altavilla, C., Pagano, M. & Simonelli, S. (2017), ‘Bank exposures and sovereign stress trans-
mission’, Review of Finance 21(6), 2103–2139.
Arbogast, T. (2020), ‘Who are these bond vigilantes anyway? The political economy of
sovereign debt ownership in the Eurozone’. MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 20/2.
Arslanalp, S. & Tsuda, T. (2014), ‘Tracking global demand for advanced economy sovereign
debt’, IMF Economic Review 62(3), 430–464.
Bank of England (2018), ‘Transition in thinking: The impact of climate change on the UK
banking sector’.
Beirne, J. & Fratzscher, M. (2013), ‘The pricing of sovereign risk and contagion during the
European sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of International Money and Finance 34, 60–82.
Bénassy-Quéré, A., Brunnermeier, M., Enderlein, H., Farhi, E., Fuest, C., Gourinchas, P.-O.,
Martin, P., Pisani-Ferry, J., Rey, H., Schnabel, I. et al. (2018), ‘Reconciling risk sharing
with market discipline: A constructive approach to Euro Area reform’. CEPR Policy Insight
No. 91.
Blanchard, O. (2019), ‘Public debt and low interest rates’, American Economic Review
109(4), 1197–1229.
Blasques, F., Koopman, S. J., Lucas, A. & Schaumburg, J. (2016), ‘Spillover dynamics for
systemic risk measurement using spatial financial time series models’, Journal of Econo-
metrics 195(2), 211–223.




Borensztein, E. & Panizza, U. (2009), ‘The costs of sovereign default’, IMF Staff Papers
56(4), 683–741.
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R. & Golder, M. (2006), ‘Understanding interaction models: Im-
proving empirical analyses’, Political Analysis pp. 63–82.
15
Chapter 1
Brookings Institution (2020), ‘How did COVID-19 disrupt the market for U.S.
Treasury debt?’. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/05/01/
how-did-covid-19-disrupt-the-market-for-u-s-treasury-debt/.
Bruegel (2019), ‘Whose (fiscal) debt is it anyway?’. Bruegel Blog, http://bruegel.org/
2019/02/whose-fiscal-debt-is-it-anyway/.
Buch, C. M. & Neugebauer, K. (2011), ‘Bank-specific shocks and the real economy’, Journal
of Banking & Finance 35(8), 2179–2187.
Buchheit, L. (2020), ‘From coronavirus crisis to sovereign debt crisis’. Fi-
nancial Times, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/03/25/1585171627000/
From-coronavirus-crisis-to--sovereign-debt-crisis/.
Bulow, J. I. & Rogoff, K. (1989), ‘Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?’, The American
Economic Review 79(1), 43–50.
Bun, M. J. & Harrison, T. D. (2019), ‘OLS and IV estimation of regression models including
endogenous interaction terms’, Econometric Reviews 38(7), 814–827.
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M. & Miguel, E. (2015), ‘Global non-linear effect of temperature on
economic production’, Nature 527(7577), 235–239.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F. & Olken, B. A. (2012), ‘Temperature shocks and economic growth: Ev-
idence from the last half century’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4(3), 66–
95.
Draghi, M. (2012), ‘Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at
the global investment conference in London 26 July 2012’. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
Eaton, J. & Gersovitz, M. (1981), ‘Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical
analysis’, The Review of Economic Studies 48(2), 289–309.
ECB (2020a), ‘Asset purchase programmes’. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/omt/html/index.en.html#pspp.
ECB (2020b), ‘Pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)’. https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html.
Edwards, S. (1984), ‘LDC’s foreign borrowing and default risk: An empirical investigation’,
The American Economic Review 74(4), 726–734.
Eichler, S. (2014), ‘The political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads’, Journal of
International Money and Finance 46, 82–103.
Fernández, A., González, A. & Rodriguez, D. (2018), ‘Sharing a ride on the commodities
roller coaster: Common factors in business cycles of emerging economies’, Journal of In-
ternational Economics 111, 99–121.




Financial Times (2019), ‘Draghi’s ECB tenure: Saving the euro, faltering on inflation’. https:
//www.ft.com/content/a62b221c-eb64-11e9-a240-3b065ef5fc55.
Hilscher, J. & Nosbusch, Y. (2010), ‘Determinants of sovereign risk: Macroeconomic funda-
mentals and the pricing of sovereign debt’, Review of Finance 14(2), 235–262.
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M. & Miguel, E. (2013), ‘Quantifying the influence of climate on human
conflict’, Science 341(6151), 1235367.
Imbs, J. (2006), ‘The real effects of financial integration’, Journal of International Economics
68(2), 296–324.
IMF (2020a), ‘Factsheet: Debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries (hipc)
initiative’. https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/
Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative.
IMF (2020b), ‘The IMF’s response to COVID-19’. https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/
imf-response-to-covid-19#Q1.
IPCC (2018), ‘Global Warming of 1.5C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (summary for policy-
makers)’, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change .
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Papaioannou, E. & Peydró, J.-L. (2013), ‘Financial regulation, finan-
cial globalization, and the synchronization of economic activity’, The Journal of Finance
68(3), 1179–1228.
Laeven, L. & Valencia, F. (2018), ‘Systemic banking crises revisited’. IMF Working Paper
18/206.
Longstaff, F. A., Pan, J., Pedersen, L. H. & Singleton, K. J. (2011), ‘How sovereign is
sovereign credit risk?’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3(2), 75–103.
Marx, K. (1894 [1992]), Capital: volume III, Penguin UK.
Moody’s (2016), ‘Environmental risks - sovereigns: How Moody’s assesses the physical
effects of climate change on sovereign issuers’. https://www.moodys.com/research/
Moodys-sets-out-approach-to-assessing-the-credit-impact-of--PR_357629.
Nizalova, O. Y. & Murtazashvili, I. (2016), ‘Exogenous treatment and endogenous factors:
Vanishing of omitted variable bias on the interaction term’, Journal of Econometric Meth-
ods 5(1), 71–77.
OECD (2019), ‘Sovereign borrowing outlook for OECD countries’. OECD Sovereign Borrow-
ing Outlook 2019.
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F. & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009), ‘The economics and law of sovereign
debt and default’, Journal of Economic Literature 47(3), 651–98.
Reinhart, C. M., Reinhart, V. & Trebesch, C. (2016), ‘Global cycles: Capital flows, com-




Smith, A. (1776 [2010]), The Wealth of Nations: An inquiry into the nature and causes of
the Wealth of Nations, Harriman House Limited.
Tooze, A. (2020), ‘Time to expose the reality of “debt market discipline”’. Interna-
tional Politics and Society, https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/europe/article/
show/time-to-expose-the-reality-of-debt-market-discipline-4381/.
UNCTAD (2019), ‘The state of commodity dependence 2019’. United Nations conference on
trade and development.
United Nations (2020), ‘Commodity exporters face mounting economic challenges as pan-
demic spreads’. UN/DESA Policy Brief 60.
Zhang, P., Deschenes, O., Meng, K. & Zhang, J. (2018), ‘Temperature effects on productiv-
ity and factor reallocation: Evidence from a half million Chinese manufacturing plants’,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 88, 1–17.
18
Chapter 2:
Avoiding the Fall into the Loop: Isolating the Transmission of
Bank-to-Sovereign Distress in the Euro Area
Abstract: While the sovereign-bank loop literature has demonstrated the amplification be-
tween sovereign and bank risks in the Euro Area, its econometric identification is vulnerable
to reverse causality and omitted variable biases. We address the loop’s endogenous nature and
isolate the direct bank-to-sovereign distress channel by exploiting the global, non-Eurozone re-
lated variation in banks’ stock prices. We instrument banking sector stock returns in the
Eurozone with exposure-weighted stock market returns from non-Eurozone countries and take
further precautions to remove Eurozone-related variation. We find that the transmission of
instrumented bank distress to sovereign distress is around 50% smaller than the corresponding
coefficient in the unadjusted OLS framework, affirming concerns on endogeneity. Despite the
smaller relative magnitude, increasing instrumented bank distress is found to be an economi-
cally and statistically significant factor for rising sovereign fragility in the Eurozone.
2.1 Introduction
The fatal relationship between bank and sovereign distress in the Eurozone, the sovereign-
bank loop, has put the political and economic survivability of the currency union to the
test. Bank distress started to amplify sovereign distress in particular with the beginning
of the Eurozone crisis, as expensive financial sector bailouts weakened the fiscal capacity
of sovereigns (bailout channel). In addition, deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness was
transmitted to domestic banks’ balance sheets through their vast holding of government debt
securities. Impaired by these negative shocks, banks holding larger amounts of sovereign
debt from GIIPS countries are associated with reducing credit supply, thus hampering general
economic activity (sovereign-bond channel). Ultimately, distressed banks made further public
rescue efforts more likely which once again endangered sovereign solvency. Taken together,
both channels place the sovereign-bank loop as one of the primary reasons for the escalation
of the Eurozone crisis as well as the sluggish economic recovery of the Eurozone after the
financial crisis (Brunnermeier et al. 2016).
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In light of these interlinkages, the identification of isolated channels within the sovereign-
bank loop remains challenging given reverse causality between bailout and sovereign-bond
channel and Eurozone-specific omitted variables such as Eurozone exit risks, implicit guar-
antees, political risks, and other institutional specifics. In this paper, we propose a novel in-
strumental variable approach to isolate the transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress within
the loop, thereby addressing the endogenous nature of the sovereign-bank relationship.
To this end, we collect stock returns of 132 banks in the Eurozone to construct country-
specific bank distress measures for nine members of the Euro Area. We instrument these
bank returns on the country level using non-Eurozone stock market returns weighted with the
bilateral claims of the Eurozone country’s banking sector against the respective non-Eurozone
country taken from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. These imported exposure shocks
indicate, if negative, loan losses or asset write-downs for banks in the respective market
and thus drive stock returns of Eurozone banks. More importantly, our instrument is less
likely to be affected by sovereign risk of the respective member state or Eurozone-specific
unobservables since we exploit risks from outside the Eurozone (the weighted average of non-
Eurozone returns) and take additional steps to remove any Eurozone related variation in
them. More specifically, we use claim data from 1999:Q1 to rule out that Eurozone banking
sectors endogenously shifted their international credit exposure as a response to the financial
or Euro crisis. We also drop all non-Eurozone countries in the construction of the instrument
if they depend heavily on financing from a Eurozone country and might therefore react more
distinctly to Eurozone bank distress. Lastly, we orthogonalize the instrument with respect
to Eurozone-specific variation of stock returns, thus removing any Euro-related correlation
in the instrument. Our approach therefore isolates as precisely as possible the effects of non-
Eurozone-driven exposure shocks affecting Eurozone banking sector distress which ultimately
impacts sovereign distress.
One further potential concern for our identification strategy could be that non-Eurozone
stock returns may have an effect on Eurozone sovereign risk that is not transmitted through
the banking system, thereby violating the exclusion restriction of the instrument. For in-
stance, the deterioration of the economic stance in a non-Eurozone country indicated by
falling stock returns could be associated with worsening export opportunities and thus higher
sovereign spreads of an Eurozone country. To remedy this concern, first, we control for non-
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financial stock market returns for each Eurozone country which should account for real eco-
nomic shocks to the Eurozone country’s economy, for instance due to deteriorating economic
conditions of a non-Eurozone trading partner. Second, we control for the nominal effective
exchange rate of the Euro, which should account for trade shocks affecting the Euro Area.
We conduct further robustness tests to address this concern. First, we repeat our baseline
estimation with non-Eurozone stock market returns consisting only of bank stocks as such
bank-specific shocks are more likely to be transmitted only through the banking sector of
a country, in line with the exclusion restriction. Second, we construct a measure of trade-
specific shocks and add it as an additional control variable. Third, we drop countries with
significant claims against the considered Eurozone country. For example, negative shocks
in non-Eurozone countries with large holdings of Eurozone sovereign bonds may be associ-
ated with selling pressure and hence direct price losses on Eurozone sovereign bond prices.
While this effect may not be entirely transmitted by Eurozone banks, excluding non-Eurozone
countries with significant claims against the respective Eurozone country from our instrument
should rule out this channel. All robustness tests confirm our main results. While we cannot
categorically rule out further channels that could be a threat to the exclusion restriction,
such as trade finance shocks, these robustness tests suggest that they are unlikely to disturb
our main results.
We empirically test the hypothesis if bank distress instrumented by foreign exposure
shocks is a statistically significant determinant of Eurozone sovereign risk. Our analysis
uncovers an economically meaningful and highly statistically significant impact of the instru-
mented banking sector distress of a Euro Area country on its sovereign distress level. A one
standard deviation increase in the instrumented national-specific bank distress of a Eurozone
country leads to a rise in national sovereign distress by 0.0828 standard deviations on average.
Banking sector distress was therefore a dominant factor for the propagation of the Eurozone
crisis. However, the risk transmission coefficient from our instrumental variable (IV) regres-
sion is around 50% smaller than the one obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and
both coefficients differ in a statistically significant manner. This result points to an afore-
mentioned bias due to omitted variables and/or reverse causality which are unaddressed in
the OLS framework. The gap between instrumented and non-instrumented coefficients re-
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mains when limiting the sample to the Eurozone crisis, using different dependent variables,
measures for bank distress, data frequencies and other versions of the instrument.
Using our instrumental variable setting, we contribute to the literature by improving
the identification of the transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress. Our results allow the
conclusion that isolated bank distress is a dominant factor for the escalation and severity of
the Eurozone crisis. Our analysis suggests that it is important to distinguish between the
bailout and the sovereign bonds channel since both channels amplify each other when using
OLS which leads to sizeable reverse causality. From a policy perspective, we provide evidence
that banking sector stress is not just a by-product of the Eurozone crisis but one of the major
factors or even potential causes for its propagation.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we conduct a literature
review on related articles and highlight the contribution of our paper. Section 2.3 describes
the data we use and the construction of the instrument. Following on this, Section 2.4 presents
our empirical strategy and compares results from the OLS framework to the IV estimation.
We conduct encompassing robustness checks in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This article is related to a large body of literature that has studied the feedback loop between
bank and sovereign distress during the Eurozone crisis. In their seminal paper, Acharya
et al. (2014) show that with the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2009-10 and the private-
to-public risk transfers during the financial crisis, sovereign and banking distress started
to positively intensify each other. This bailout-channel likely emerges from the fact that
governments might face insolvency themselves if they allocate vast fiscal means for the rescue
of an ailing and potentially too-big-to-fail banking sector. Alter & Schüler (2012) find results
in accordance with this channel. Gerlach et al. (2010) research the determinants of rising
sovereign bond spreads in the Euro Area and find that the balance sheet size of a country’s
banking sector relative to the country’s GDP to be a significant determinant of rising sovereign
bond spreads relative to Germany.
The sovereign-bond channel is constituted by several incentives banks face to hold do-
mestic government debt. This effect is shaped by the zero risk weight of such assets in the
calculation of banks’ capital ratios (the risk shifting hypothesis, see Acharya & Steffen (2015),
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Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger & Hirsch (2018), Buch et al. (2016), Kirschenmann et al. (2017)),
political pressure by their home governments (the moral suasion hypothesis, see Becker &
Ivashina (2017), De Marco & Macchiavelli (2016), Ongena et al. (2019)), monetary policy
interventions (Crosignani et al. (2020), Drechsler et al. (2016)) or a combination of these
factors (Altavilla et al. (2017), Horváth et al. (2015)). In the context of the sovereign-bank
loop, banks’ inclination towards government debt of their home state might stabilize their
sovereign’s bond spread as the domestic banking sector acts as a “buyer of last resort” for
these securities (see Crosignani (2017)). However, the sovereign-bond-channel also constitutes
a direct transmission of increasing sovereign distress to bank balance sheets which might im-
pair banks’ lending activities. In accordance with this channel, Popov & Van Horen (2015)
and Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger & Hirsch (2018) find that banks that hold larger exposures of
sovereign debt by GIIPS countries issue less credit to non-financial firms.
Our research is furthermore connected to Battistini et al. (2014) who split sovereign risk
into a country-specific and a common component. The authors find evidence that banking
sectors in periphery countries, but not core countries, respond to increases in the country-
specific risk factor by expanding their holding of domestic sovereign debt. Comparably, we
focus in our analysis on country-specific banking sector distress that captures idiosyncratic
variation in the bank stock returns of a country. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) study the
contagion between bank and sovereign risks during the Eurozone crisis and find that lower Tier
1 ratios on the banking and higher debt-to-GDP ratios on the country level are connected to
stronger contagion. Schnabel & Schüwer (2016) investigate the relationship between financial
and sovereign risk over time and find that the magnitude of the loop was largest in the period
between 2010 and 2013 before it contracted somewhat while gaining new momentum in 2016.
Fratzscher & Rieth (2019) highlight the two-way causality between banking and sovereign
distress in a VAR-approach and find that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policies and
bank bailout announcements reduced credit risks of sovereigns and banks. Singh et al. (2016)
also use bank distress measures based on stock market data to investigate the direction of
bank-to-sovereign and sovereign-to-bank distress transfers and find evidence for both types of
spillovers. Though they identify spillovers based on Granger causalities, both our paper and
Singh et al. (2016) find that with the beginning of the financial and Euro crisis, the spillover
direction from banks to sovereigns became more forceful. Nevertheless, as we show in Section
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2.5.1, the difference between isolated bank-to-sovereign transfers and the unadjusted OLS
framework remains substantial, even with the onset of the Euro crisis. Breckenfelder &
Schwaab (2018) also recognize difficulties in handling the two-way dependence of bank and
sovereign risks and use the ECB’s stress test results from 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment
to isolate bank-sovereign distress spillovers, finding that bank risks in stressed countries spilled
over to non-stressed countries. Kallestrup et al. (2016) use a measure comparable to ours
by multiplying the international exposures of a country’s banking sector derived from BIS
consolidated statistics with the banking or sovereign risk of the respective foreign country.
However, they do not use this measure as an instrument for national bank distress, but rather
to show correlations between domestic and foreign bank risk. Furthermore, and in contrast to
Kallestrup et al. (2016), our focus is in particular on the sovereign-bank loop in the Euro Area
as this currency union is special compared to countries with independent monetary policy and
national currencies (see also De Grauwe & Ji (2013)). Despite these differences, the results
between our paper and Kallestrup et al. (2016) are comparable: Whereas they report that an
increase by one standard deviation in bank risk leads to a rise in the standard deviation of
sovereign risk by 25%, this value is at 8.3% in our IV framework. This smaller magnitude is
likely because we control for reverse causality factors and have a longer sample period starting
in the (calmer) year 1999. In sum, we aim to contribute to the literature by proposing a
novel instrumental variable setting to improve the identification of the transmission of bank-
to-sovereign distress, thereby adding an additional layer of exogeneity to the above literature.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Deriving Country-Specific Bank Distress
Our banking sector distress measure is based on daily stock returns of publicly-traded banks
in the nine major Eurozone (EZ) countries5 for the period of 1999-2016. Hence, we include all
major events since the introduction of the Euro, such as the financial crisis and the Eurozone
crisis. We include all frequently traded Eurozone banks available from Datastream during
our observation period, arriving at 132 banks in total (see a list of the banks and their mean
5Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. We have to exclude
Germany as it is the reference country in the construction of the dependent variable, i.e. sovereign return
spreads. However, we include German banks for the construction of Eurozone-specific variables further below.




asset size in the Appendix in Table A.2.7). The mean asset sizes of the banks indicate that
we have financial institutions of various sizes. Given that our bank distress measure is based
on asset weights, our results are driven by large international banks that are likely to respond
to non-Eurozone exposure shocks as captured in our instrument.
Weighted bank stock returns are a simple measure for the fragility or distress of a country’s
banking sector. The bank stocks in our panel are frequently traded, making the stock price
an easily observable and daily available measure. In the absence of new stock issuances or
buy-backs, stock price movements correspond to changes in the market value of the equity of
a bank. Falling stock prices can therefore be a clearer signal for a deterioration of a bank’s
fundamentals, as measured by the market, than balance sheet items which vary only quarterly
and are subject to the reporting habits by the regulator.6 It is also common in the financial
literature to use buy-and-hold stock returns as a measure for a bank’s performance over a
certain period (see Beltratti & Stulz (2012), Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011)) and it is intuitive
to assume that a poor performance by a large, potentially too-big-to-fail bank has an adverse
impact on sovereign creditworthiness. Lastly, stock market data has been frequently used to
measure bank fragility in similar contexts (Bongini et al. (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga
(2013), Eichler & Sobański (2016), Gropp et al. (2006)).
Though CDS spreads are also a common distress measure for banks, we choose stock
returns, first, because they were more liquid during the crisis. Using CDS would force us to
drop several Greek or Portuguese banks in the analysis as their CDS spreads turned illiquid.
Second, stock returns are a better match for our instrument which relies on the international
exposure of a banking sector towards all borrowers of a country, i.e. they encompass all
sectors, whereas CDS spreads are sector-specific. Third, stock returns are more accurate to
incorporate future profit expectations than CDS premiums. Imported stock return shocks as
we construct them should therefore encompass international economic activity more broadly
than CDS spreads.
We weight the daily stock return of each bank with its yearly total asset share on its
home country level and then aggregate these weighted return series of a country’s banking
6For instance, in September 2015 Moody’s (2015) downgraded Greek banks to C despite their CET1
equity ratios being fairly above the regulatory requirement (e.g. 12.1% in the case of National Bank of
Greece). However, a major part of this equity consisted of state preference shares and deferred tax assets
which are considered to be low-quality equity. The banks’ stock prices, on the other hand, had been declining
for months at this point.
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sector for each country  in our sample (). This step provides us with a daily
measure for bank distress on the country level in which the largest banks of the respective
country have the greatest weight.7
However, the bank stock returns from which each country’s return series is built will be
subject to national, Eurozone and global variation in stock prices and economic activities.
In the Eurozone, banking distress after the common shock of the financial crisis often took
place on a national level, such as Ireland’s bank bailout in 2010, Spain’s nationalization of
Bankia in 2012 or Italy’s series of rescue packages for its ailing banking sector in 2015 and
2016. This national component of bank distress, separated from common financial distress
affecting all EZ states at the same time, will likely react more strongly to country-specific
macroeconomic or political factors. In order to construct a measure for bank distress on the
country level that is only driven by national and global factors, i.e. to remove the Eurozone
component in stock prices, we proceed as follows:
Similarly to the bank return series on the country level, we derive a Eurozone-specific
return series by weighting the bank stock returns of our nine Eurozone sample countries and
Germany with their asset share on the Eurozone level, i.e. of the asset size of all banks in
our panel, and subsequently aggregate all weighted returns on the Euro Area level. Since
this return series will still feature a global component of stock prices, we orthogonalize this
Euro Area return series with respect to a Datastream bank stock return series for all global
banks, except those from the Euro Area. Doing so, we clean the Eurozone bank returns from
worldwide, non-Eurozone variation in stock prices and therefore isolate the Eurozone-specific
component in bank stocks ().
Finally, we follow the approach of Buch & Neugebauer (2011) and subtract these Eurozone-
specific bank returns from the derived bank stock return series for each Euro Area country ,
arriving at a bank distress measure that picks up country-specific variations of bank distress,
separated from common financial distress affecting all Eurozone states similarly.8 We multi-
7We set the return of a bank to missing if the bank was delisted or taken over to control for survivorship
bias. We also disregard stock returns when there was no turnover of the stock. If the stock return of a bank
in a given quarter was missing for more than seven consecutive trading days, we set all returns of the bank
in the respective quarter to missing in order to avoid jumps in the indices we construct in the following. This
procedure affects mainly small banks with low trading volumes and is not critical for our results.
8We subtract the Eurozone-specific returns to be as close as possible to Buch & Neugebauer (2011). In
a robustness check, we also remove Eurozone-specific returns by orthogonalization. Both distress measures
correlate at almost 99% and we arrive at nearly identical results.
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ply with minus one to interpret the returns as a distress measure, for which higher values of
the distress measure indicate higher levels of distress.
∆ = (1)  (  ) (1)
Though we receive similar results if we apply our following analysis to the unadjusted
, as shown in the robustness section, we have reason to believe that the
national-specific bank distress measure approximates more precisely for the observed events
of idiosyncratic bank distress, e.g. during the Eurozone crisis.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of ∆NationalBankDistress for the five GIIPS coun-
tries three months before different key events of banking sector turmoil during the crisis,
showing in all cases considerable distress on average and elevated standard deviations.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of country-specific bank distress three months before events of
financial sector turmoil during the Eurozone crisis
∆NationalBankDistress Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Ireland: 09/16/2010–12/16/2010
(when EU-IMF bailout was signed) 66 0.604 1.096 4.132 -6.709 6.974
Spain: 03/09/2012–06/09/2012
(when EU-IMF bailout was agreed upon) 63 0.328 0.197 1.398 -2.363 4.306
Portugal: 05/03/2014–08/03/2014
(when bailout for Espirito Santo was announced) 65 0.322 0.576 2.597 -6.709 6.974
Italy: 04/29/2016–07/29/2016
(when ECB stress test results were announced
in which Italian banks performed poorly)
66 0.238 0.462 2.506 -5.944 6.974
Greece: 01/26/2010–04/27/2010
(when Greece was downgraded to junk status) 61 0.384 0.244 3.164 -6.709 6.974
∆NationalBankDistress are asset-weighted bank stock returns, winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. See
Table A.2.10 for all data sources. Source Ireland: IMF (2010); source Spain: New York Times (2012);
source Portugal: Reuters (2014); source Italy: Financial Times (2016); source Greece: Reuters (2010).
2.3.2 Instrumenting Bank Distress using Exposure-Weighted Stock Market Re-
turns
Our goal is to derive a variation in  that is, first, unaffected by
omitted variables representing Eurozone-specific developments or risk attitudes. Secondly,
the instrument should not increase simultaneously with national sovereign distress of the
respective Eurozone country, thus limiting the biasing impact of reverse causality. In a
nutshell, a valid instrument to identify the transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress in the
Eurozone needs to have a strong correlation with national bank distress (relevance condition)
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and affect sovereign distress only through its impact on national bank distress while being
uncorrelated with unobserved factors in the error term (exclusion restriction).
We argue that economic shocks that occur outside the Euro Area but directly impact
the credit exposure and thereby the performance of EZ banks can fulfill these criteria, as
discussed in the following.9 We measure imported fragility from outside the EZ by focusing
on stock returns of non-EZ countries where the respective EZ banking sector is invested in
and weight these returns using the bilateral claims of the respective EZ banking sector.
Using the Consolidated Banking Statistics of the BIS, we collect the consolidated claims of
a Eurozone country’s banking sector  against all borrowers (banks, official sector, non-bank
private sector) of a non-Eurozone country . These claims are a suitable approximation for the
international credit exposure of a country’s banking sector as they aggregate all international
claims, including those from banks’ foreign affiliates, consolidated on the bank’s headquarter
level. In order to avoid banks’ endogenous shifting of their international claims, for instance
due to the financial or Euro crisis, we fix each weight at the first observation of 1999, i.e. the
start of our sample period.10 Also, we exclude the direct claims between Eurozone countries
since they are subject to common Eurozone crisis factors and distress spillovers which is
precisely the correlation we want to avoid.
We focus on the BIS’s immediate counterparty basis claims as they cover the longest
time window.11 Since we require both the BIS exposure data towards and stock return
series of a non-Eurozone country, we end up with 47 countries outside the EZ. The list
of countries can be found in the Appendix (Table A.2.8) and covers the most important
markets for Eurozone banks. Our data shows that the exposure towards these non-Eurozone
countries, when converted to Euro, makes up on average 15.5% of the total asset size of a
country’s banking sector over our sample period, and is therefore meaningful enough to have
an economic impact on its financial sector performance. Table 2.2 shows this ratio for all
countries in the estimation.
9For example, a New York Times (2013) article from January 31, 2013 reports that Spanish bank Santander
“now generates half of its earnings in Latin America’s emerging economies” and that “a slowdown in Brazil
and Mexico, combined with financial troubles in Europe, weighed on Santander’s earnings last year.” As a
consequence “shares in Santander fell 2.3 percent in morning trading in Madrid on Thursday after the bank’s
fourth-quarter earnings fell below analysts’ expectations.”
10Data points before are of worse quality. For Portugal, Greece and Ireland, the first BIS claim weight is
reported in 1999:Q4, 2003:Q4 and 2006:Q1 respectively. We fix the weights of these countries at these points
in time.
11The BIS statistics show occasionally small gaps in the claim data. For statistics that use the full time
period, we interpolate the data.
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Table 2.2: Banking sector exposure towards non-Eurozone countries to total bank assets
Austria Belgium France Greece Ireland Italy NetherlandsPortugal Spain
15.9 19.7 15.0 11.3 11.9 6.53 27.8 6.14 22.6
Ratio (in %) between a banking sector’s BIS immediate counterparty claims towards non-Eurozone coun-
tries in Table A.2.8 and total bank assets (mean of 1999-2016 sample period).
However, one concern with the selection of non-Eurozone countries could be that some
markets may depend heavily on credit supply from a Euro Area banking sector. As such
countries might react more distinctly to Euro-related events, we define a criterion to be
included in the final exposure portfolio: We list the claims of all the BIS’s creditor countries
(including those outside the Euro Area) towards a non-Eurozone country. We identify all
creditors that hold the 90th percentile or more of the claims towards this non-Eurozone
market. If a Eurozone country is at any point in our sample period a “large creditor” towards
a non-Eurozone country based on this definition, this non-Eurozone country is removed from
the Eurozone country’s exposure portfolio.12
The claim of each EZ country  towards a non-EZ country  () in 1999
is then set in relation to the total claims of  towards all  countries (excluding “large”







 is therefore a measure for the importance of a non-Eurozone country  in the
portfolio of the banking sector in Euro country  at beginning of our sample period.
In order to measure the distress of the exposure, we then multiply this weighting factor
with a daily-varying stock market return series of country :
 =    (3)
We use broad stock market series that encompass all industries of the respective non-Eurozone
country so that the exposure weights match the stock returns by covering all sectors of the
economy. Finally, these exposure weighted returns are aggregated on the country level of
each country  to construct a series of .
12Table A.2.9 in the appendix lists the “large creditor/borrower” pairs. In a robustness test, we alternatively
drop European countries not part of the Euro Area and find similar results.
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A final step we carry out to construct our instrument concerns the issue that international
stock returns could be partially driven by Eurozone events due to the significance of the
currency union for the global financial system. To deal with this concern, we aim to remove
the Eurozone-specific component in global stock returns. To this end, we orthogonalize
 towards , i.e. the bank return series on the
Eurozone level we derived in Section 2.3.1 that approximates pure Eurozone bank distress.13
We have reason to believe that our measure of exposure-weighted bank returns from
outside the Eurozone is a valid instrument to isolate bank-to-sovereign distress shocks. First
of all, bank stock returns in open economies such as the Eurozone have a sizeable global
component and should therefore likely be affected by exposure-weighted return series from
other countries. Negative shocks transmitted from these non-EZ markets can hurt EZ banks,
e.g. by loan losses, asset write-downs or currency losses. Secondly, because these shocks are
imported from other countries not part of the Euro currency area, they are less likely to
be affected by unobserved factors regarding Euro Area politics or a Euro country’s national
sovereign fragility. The exogeneity is further strengthened as the final instrument is purged
from Eurozone-specific bank return variation, uses fixed claim data from the beginning of the
sample period and is removed of all non-Eurozone countries that depend heavily on Eurozone
bank funding.
2.3.3 Set of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
2.3.3.1 Dependent Variable
Similar to Gerlach et al. (2010) and Singh et al. (2016) sovereign distress is measured as the
spread between the 10-year sovereign bond return of an EZ country and the 10-year sovereign




Higher values indicate higher levels of sovereign distress. Data is taken from Datastream.
Figures 2.1 to 2.5 depict ∆NationalBankDistress and ∆SovereignDistress for the five GIIPS
13We conduct a different test specification to remove the Eurozone-specific variation in the robustness
section and find similar results.
14A robustness check using yields instead of returns yields similar results.
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countries over different 3- or 4-month periods which include several events that affected bank
and sovereign distress in the respective country. All figures show that our measures for bank
and sovereign distress are highly positively correlated and respond to key events during the
Eurozone crisis.15 We again prefer bond yields over CDS spreads since some CDS turned
illiquid during the Euro Area crisis which would require to disregard e.g. Greece from the
analysis. However, we also use CDS spreads of sovereigns as a dependent variable in the
robustness section and find similar effects.
Figure 2.1: Bank distress (based on ∆NationalBankDistress) and sovereign distress (based
on ∆Sovereign Distress) in Italy from May 1st 2016 to August 1st 2016
Figure 2.2: Bank and sovereign distress in Spain from April 1st 2012 to July 1st 2012
15Sources Italy: The Guardian (2016), CNN (2016); sources Spain: Financial Times (2012), Reuters (2012),
New York Times (2012), The Guardian (2012); sources Portugal: The Guardian (2011a), The Guardian
(2011b), Financial Times (2011); sources Ireland: The Guardian (2010b), New York Times (2010), The
Guardian (2010e), Moody’s (2010); sources Greece: CNBC (2010), The Guardian (2010a), The Guardian
(2010d), Reuters (2010), The Guardian (2010c).
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Figure 2.3: Bank and sovereign distress in Portugal from May 1st 2011 to August 1st 2011
Figure 2.4: Bank and sovereign distress in Ireland from September 1st 2010 to January 1st
2011




In order to control for the impact of daily developments in financial markets that could
influence both sovereign and bank distress, we introduce a broad set of explanatory variables
to capture international, European and national financial market developments. Definitions
and sources of all control variables can be found in Table A.2.10.
Global factors have been shown to drive sovereign creditworthiness to a sizeable degree
(Longstaff et al. 2011). We therefore control for the VIX to capture the implied volatility of
US equity markets to capture volatility, “fear”, or increased risk premiums in US financial
markets. We also control for the US term spread, i.e. the yield spread of a 10-year US
treasury bond and a 3-month T-Bill which approximates the premium investors receive for
long-term investments.
On a European level, we control for changes in the VSTOXX which capture similar
volatility dynamics than the VIX but are based on the EuroStoxx50. We expect increases
in the VSTOXX to be associated with heightened financial market volatility and thus rising
sovereign distress. Also, we incorporate the nominal effective exchange rate of the Euro
into our analysis, i.e. the weighted exchange rate of the Euro against the Eurozone’s most
important trading partners. This variable represents movements in the external value of
the Euro. A lower external value could indicate better export opportunities for firms in
the Eurozone which could lead to lower sovereign distress. However, a depreciation of the
Euro could also be the result of negative news shocks regarding the Eurozone crisis that
are associated with higher sovereign spreads. We use the nominal effective exchange rate
provided by JP Morgan but our framework is robust towards the version of other providers.
The ECB’s monetary policy, especially its unconventional programs, is likely to impact
both sovereign and bank distress. In order to account for these effects, we use the current
account holdings of EZ banks at the ECB as a measure for the general stance of monetary
policy. The current account holdings are the sum of banks’ required and excess reserves held
at the ECB and expanded considerably as a consequence of the central bank’s asset purchase
programs, i.e. SMP and PSPP. We believe expansionary monetary policy that is visible in
the current account holdings to have a negative impact on sovereign spreads.
The term spread on a Eurozone-level might differ in its informativeness regarding short-
and long-term interest rates compared to the US version. Hence, we also control for the
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spread between a 7-10 year FTSE MTS Eurozone government broad yield, which is designed
to be a measure of the overall interest rate level in the Eurozone government bond market,
and the 3-month Euribor rate.
Finally, we want to account for macroeconomic factors on the country level that go beyond
the financial sector impact picked up by our bank distress measure. If, for instance, firm dis-
tress due to the recession in the Eurozone drives up sovereign spreads and impairs the banking
sector through non-performing loans, not controlling for these effects could hamper our sta-
tistical inferences. We therefore include each EZ country’s stock return index comprising
non-financial firms in our panel, provided by Datastream, as a covariate. As we are inter-
ested in the non-financial-specific variation of these stock prices and not the co-movement
with banking sector distress, we orthogonalize the non-financial stock returns towards the
bank distress measure of every country. That way, which is similar to the approach of Beck
et al. (2017), we are provided with a measure of stock return shocks specific to the real-sector
of a country. In order to separate these shocks further from common Eurozone-wide ef-
fects, we, similar to our construction of country-specific bank distress, also orthogonalize the
non-financial stock returns with respect to a total Eurozone stock return series provided by
Datastream. The resulting returns are now both country- and non-financial-sector-specific.
We test our model also for other versions of this variable in the robustness section and find
concordant results.
All variables we use are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to alleviate the impact
of outliers. Subsequently, the variables are standardized to ease the interpretation of the
estimated economic effects. As a rule of thumb, we use variables in natural logs that have no
sensible meaning in the un-manipulated level, such as bank stock or sovereign bond prices
or exchange rates. Variables in percentages such as spreads or interest rates have a natural
meaning in levels therefore we do not use them in logs. Since most variables in levels and log
levels are not stationary, we use all (logged) variables in first differences. Summary statistics
of the non-standardized variables can be found in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics of all variables used in the main empirical specification
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
∆SovereignDistress 42,192 0.00191 0 0.393 -1.670 1.728
∆NationalBankDistress 40,555 0.0442 -0.00306 2.020 -6.709 6.974
NonEZStockReturns 38,999 0.00723 0.0471 1.047 -3.443 3.034
∆Vstoxx 42,246 -0.0130 -0.0600 1.502 -4.480 5.130
∆VIX 42,255 -0.00682 -0.0400 1.386 -4.170 5.030
∆NominalExchangeRate 42,255 0.000518 0 0.369 -1.015 1.003
∆CurrentAccountHoldings 42,255 -0.196 -0.100 9.835 -33.45 60.99
∆USTermSpread 42,255 0.000441 0 0.0603 -0.162 0.192
∆EurozoneTermSpread 42,255 6.96e-05 0 0.0403 -0.110 0.122
NonFinancialStockReturns 40,561 0.00144 0.00511 0.919 -2.698 2.664
Sample period is 01/01/1999–31/12/2016. All variables are in daily growth rates, winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile and depicted in non-standardized format. See Table A.2.10 for definitions and sources.
2.4 Empirical Specification and Results
To get a first indication of the effect of national bank distress on sovereign distress we
estimate the following OLS regression for all nine Eurozone countries in our panel from
 = 01011999  12312016:
∆ = 1∆ +∆() + + +  (5)
∆ measures the daily sovereign bond return of EZ country  minus Ger-
many’s sovereign bond return. ∆ measures the country-specific
banking sector returns. Both distress measures enter with converted signs so that higher
values indicate higher levels of distress. ∆() encompass all explanatory variables
introduced in the previous section, specified either in simple first differences or natural log
first differences.  are country fixed effects to address the possibility that both sovereign
creditworthiness and financial sector distress are driven by time-invariant country-specific
unobservable factors, such as customs and culture in the financial market structure and reg-
ulation. We also include time fixed effects  on the quarter-year level to alleviate concerns
that our results are influenced by time-specific market-wide developments that have a com-
mon effect on all countries. We cluster standard errors at the country level to allow for the
correlation of unobserved factors in the error terms within countries. We expect a positive
1, i.e. higher levels of banking sector fragility are associated with higher sovereign distress.
However, as highlighted above, a fundamental shortcoming of this OLS approach is that it
produces possibly biased estimates of 1 as it could be prone towards reverse causality between
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bank and sovereign distress and unable to control for unobserved crisis-related factors driving
both distress sources. We use an IV regression to address these endogeneity concerns. The
first and second stage of the IV approach are as follows:
∆ = 1+∆()+++ (6)
∆ = 1∆  +∆() + + + (7)
Controls and fixed effects refer to the same variables used in the OLS framework. The
instrument  measures the exposure weighted stock returns of non-
EZ countries, against which the respective Eurozone banking sector holds claims. We run
OLS and IV over those points in time for which both approaches have overlapping data to
allow a direct comparison. By drawing the predicted values from the first stage regression
( ), we explicitly exploit the variation in bank distress in the Euro-
zone that is due to international returns in stock markets that are tailored to the exposures
of Euro Area banking sectors. Our approach tests two hypotheses: First, if bank distress
instrumented by foreign exposure shocks affects Eurozone sovereign distress, which can be
ascertained by the  coefficient of the second IV-stage. Second, if OLS
and IV estimates of the sovereign-bank loop significantly differ, which can be detected by the
difference in coefficient magnitudes of  of both approaches.
The results of the OLS and the IV estimation are reported in Table 2.4. All variables
are standardized which eases the interpretation of the relative economic significance of the
variables. The estimated outcomes of the first IV stage in column (2) suggest that our in-
strument of exposure-weighted stock returns in non-Eurozone countries is highly statistically
significant in explaining national-specific banking sector distress of Eurozone countries. An
increase of exposure-weighted non-EZ stock returns by one standard deviation is associated
with a decrease in national-specific bank distress by 0.427 standard deviations on average.
The F-statistic of 143.19 suggests that the instrument is unlikely to be weak. Comparing the
standardized coefficients reveals that our instrument is by far the most influential determinant
of national banking sector distress with a standardized coefficient of -0.427. The standardized
coefficients of the VSTOXX (0.169) and VIX (-0.042) are much smaller (other determinants
are statistically insignificant) underlining the economic importance of our instrument.
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The second stage, reported in column (3), estimates the impact of the predicted values of
national-specific bank distress on sovereign distress.16 We find that the isolated transmission
of imported bank distress to sovereign distress in the IV regression is both economically and
statistically highly significant at the 1% level: An increase of instrumented national-specific
banking sector distress by one standard deviation yields a 0.0828 standard deviation increase
in sovereign distress. This result speaks in favor of the hypothesis that non-EZ exposure
returns affect EZ bank distress, which then impacts sovereign distress. While the effect is
sizeable, it is, however, substantially lower than the corresponding OLS coefficient of 0.167
reported in column (1). The instrumental variable coefficient is thus around 50% lower than
the corresponding OLS estimate. Both coefficients are statistically significantly different at
the 10% level.17 These results, addressing our second hypothesis, suggest that estimating the
sovereign-bank loop with simple OLS could lead to an over-estimation of the corresponding
coefficients due to reverse causality or omitted variables.
Judging the relative economic importance of determinants of sovereign distress reveals
that the standardized impact of the instrumented national banking sector distress (being
0.083) is lower than the standardized impact of the VSTOXX, the exchange rate, and the
term spreads of the Eurozone and the US, while the standardized impact is higher than for
the non-financial stock return, current account holdings, and the VIX.
We believe that this procedure is the most thorough way of isolating the bank-to-sovereign
distress channel as our instrument takes only non-Eurozone shocks into account and these
shocks are calculated with constant exposure weights, disregard Eurozone-dependent borrow-
ers and are purged from Eurozone-specific variation. Our results indicate that concerns about
reverse causality and potentially omitted variable bias in the sovereign-bank loop literature
are likely valid as both IV and OLS coefficients differ by a significant order of magnitude.
However, since the isolated bank-to-sovereign distress coefficient is statistically and economi-
cally significant, we provide evidence that banking sector distress was not just a by-product or
a correlation, but a major factor and likely cause for deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness
in the Euro Area and for instance during the Eurozone crisis.
16We estimate both stages in a single procedure to receive correct standard errors. However, in this way
the predicted values from the first stage are not standardized when they enter the second stage and thus the
coefficient size cannot be compared to the OLS version. As a solution, we estimate both IV stages separately
and standardize the predicted values to receive comparable coefficient sizes, while extracting standard errors
from the conventional 2sls manner. Also, note that the second stage of an IV typically does not report 2.
17Chi-squared of 3.04; this test also corresponds to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
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Regarding the control variables, we find reasonable signs and significance levels on all
specifications. One questionable sign could be the negative impact of the VIX on sovereign
distress in both the IV and the OLS estimation. However, this effect only emerges once
the VSTOXX is included as a covariate. This result indicates that the VIX picks up the
remaining international market volatility. Significance levels suggest that controlling for
market volatility in Europe through the VSTOXX is more important than international
volatility in the VIX.
2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Comparison of IV and OLS during Eurozone Crisis
While we run our main regression from 1999 onward to exploit maximum data availability,
we focus in this subsection on the bank-to-sovereign distress transfer during the Euro crisis
that started in 2009. To make the comparison between OLS and IV estimation as precise
as possible, we winsorize, standardize and orthogonalize all our variables only for the post
2008 period. Furthermore, we use fixed BIS exposure from 2007:Q1, as they are likely more
informative than 1999:Q1 weights we used so far.
Results are reported in Table 2.5. For the first stage of the IV estimated for the years 2009
to 2016, we obtain a coefficient of non-Eurozone stock returns of 0.395 with an F-value of
111.28 reported in column (1) of Table 2.5. The instrument is therefore still highly statistically
significant albeit slightly smaller than for the full sample. For the second stage of the IV
estimation, the standardized coefficient of bank distress is at 0.112 and statistically significant
at the 1% (column (2)). This larger coefficient compared to the baseline is reasonable, given
that bank-to-sovereign distress transfers were especially pronounced during the Euro crisis.
The corresponding OLS coefficient is 0.199 and thus the relative difference in the size of
the coefficients is comparable to our main specification (column (3)). However, given the
shorter estimation period, this difference in magnitudes is more noteworthy, as IV and OLS
coefficients are now statistically different from another at the 3% level. Hence, if anything,












∆VIX -0.00968* -0.0421* -0.00807
(0.00486) (0.0185) (0.00575)
∆USTermSpread -0.0988*** -0.00920 -0.0990***
(0.0244) (0.00570) (0.0232)
∆Vstoxx 0.151*** 0.169** 0.154***
(0.0325) (0.0583) (0.0352)
∆NominalExchangeRate -0.108*** 0.0142 -0.108***
(0.0239) (0.0354) (0.0233)
∆EurozoneTermSpread 0.108*** -0.00945 0.108***
(0.0154) (0.00552) (0.0142)
∆CurrentAccountHoldings -0.0156*** 0.00257 -0.0156***
(0.00343) (0.00361) (0.00327)
NonFinancialStockReturns -0.0736* 0.0353 -0.0731**
(0.0329) (0.0773) (0.0300)
Constant -0.0264* -0.0396 0.0317**
(0.0136) (0.0242) (0.0133)
Observations 37,794 37,794 37,794
R-squared 0.112 0.273
Number of Countries 9 9 9
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
2 between OLS and IV
of ∆NationalBankDistress 3.04*
This table shows the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress for 9 Eurozone coun-
tries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) during the pe-
riod 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2016. ∆SovereignDistress is the daily change in the natural logarithm
of a country’s 10-year government bond index relative to Germany’s respective bond index change.
∆NationalBankDistress are asset-weighted bank stock returns on the country-level minus asset-weighted
bank stock returns on the Eurozone-level. Estimated coefficients in (1) are from least squares regression.
Column (2) instruments ∆NationalBankDistress with weighted stock market returns from non-Eurozone
countries that are weighted according to the BIS claims of the Eurozone country towards all borrow-
ers in the respective non-Eurozone country (NonEZStockReturns). Column (3) shows the 2nd stage of
this IV regression in which ∆NationalBankDistress refers to the predicted values from (2). ∆VIX is the
daily change in the VIX volatility index, ∆USTermSpread is the daily change between the 10-year US
Treasury yield and the 3-month T-Bill yield, ∆Vstoxx is the daily change in the Vstoxx volatility in-
dex, ∆NominalExchangeRate is the change in the natural logarithm of the nominal effective exchange
rate of the Euro, ∆EurozoneTermSpread is the daily change in the spread between a Eurozone 7-10
year broad yield and the 3-month Euribor yield, ∆CurrentAccountHoldings is the daily change in the
natural logarithm of current account holdings (i.e. minimum and excess reserves held by banks at the
ECB) and ∆NonFinancialStockReturns are the daily changes in the natural logarithm of a country’s
non-financial stock market returns, which are orthogonalized towards ∆NationalBankDistress and total
stock market returns in the Eurozone. 2 shows the test statistic for the statistical difference between
∆NationalBankDistress in the OLS and the IV estimation. All variables are standardized and winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. All columns include country and time fixed effects on the quarterly level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable definitions and sources.
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Observations 18,213 18,213 18,213
R-squared 0.175 0.275
Number of Countries 9 9 9
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
2 between OLS and IV
of ∆NationalBankDistress 4.77**
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress with
respect to the estimation period, which ranges from 01/01/2009 to 12/31/2016 to capture the Euro crisis.
In contrast to Table 2.4, this specification also winsorizes, orthogonalizes and standardizes all data from
2009 onward. Fixed BIS claim weights are from 2007:Q1. Estimated coefficients in (1) are from least
squares regression. Column (2) instruments ∆NationalBankDistress with weighted stock market returns
from non-Eurozone countries (NonEZStockReturns). Column (3) shows the 2nd stage of this IV regression.
2 shows the test statistic for the statistical difference between ∆NationalBankDistress in the OLS
and the IV estimation. All variables are standardized and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 9
Eurozone countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
All columns include country and time fixed effects on the quarterly level and the daily control variables
discussed in Table 2.4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable
definitions and sources.
2.5.2 Alternative Versions of the Dependent Variable
We perform a range of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the robustness of our results. First,
we replace the sovereign bond return spreads with sovereign bond yield spreads. Also, we
conduct the estimation using the 5-Year CDS premium of the respective country minus the
5-Year CDS premium of Germany (both quotes in US dollars) as the dependent variable to
show that are our results do not depend on using government bonds as a sovereign fragility
indicator. For the CDS version, we have to disregard Greece from the analysis, as its CDS rate
turned illiquid during the course of the Euro crisis. Also, CDS data only starts around 2008
which shrinks our sample considerably. Although this limits the comparability to our baseline
somewhat, we want to make sure that our main results are broadly intact when using CDS
data. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.6 report the second stages of the IV-2SLS regressions
with the results of the versions using sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads. We find similar
results on both specifications compared to our baseline. Most control variables enter with the
same sign and significance. More importantly, the coefficient of instrumented bank distress
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has the same level of statistical significance and a comparable size in all specifications, in
particular for sovereign yields, though it is slightly larger when using CDS spreads.
Table 2.6: Robustness: alternative versions for dependent variable
(1) (2)
∆Sovereign


















Number of Countries 9 8
Time & Country FE Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on forms of ∆SovereignDistress
with respect to the dependent variable in the main specification. Columns show the second stage of the
IV-2SLS estimation in which country-specific bank distress of 9 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) is instrumented using exposure-weighted
non-Eurozone stock returns from 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2016 according to Table 2.4. Column (1) uses the
spread in 10-year sovereign bond yields between a country and the German rate as a dependent variable.
Column (2) repeats the analysis with the 5-year CDS rate of a country with respect to the German CDS
rates. Due to data constraints, this specification excludes Greece and starts in 2008. All variables are
standardized and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All columns include country and time fixed
effects on the quarterly level and the daily control variables discussed in Table 2.4. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable definitions and sources.
2.5.3 Alternative Versions for Bank Distress Variable
Next, we check if the effects we derived were due to our definition of national-specific bank
distress. We therefore repeat the baseline analysis using the weighted bank stock returns on
the country level but without subtracting any Eurozone-specific component (,
here multiplied times minus one).18 Column (1) in Table 2.7 shows that the instrument for
this estimation is also strong and highly significant. Results in column (2) yield a highly
18To estimate in accordance with our baseline approach, we now orthogonalize the non-financial returns on




statistically significant effect of instrumented bank distress on the second stage of the IV. The
coefficient is somewhat larger than in the baseline which could undermine our conjecture that
the original OLS version seems to overestimate the transmission of distress in the sovereign-
bank loop. Therefore, column (3) reports the OLS estimation using the same unadjusted
bank distress on the country level as a right-hand side measure of interest. In this case, the
respective coefficient is also larger in size and surpasses the IV coefficient by almost 50%. This
finding suggests that we can maintain our presumption that our IV specification accounts for
the reverse causality and omitted variable biases present in the OLS estimation.
One further concern could be the way in which we removed the Eurozone-specific variation
from the bank distress variable. We chose to subtract the Eurozone return index to follow
as close as possible to Buch & Neugebauer (2011). However, one could also eliminate the
EZ component by means of orthogonalization. Columns (4)-(6) in Table 2.7 show the two
IV stages and the OLS estimation when following this approach. The results are extremely
close to our baseline and the IV and OLS coefficients differ to a very similar degree.
2.5.4 Alternative Versions for Instrumental Variable
The next concern we address is the orthogonalization of the instrument by which we removed
the Eurozone-specific variation in Section 2.3.2. We used the Eurozone return index we de-
rived beforehand and orthogonalized it towards a world stock return series that excludes
the EZ. As an alternative, we also utilize a previously derived variable, namely the total
(i.e. not country-specific) bank returns of Eurozone countries constructed in Section 2.3.1
(). We conduct a principal component analysis based on these bank returns
of all EZ countries. The first component, approximating return variation that is common for
all Eurozone countries, explains roughly 59% of the total variation. In order to isolate the
Eurozone-specific part of the variation, we once again orthogonalize this first principal com-
ponent with respect to the same world bank stock return series that excludes the EZ. Finally,
we clean the instrument of this Eurozone-specific component by means of orthogonalization.
The results of this different elimination procedure for both IV stages are reported in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2.8 in which we find almost identical results compared to our baseline.
Another potential concern related to our IV specification could be the removal of credit-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eurozone countries in the exposure portfolio of a Eurozone country if this Eurozone country
held at any point in our sample period more than 90th percentile of the total international
claims towards the respective non-Eurozone country. Another way to remove countries that
are economically close to the Euro Area and could face Eurozone crisis spillovers is to simply
remove all EU countries which do not have the Euro as their main currency from the sample
as they share similar institutions and regulation with the rest of the Eurozone (though several
of these countries are also affected when removing the credit-dependent nations). We do so
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.8, while otherwise specifying the instrument in the same
way as before. Though the instrument is slightly weaker in the first stage, our main results
are unaffected by this exercise.
Lastly, we consider the reverse case to the “large borrower” criterion we set up. Instead
of removing non-EZ countries from the portfolio of an EZ country if the EZ country’s claims
against this non-EZ country exceed the 90th percentile of claims for this non-EZ market, we
now disregard a non-EZ country if it is a “large” credit supplier to the EZ country, i.e. if the
bilateral BIS liabilities of the EZ member vis-a-vis the respective non-EZ member is at the
90th percentile or above.
Such cases cover, for instance, countries that hold a lot of Eurozone sovereign debt, which
could have impacted certain banking sectors during the Euro crisis. Moreover, shocks in the
non-EZ country could have a direct price effect on EZ sovereign bonds due to large sovereign
bond holdings, which are not transmitted by the EZ banking sector. In practice, this criterion
affects mainly the US and the UK, but also Japan. One drawback of this specification is that
the BIS reports claims towards Eurozone countries only for 14 members from our sample
of non-EZ countries. Despite this limited comparability, we report (columns (5) and (6) in


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.5 Strengthening the Exclusion Restriction of the Instrument
One key assumption of the instrumental variable approach is that the instrument, in our
case exposure-weighted stock market returns from non-EZ countries, affects the dependent
variable, sovereign creditworthiness, only through the instrumented variable, i.e. an EZ
country’s banking sector distress. A potential concern for our identification strategy could
be that non-EZ stock return shocks are transmitted to EZ sovereign distress through other
channels than banking sectors. For instance, real economic downturns in a non-EZ country
that are visible in falling stock returns could spill over to firms in a country of the Eurozone
and worsen its sovereign creditworthiness, independent of banking sector claims. This effect
could be more pronounced if the countries share stronger trading relationships. In this case,
the exclusion restriction of the instrument would be violated.
Though we cannot categorically reject this channel, we have reason to believe that our
approach is robust to these concerns. First, we already control for non-financial stock market
returns of every EZ country which should account for real economic shocks transmitted
to or stemming from any EZ economy. In addition, we also control for potential trade
shocks affecting the Euro Area by including the nominal effective exchange rate of the Euro.
We thereby account for non-financial shocks transmitted to sovereigns that could otherwise
bypass the banking sector in our instrumental variable approach. Second, several papers show
that trade or trade openness is not statistically significantly related to sovereign distress of
Euro Area countries (Aizenman et al. (2013), Beirne & Fratzscher (2013)), suggesting that
such shocks or any remaining biasing effect in our instrument would be limited in size.
We conduct further robustness tests to strengthen the exclusion restriction of the in-
strument. First, we build a version of exposure-weighted non-EZ stock market returns that
consists only of bank stocks. By focusing on bank-specific stock market shocks of a non-EZ
country as an instrument, it is less likely that this approach transmits distress to sovereign
creditworthiness through non-financial sectors or trade-specific channels that could otherwise
be present in the total stock market returns of a non-EZ country. Simply put, banking sector
shocks of a non-Eurozone country are more likely to affect EZ sovereign creditworthiness in
no other ways than through the banking sector of a Eurozone country. We construct this
alternative specification in the same way as our baseline. Results in Table 2.9 column (1)
show that the instrument is similar to the baseline in the first stage. Column (2) reports a
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slightly larger and still highly statistically significant second stage coefficient of instrumented
bank distress that is close to our baseline. This result suggests that alternative channels of
how non-EZ stock market shocks could affect sovereign creditworthiness in other ways than
bank distress are, if present, limited in size and not critical for our results.
In a further robustness check, we aim to control directly for trade-related shocks. To do
so, we construct an export-weighted non-financial stock market variable: export volumes of
EZ to non-EZ countries are drawn from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. We construct
export weights that approximate the importance of a trading partner country in the same way
as the BIS weights in Section 2.3.2. We multiply the export importance of a non-EZ country
towards an EZ country with a non-financial stock market return series of the former since this
variable is closer to capture real-economic variation that affects the trading performance of
a country. Since we are interested in the trade-specific variation of this variable and not the
co-movement with stock returns captured in the instrument, we orthogonalize the trade shock
measure towards our instrumental variable. The trade shock variable enters our baseline as an
additional control variable. Results in column (3) of Table 2.9 show that trade-specific stock
market returns enter statistically significantly in the first stage of the instrument, indicating
that trade-specific shocks drive part of the variation in EZ bank distress. However, while
the instrument remains statistically significant in the first stage, column (4) shows that the
second stage coefficient of instrumented bank distress is nearly identical to our baseline while
the export-weighted returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero. There could be
additional channels, such as trade credit shocks which are not conducted via the banking
system, but could impact real-sector performance of a Eurozone country and hence sovereign
distress. Though we cannot categorically rule out such further trade-related channels, we
conclude that with our control variables and conducted tests, we have reason to believe that
these channels are, if present, not a significant threat to our main results.
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Table 2.9: Robustness: strengthening exclusion restriction















Trade-Weighted Shocks -0.151*** 0.00475
(0.0328) (0.0178)
Observations 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
R-squared 0.287 0.289
Number of Countries 9 9
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress to
strengthen the exclusion restriction of the IV approach. The columns show the first and second stages of
the IV-2SLS estimation in which bank distress of 9 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) is instrumented using exposure-weighted non-Eurozone
stock returns from 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2016. Columns (1) and (2) show first and second stages when using
only bank stocks in the exposure-weighted stock returns as an instrument. Columns (3) and (4) show first
and second stages when repeating the baseline estimation of Table 2.4 but adding trade-weighted shocks as
an additional control, i.e. export-weighted non-financial stock returns of non-EZ countries. All variables
are standardized and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All columns include country and time
fixed effects on the quarterly level and the daily control variables discussed in Table 2.4. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable definitions and sources.
2.5.6 Weekly Frequency
The next concern we address is related to our data frequency. We use daily data in order to
draw from a larger set of observations. However, daily data may be noisy. Even though we
already winsorized our data to account for this possibility, we collapse the data to a weekly
frequency and re-do the baseline OLS and IV estimations. We find a very similar second
stage IV coefficient in size and statistical significance, while the OLS coefficient increases in
size, thus widening the gap between OLS and IV (Table 2.10). Our main results are therefore
robust to a lower data frequency.
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Observations 7,761 7,761 7,761
R-squared 0.189 0.363
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 9 9 9
Controls Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress with
respect to a change in frequency of the data. The columns show the first and second stages of the
IV-2SLS estimation in which bank distress of 9 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) is instrumented using exposure-weighted non-Eurozone
stock returns from 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2016. Column (1) repeats the estimation from Table 2.4 when
collapsing the data to the weekly frequency and shows results for an OLS estimation. Columns (2) and (3)
show results for IV-2SLS estimations. All variables are standardized and winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. All columns include country and time fixed effects on the quarterly level and the weekly control
variables discussed in Table 2.4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***,
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for
variable definitions and sources.
2.5.7 Alternative Control Variables and Time Fixed Effects
We want to make sure that certain daily control variables in the IV regression do not critically
drive our results. One potential candidate to do so could be the non-financial stock market
returns on the country level. In our baseline, we orthogonalized this variable with respect to
the national-specific bank returns and the stock returns on the Eurozone level. However, the
former adjustment renders the non-financial returns insignificant in explaining bank return
variation in the first stage of the instrument. To investigate if this step has any consequences
for our main results, we introduce a version of non-financial stock returns that is only orthog-
onal towards stock returns on the Eurozone level. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.12 report
the first and second stage of the IV regression. The new non-financial return variable is now
negative and significant in the first stage regression, i.e. higher non-financial stock returns are
associated with lower bank distress. However, the magnitude of the second stage coefficient
for predicted country-specific bank distress remains almost unchanged. This result suggests
that our chosen specification of non-financial returns is not critical for our main findings.
Another control variable that might require an additional robustness check is the VIX as
it could correlate excessively with the VSTOXX. However, when we remove the VIX from
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the list of covariates, our results hardly change (column (3) of Table 2.12). Furthermore,
when conducting the variance inflation factor (vif) test for our first and second IV stage, we
find no covariate near the critical value of 10 (highest value 3.51, see Table 2.11), implying
that multicollinearity in the controls is not a concern. In a further test, we replace the
nominal Euro exchange rate from JP Morgan with the nominal Euro/US Dollar exchange
rate, finding again similar effects (column (4)). Also, we replace quarterly with monthly time
fixed effects in our IV regression to account for market-wide changes on a higher frequency.
Column (5) indicates that our results are not sensitive to this adjustment. Finally, we add a
trading liquidity variable to control for potentially low turnovers of certain bank stocks. We
proceed in a similar way than for our bank distress measure and calculate the ratio of the
daily turnover of a bank stock over the stocks outstanding for this bank. We then weight this
ratio with a bank’s asset size on the country level and add up the asset-weighted liquidity
ratios on the country level. This variable is introduced as an additional control in our main
regression (column (6)). The liquidity indicator is statistically insignificant and leaves our
main results unchanged.
Table 2.11: Variance inflation factor (vif) test for estimations of Table 2.4
Variable VIF (OLS) VIF (1st stage IV) VIF (2nd stage IV)
NonEZStockReturns 2.30
∆NationalBankDistress 1.24 3.51
∆VIX 1.48 1.99 1.79
∆USTermSpread 1.10 1.10 1.10
∆Vstoxx 1.62 1.77 2.77
∆NominalExchangeRate 1.19 1.21 1.20
∆EurozoneTermSpread 1.05 1.05 1.05
∆CurrentAccountHoldings 1.01 1.01 1.01





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.8 Wild Cluster Bootstrapping
Lastly, we take concerns by Cameron et al. (2008) on downward biased standard errors if
the number of clusters is relatively low into account. Using the wild bootstrap developed by
Roodman et al. (2019), we find and report almost identical wild cluster bootstrapped t-values
for both our first and second stage of our baseline IV in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Robustness: bootstrapping standard errors

























Observations 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
R-squared 0.273 0.273
Number of Countries 9 9 9 9
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress in
which standard errors are bootstrapped. The columns show either the first or second stage of the IV-2SLS
estimation in which bank distress of 9 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) is instrumented using exposure-weighted non-Eurozone stock returns
from 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2016. Column (1) shows results of the first and column (3) results of the second
IV stage as estimated in the benchmark model in Table 2.4. Columns (2) and (4) repeat the estimation but
are adjusted by the wild cluster bootstrap method using Rademacher weights and setting replications to
1000. The resulting t-values are reported in square brackets. All variables are standardized and winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. All columns include country and time fixed effects on the quarterly level
and the daily control variables discussed in Table 2.4. T-values (in square brackets) are clustered at the
country level or bootstrapped, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable definitions and sources.
2.6 Conclusion
We present a novel instrumental variable approach to account for reverse causality and omit-
ted variable biases in the estimation of the bank-to-sovereign distress transmission in the
Eurozone. Banking sector distress of Eurozone countries is measured by the asset-weighted
stock returns of 132 Eurozone banks. We instrument country-specific bank distress using
the weighted stock returns of 47 non-Eurozone countries that are tailored to the BIS’s bank-
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ing sector claims of a Eurozone country towards borrowers in the respective non-Eurozone
country. These imported shocks, aligned to the international exposures of Eurozone banking
sectors, are shown to be a highly significant instrument for bank distress in the Eurozone. We
carry out several adjustments in order to avoid reverse causality and omitted variable issues:
First, we use fixed exposure weights from the beginning of our sample. Second, we only
include those non-Euro countries into a weighted stock portfolio that do not depend heavily
on credit supply by the respective Euro member country. Third, we purge the instrument
from any Eurozone-specific variation by means of orthogonalization.
Controlling for a range of financial market indicators, we find a statistically and econom-
ically significant effect of instrumented banking sector distress on sovereign distress for the
considered nine Eurozone countries in the period 1999-2016. Banking sector distress was
therefore a major factor and likely cause for deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness during
the crisis and not just a by-product or a correlation. The size of our instrumental variable
coefficient is around 50% lower than the corresponding OLS coefficient, and the difference is
statistically significant. This finding supports our conjecture of reverse causality and omit-
ted variables in the sovereign-bank loop estimation which are uncontrolled for in the OLS
framework. The statistical significance of the IV estimator and sizeable difference between
OLS and IV coefficient holds for a large number of robustness checks.
Our results have straightforward ramifications for the debate on the future of the Eu-
rozone. We showed that bank distress is a major determinant of the creditworthiness of
sovereigns. This finding calls for the stringent participation of equity holders and junior
creditors in the loss participation of bank bankruptcies which are currently governed by
the bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD). Applying these bail-ins predictably and
credibly, while limiting exceptions for large or politically connected banks, could have the
potential to lower this transmission of financial distress.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1 Drivers of Bank-to-Sovereign Distress Transmissions
This appendix chapter shows estimates of the drivers of the bank-to-sovereign risk transmis-
sion. It does not appear in the main text, as it was not part of the published version of the
corresponding paper. The following specification uses the same data as the corresponding
main section, however, it focuses on the Eurozone crisis from 2009 to 2016. All adjustments
to the data are described in the first paragraph.
To investigate the potential drivers of bank-to-sovereign distress spillovers, we start with
the IV-specification that we derived in Section 2.3.2. However, in order to focus on the
Eurozone crisis, all estimations are from 01/01/2009 to 12/31/2016. Therefore, BIS claims
used in the instrument are fixed towards the period of 2007:Q1, as this date is likely more
informative than the 1999:Q1 weights used so far. Furthermore, we winsorize, standard-
ize and orthogonalize all our variables with respect to the 2009-2016 period, similar to the
robustness check conducted in Section 2.5.1. As they have full data coverage for the 2009-
2016 period, the ∆USCorporateSpread (daily change in the spread between the US corporate
benchmark BBB 10-year yield and the respective AAA yield) by Thomson Reuters and the
∆NonFinancialItraxx (the residuals from a regression of the daily change in the natural log-
arithm of the 10-year Itraxx Europe against the corresponding change of the 10-year Itraxx
senior and subordinated financial indices) by Markit are introduced as additional controls.
Table A.2.1 repeats the regressions of the main section in Table 2.4 that compare the size
difference of bank-sovereign distress transmissions between OLS and IV estimates, but uses
the adjusted 2009-2016 data. Both the OLS (0.195 instead of 0.167) and the IV coefficient
(0.109 instead of 0.0828) for bank distress are slightly larger in the new specification, and
extremely close to the robustness check in Section 2.5.1. This increase is likely because the
sovereign-bank loop was most amplified during the 2009-2016 period. Nevertheless, the larger
magnitude of the OLS towards the IV bank coefficient (80% in the new version compared to
100% in the main section) is very comparable in both specifications. In addition, OLS and IV
estimates continue to differ statistically significantly. Therefore, the following specification is
extremely close to the main part and thus appropriate to investigate the drivers of bank-to-
sovereign risk transmissions during the Euro crisis.
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∆VIX -0.0280*** 0.0274 -0.0385***
(0.00414) (0.0166) (0.00491)
∆USCorporateSpread 0.0184* 0.0112* 0.0163*
(0.00924) (0.00586) (0.00843)
∆USTermSpread -0.106*** -0.0298*** -0.101***
(0.0217) (0.00740) (0.0201)
∆Vstoxx 0.152*** 0.0986*** 0.123***
(0.0364) (0.0250) (0.0336)
∆NominalExchangeRate -0.129*** 0.0532 -0.124***
(0.0264) (0.0454) (0.0224)
∆EurozoneTermSpread 0.125*** 0.0163** 0.122***
(0.0174) (0.00660) (0.0162)
∆NonFinancialItraxx 0.0194** 0.0318** 0.0105
(0.00724) (0.0119) (0.00951)
∆CurrentAccountHoldings -0.0191** -0.00933 -0.0174***
(0.00638) (0.00529) (0.00618)




Observations 18,208 18,208 18,208
R-squared 0.176 0.296
Number of Countries 9 9 9
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
2 between OLS and IV
of ∆NationalBankDistress 3.89**
This table shows the effects of ∆NationalBankDistress on ∆SovereignDistress for 9 Eurozone countries
(Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) during the Eurozone cri-
sis from 01/01/2009 to 12/31/2016. ∆SovereignDistress is the daily change in the natural logarithm
of a country’s 10-year government bond index relative to Germany’s respective bond index change.
∆NationalBankDistress are asset-weighted bank stock returns on the country-level minus asset-weighted
bank stock returns on the Eurozone-level. Estimated coefficients in (1) are from least squares regression.
Column (2) instruments ∆NationalBankDistress with weighted stock market returns from non-Eurozone
countries that are weighted according to the BIS claims of the Eurozone country towards all borrow-
ers in the respective non-Eurozone country (NonEZStockReturns). Column (3) shows the 2nd stage of
this IV regression in which ∆NationalBankDistress refers to the predicted values from (2). All variables
are standardized and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All columns include country and time
fixed effects on the quarterly level and the daily control variables discussed in Table 2.4 and additionally
∆USCorporateSpread (daily change in the spread between the US corporate benchmark BBB 10-year
yield and the respective AAA yield) and ∆NonFinancialItraxx (the residuals from a regression of the daily
change in the natural logarithm of the 10-year Itraxx Europe against the corresponding change of the
10-year Itraxx senior and subordinated financial indices). 2 shows the test statistic for the statistical
difference between ∆NationalBankDistress in the OLS and the IV estimation. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively. See Table A.2.10 for variable definitions and sources.
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We hypothesize that the distress transfer is stronger for countries with weaker macroe-
conomic performances, larger vulnerabilities in their market for sovereign bonds, impaired
banking sectors and elevated political risks. For each channel under investigation we estimate
the following model:19
∆ =1∆   1 + 21+
3∆  + ∆() +  +  + 
(8)
Each interaction enters with a lag of one quarter or one month, corresponding to the frequency
of the interaction variable, except when stated otherwise. This step is to account for the
presumption that financial market participants in time  base their analysis on the released
data from   1. Concerning the sign of the interaction terms, we expect variables which
increase the transmission of distress to have a positive, while factors that lower the distress
transfer to have a negative coefficient.
Following Nizalova & Murtazashvili (2016) and Bun & Harrison (2019), we argue that our
interaction coefficients are consistently estimated and allow for causal interpretation, as long
as one variable in the interaction term is exogenously determined. We have demonstrated this
assumption for our instrument and showed that potentially biasing effects are small in size
and do not disturb our main results. Therefore, even if some channels could be endogenous
with respect to sovereign creditworthiness, we argue that the interaction terms allow for an
exogenous interpretation. We trim the interaction variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to
account for potential outliers, such as Ireland’s 25% increase in GDP in the first quarter of
2015 resulting from foreign companies switching their base to Ireland. Summary statistics on
all non-standardized interaction variables are in Table A.2.2. All data sources are reported
in the appendix in Table A.2.10.
19In practice, we estimate an IV regression with two endogenous variables (national-specific bank distress
and the interaction of bank distress with the interaction term), and two instruments (international exposure-
weighted stock returns and the interaction of international stock returns with the interaction term), see
Wooldridge (2010) chapter 9.
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Table A.2.2: Summary statistics of all interaction variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max
DebtToGDP 21,793 98.82 96.50 29.18 48.90 179.7
FiscalDeficitToGDP 22,902 4.965 3.900 4.142 -1 28.38
GDPGrowth 22,581 0.269 0.435 1.172 -3.578 4.757
UnemploymentRate 22,508 11.09 9.200 5.800 4.300 27.40
CurrentAccountToGDP 22,640 -0.302 -0.290 5.001 -12.69 12.71
Inflation 22,945 1.391 1.400 1.453 -2.500 4.800
DebtIssuanceToGDP 16,342 2.225 2.200 1.211 0.0800 6.070
DebtRedemptionToGDP 16,337 2.007 1.990 1.244 0.0900 6.390
HighIssuance 16,641 0.498 0 0.500 0 1
HighRedemption 16,641 0.497 0 0.500 0 1
HomeShare 22,621 0.675 0.690 0.241 0.107 0.987
NonPerformingLoanRatio 20,160 8.775 5.170 7.866 2.250 36.99
ReturnOnAssets 22,448 0.184 0.330 0.670 -2.700 2.110
Tier1Ratio 21,402 12.12 11.78 3.091 7.470 25.05
BankAssetsToRevenue 22,575 33,008 28,310 19,857 16,921 120,430
CentralBankFundingShare 22,641 5.977 3.015 7.050 0.357 37.82
NonFinancialSecuritiesToGDP 22,423 8.22e-05 7.31e-05 6.33e-05 2.91e-07 0.000240
MacroprudentialIndex 18,792 0.173 -1 1.622 -2 6
PolicyUncertaintyEurope 21,717 175.5 164.4 60.58 91.38 433.3
PolicyUncertaintyEuro 22,509 0.128 0.0716 1.187 -2.402 3.939
Election 23,490 0.0239 0 0.153 0 1
Left/RightPreference 23,490 5.507 5.516 1.318 3.269 7.597
State/MarketPreference 23,490 5.587 5.241 1.327 3.105 7.913
Contra/ProEUPreference 23,490 7.953 7.903 1.071 4.758 9.253
Sample period is 01/01/2009–31/12/2016. All variables are in levels, trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile
and depicted in non-standardized format. See Table A.2.10 for definitions and sources.
A.2.1.1 Macroeconomic Performance
We test the impact of the macroeconomic performance of a Eurozone country on the isolated
bank-to-sovereign distress channel using six variables. The public debt-to-GDP ratio of a
country should approximate the fiscal space a government might have to finance financial
sector rescue packages in times of banking sector turmoil. Similarly, the fiscal deficit to GDP
ratio shows how much a government has to go into debt in a specific period and thus also
approximate its potential access to financial markets in case of increasing banking sector
distress. We hence expect that countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios and larger fiscal
deficits should be associated with a stronger bank-to-sovereign distress channel, i.e. a positive
interaction coefficient.
Higher GDP growth and current account balance to GDP ratios as well as a lower unem-
ployment rate should signal improved macroeconomic fundamentals and thus a reduction in
the fragility transmission. We also test for the interactive effects of inflation, for which both
increased or decreased transmissions are plausible.
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The results in Table A.2.3 seem to confirm most of our hypotheses. We find evidence
that both high public debt ratios and fiscal deficits show a positive and statistically signifi-
cant relationship on the bank-to-sovereign distress channel, i.e. the transmission of distress
strengthens with increasing levels of public indebtedness (columns (1) and (2)). However,
both size and significance are larger for the debt-to-GDP ratio, probably because fiscal deficits
were often adjusted in the short- to medium-run as a response to the crisis, while the out-
standing indebtedness of the sovereign can only be reduced in the long-run.20
We find no statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term featuring lagged GDP
growth, though it has the expected negative sign (column (3)). However, the margin plot in
Figure A.2.1 provides some evidence that countries with a higher quarterly growth rate, in our
case at around 1%, are no longer subject to a statistically significant transmission of distress
from banks on sovereigns. Regarding the unemployment ratio, we find a highly significant
positive interaction coefficient (column (4)) which suggests that periods of depressed economic
performance are associated with stronger private-to-public distress transfers.
Also, countries with an increasing current account surplus seem to have statistically sig-
nificant weaker transmissions of distress (column (5)), possibly indicating that economies
with stronger export sectors and less import dependence seem more robust in fending off fi-
nancial shocks. We cannot reject the null-hypothesis that higher inflation has no statistically
significant impact on the effect of financial sector distress on sovereign creditworthiness, in
accordance with our hypothesis (column (6)).
Considering the marginal effect of instrumented bank distress on sovereign bond spreads,
conditional on the macroeconomic performance of a country, the marginal effect plots depicted
in Figure A.2.1 support the evidence we gained in the regression framework. The marginal
effect of bank distress only becomes insignificant if macroeconomic factors are sufficiently
stable, in our case at a debt-to-GDP ratio of roughly 90%, a fiscal deficit under -2% of GDP,
quarterly GDP growth of 1%, an unemployment ratio of 8% or a current account ratio of
roughly 3%. Regarding the marginal effects of bank distress conditional on inflation, we find
evidence that higher rates of inflation can indeed lead to statistically significant transmissions,
however, this result seems to be primarily driven by the fewer observations of periods with
lower inflation.
20At least in the absence of sovereign insolvency regimes or haircuts on government debt, which, during























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2.1: Marginal effects of instrumented bank distress on sovereign distress conditional
on macroeconomic factors. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Distribution of interaction





A.2.1.2 Government Bond Issuances, Redemptions and Holdings
The primary issuance of government bonds features prominently in the literature as a key
transmission channel for the sovereign-bank loop. Both Gaballo & Zetlin-Jones (2016) and
Farhi & Tirole (2017) model the loop with a sovereign that issues new public debt in order
to finance bank bailouts. The increased supply of bonds lowers their prices and raises their
interest rates. Bond losses are transmitted to bank balance sheets that prefer holding domestic
sovereign debt which necessitates further bailouts. Similarly, Ongena et al. (2019) identify
months in which governments have to roll-over maturing government debt as periods in which
the sovereign likely performs moral suasion towards its banking sector, pressuring domestic
banks to stand ready as buyers of government debt. Following this literature, it is likely that
periods with higher issuances or redemptions of government bonds could be associated with
a stronger transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress.
We therefore test if the effect of instrumented bank distress on sovereign bond spreads
is conditional on the amount of government debt a country issues or repays. We assume
that the effect of the issuance or redemption should affect the financial distress of the same
month, hence we consecutively interact the contemporaneous level of issuance or redemption
of government bonds in relation to a country’s GDP with instrumented bank distress in our
estimation. In both cases, we find a similar effect on the transmission of distress that is,
however, statistically indistinguishable from zero, as shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table
A.2.4. Concerning the marginal effect of the distress channel conditional on government bond
issuances and redemptions in Figure A.2.2, we find that there are values of the interaction
variable for which the marginal effect of bank distress turns insignificant, however, this finding
seems to be clearly driven by fewer observations and therefore wider confidence intervals in
the distribution of government bond redemptions or issuances.
We further investigate this channel by using the actual amounts of government bonds
issued or redeemed and marking the months in which the amounts of bonds given out or
repaid lay above the median for this country during our sample with a dummy that is 1
in these months and 0 otherwise. Again, we find no statistically significant effects when we
interact this variable with the instrumented bank distress measure (columns (3) and (4)). We
view this finding as evidence that, while there may certainly have been cases in which large
chunks of new government bonds entering the market could have had price effects, financial
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markets, on average, did not discriminate between months with high or low government debt
issuances when they re-priced such securities.
Lastly, we look if the holding of domestic government bonds by the banking sector could
have had an impact on the bank-sovereign distress channel. The literature has shown that
governments likely pressure domestic banking sectors to purchase their own securities to ease
refinancing (De Marco & Macchiavelli (2016), Ongena et al. (2019)). A banking sector with
strong exposure towards its own government getting hit by a negative shock could have a
detrimental impact on sovereign creditworthiness as the bank might rapidly sell government
securities to raise liquidity. Another possible channel is that the holding of government bonds
artificially increases the equity ratio of the bank due to the zero risk weight of government
securities which makes the bank look safer on paper than in practice. Lastly, the bank
might be more likely to be bailed out because the government wants to keep it as a buyer
of government securities. Consequently, we interact our main specification with the lagged
home share of government bonds by a banking sector, i.e. the share of domestic government
debt securities held compared to the total holdings of government securities. Column (5)
in Table A.2.4 and the margin plot in Figure A.2.2 show that a larger home share has
a strong and statistically highly significant positive effect on the bank-sovereign distress





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2.2: Marginal effects of instrumented bank distress on sovereign distress conditional
on issuance, redemption or holdings of government debt securities. Bars indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals. Distribution of interaction variable is shown. The results of the corresponding
regressions are in Table A.2.4
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A.2.1.3 Banking Sector Structure and Stability
In the following, we shed light on the link between the bank-to-sovereign distress channel and
the structure and stability of the corresponding country’s banking sector. Our hypothesis is
that the effect of bank distress, instrumented by imported stock market returns, is conditional
on the profitability, capitalization, amount of non-performing loans, liability structure and
size of the banking sector. Furthermore, we suspect that both stronger macroprudential
regulation and more developed capital markets can cushion the transmission of distress, as
the former might point to a more comprehensive regulatory handling of financial sector shocks
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whereas the latter can serve as a substitute for firm financing in case of an impaired banking
sector.
We interact the instrumented bank distress measure consecutively with these variables
and report results in Table A.2.5. The findings suggest that the transmission of distress
depends in a statistically significant manner on the return on assets (column (2)) and the
non-performing loans ratio (column (1)) of a banking sector, the former with a cushioning
impact when higher, the latter with an accelerating one, as hypothesized. With regard to the
interaction of the Tier 1 capital ratio, we find a negative effect that does, however, not differ
statistically significant from zero (column (3)). This finding could be explained by the fact
that higher capital requirements were arguably the most often prescribed action by regulators
for ailing banking sectors. Demanding higher equity in times when the transmission of bank
distress is strongest would bias the corresponding coefficient towards zero and hence account
for the result. However, when investigating the marginal effects depicted in Figure A.2.3,
we find indeed some evidence suggesting that banking sectors with sufficient Tier 1 capital
ratios, in our case at around 16%, are no longer subject to a statistically significant marginal
effect of bank distress on sovereign creditworthiness. The marginal effects of bank distress,
conditional on non-performing loans or return on assets are, in a similar vein, pointing towards
an insignificant transmission of distress when non-performing loans are lower than 4% and
return on assets higher than 0.8%. Stronger banking sectors, in terms of capitalization,
non-performing loans or profitability, may therefore contribute to less distress spillovers on
sovereign creditworthiness.
Turning towards the size of the banking sector, we interact national bank distress with
the total bank asset to public revenue ratio of a country. This ratio sets the size of banks in
relation to the fiscal means the government has in this period to potentially finance rescue
packages. However, we cannot statistically significantly reject the null hypothesis of a zero
effect of this interaction term on sovereign creditworthiness (column (4) in Table A.2.5). One
interpretation for this result could be that too-big-to-fail banking sectors are not an exclusive
driver of the bank-sovereign distress channel but that interconnected financial sectors, for
instance in the case of a regional banking system in distress as witnessed in Italy or Spain,




Next, we interact bank distress with a measure for liability risks of the financial sector.
We use the share of banking sector liabilities that is funded by the central bank, i.e. the
ECB or in practice the national central bank. Banks that turn to the central bank to finance
their assets likely do so, because it is more expensive or no longer possible for them to receive
funds on private markets. Indeed, during the Eurozone crisis international money market
funds started to withdraw short-term funding for Eurozone banks in 2011, with the ECB
stepping in as a lender of last resort to limit the funding gap (Acharya, Pierret & Steffen
(2018)). In our estimation, the positive and highly statistically significant interaction term
in column (5) suggests that banking sectors that required more financing by the central bank
also featured a stronger transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress.
Finally, we investigate the impact of two measures that could potentially cushion the
analyzed distress channel. We obtain the cumulative macroprudential index from Cerutti
et al. (2016) which is an index that sums up all macroprudential instruments such as sector-
specific capital buffers or loan-to-value caps introduced by regulators on a quarterly frequency.
Also, we estimate the model using the amount of debt securities issued by non-financial firms
in relation to GDP as an interaction term. This variable approximates how well firms could
substitute bank credit in case the loan supply by banks was disrupted during the crisis.
We find negative but not statistically significant effects for both interaction terms (columns
(6) and (7)). However, the marginal effect plots in Figure A.2.3 provide some evidence
that countries with higher macroprudential regulation or a more pronounced capital market
are subject to a lower and at some point statistically insignificant transmission of bank to
sovereign distress. These results suggest that macroprudential regulation and developed
capital markets are not primary channels for the bank-to-sovereign connection, but may































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2.3: Marginal effects of instrumented bank distress on sovereign distress conditional
on banking sector stability. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Distribution of interaction






Lastly, we test whether different levels of political risk or events approximating them have a
significant effect on bank-sovereign distress transfers. We hypothesize that elevated political
uncertainty in Europe or the Eurozone could increase the transmission of distress because
they make a collaborative approach concerning the regulatory architecture of the Eurozone
or a common political strategy on rescue packages for banks or countries more difficult. This
insecurity could feed into the bank-sovereign distress channel by creating a lack of clarity or
ambiguity in handling financial sector shocks which ultimately leaves sovereigns and taxpayers
on the country-level to deal with these risks.
To analyze this channel, we interact instrumented bank distress with a political uncer-
tainty index for Europe as established by Baker et al. (2016). This continuous index is based
on articles from various European newspapers covering political uncertainty and hence pro-
vides a monthly-varying approximating of political risks in Europe. The results in Table
A.2.6 suggest that an increasing level of political uncertainty can lead to a stronger trans-
mission of bank distress on sovereign creditworthiness, as the interaction term is positive and
statistically highly significant (column (1)).
In order to test if political risks that are more closely related to the Euro Area crisis
than the broader European index have a similar effect, we proceed as follows: We collect the
political uncertainty indices for Ireland, Spain and Italy which are the only GIIPS countries
with an uncertainty index. We then conduct a principal component analysis and estimate
the first component of these three indices. This component describes variation in the indices
that is common for all three countries and should therefore pick up political risk factors that
are shared by these countries, such as uncertainty related to the future of the EZ. This first
component accounts for 57.77% of the total variation. Interacting the variable with national-
specific bank distress, we find a positive statistically significant effect at the 1% level for the
interaction term (column (2)).
Next, we test the effect of political uncertainty on the country level. We use the parlgov
database to pinpoint the months in which federal parliamentary elections for each country in
our panel took place. We give these months a value of 1 and 0 for months without elections.
Interacting this dummy with our measure for bank distress, we find a highly positive and
statistically significant effect which suggests that months with elections and hence greater
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political uncertainty seem to be associated with a stronger bank-sovereign distress channel
compared to months without elections (column (3)). These results suggest that in times of
elevated political uncertainty, the transmission of distress from banking sectors to sovereigns
is amplified.
Lastly, we exploit the parlgov database to test if the political preferences of political par-
ties in ruling governments had any impact on the investigated distress channel. Similar to
Eichler & Sobański (2016), we weight the size of the political parties in the ruling cabinet
based on their seats in parliament. We then create a weighted index of the government’s
stance of being a left versus a conservative, a state-friendly versus a market-friendly and a
pro-European versus an EU-skeptical cabinet coalition. A higher value of the index indi-
cates a more conservative, market-friendly or EU-friendly government respectively. However,
the interaction of the contemporaneous index value with the bank distress measure yields
small and in each case statistically insignificant coefficients (columns (4)-(6) of Table A.2.6).
Figure A.2.4 supports this conclusion, as the marginal effects of bank distress depicted are
largely unconditional towards the government’s ideological stance. Only for more pro-EU
governments, there seems to be a stronger transmission of distress. However, it should be
noted that almost all governments during our sample period are represented by a pro- or at
least EU-tolerating index which limits the informative value of this outcome. Overall, these
results could suggest that the political ideology of governments during the Eurozone crisis, on























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2.4: Marginal effects of instrumented bank distress on sovereign distress conditional
on political stability. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Distribution of interaction





A.2.2 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.2.7: List of included banks (mean asset size in Euro in brackets)
Country Banks
Austria BKS Bank (4.29 bn), Bank Tirol and Vorarlberg (4.47 bn), Erste Group Bank(165 bn), Oberbank (14.0 bn), Raiffeisen Bank International (104 bn)
Belgium Dexia (433 bn), KBC Ancora (2.9 bn), KBC Group (267 bn)
France
Banque De La Reunion (2.1 bn), Banque Tarneaud (2.0 bn), BNP Paribas
(1490 bn), Boursorama (2.5 bn), Credit Agricoles Alpes Provences (12.2 bn),
Credit Agricole Atlantique Vendee (14.8 bn), Credit Agricole Brie Picardie
(19.7 bn), Credit Agricole Centre Loire (8.9 bn), Credit Credit Agricole d’Ile de
France (27.9 bn), Credit Agricole d’Ille-et-Vilaine (7.9 bn), Credit Agricole
Languedoc (20.5 bn), Credit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire (7.4 bn), Credit Agricole
Normandie Seine (9.9 bn), Credit Agricole Morbihan (6.9 bn), Credit Agricole
Nord de France (23.8 bn), Credit Agricole SA (1360 bn), Credit Agricole Sud
Rhone Alpes (11.2 bn), Credit Agricole Toulouse (6.9 bn), Credit Agricole
Touraine Poitou (8.3 bn), Credit Foncier de Monaco (2.8 bn), Credit Industriel et
Commercial CIC (208 bn), Natixis (360 bn), Rothschild & Co (5.4 bn), Societe
Generale (935 bn)
Greece
Agricultural Bank of Greece (22.7 bn), Alpha Bank (50.1 bn), Attica Bank
(3.15 bn), Bank of Piraues (43.5 bn), Emporiki Bank (21.2 bn), Eurobank Ergasias
(54.7 bn), General Bank of Greece (3.4 bn), Marfin Egnatia Bank (8.4 bn),
Marfin Investment Group (3.0 bn), National Bank of Greece (81.5 bn),
Proton Bank (2.6 bn), T Bank (2.0 bn), TT Hellenic Postbank (14.6 bn)
Ireland Allied Irish Banks (123 bn), Anglo Irish Bank (50.5 bn), Bank Of Ireland (140 bn),Permanent Tsb Group (50.9 bn)
Italy
Banca Carige (27.4 bn), Banca Finnat Euramerica (0.66 bn), Banca Generali
(5.5 bn), Banca IFIS (3.4 bn), Banca Intermobiliare (2.8 bn), Banca Italease
(21.5 bn), Banca Mediolanum (24.0 bn), Banca Monte Dei Paschi (166 bn),
Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese (18.7 bn), Banca Popolare Italiana (38.8 bn),
Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio (8.4 bn), Banca Popolare di Milano
(41.4 bn), Banca Popolare di Sondrio (21.0 bn), Banca Popolare di Spoleto (2.3 bn),
Banca Profilo (1.6 bn), Banca Sistema (2.1 bn), Banco Di Sardegna (12.3 bn),
Banco BPM (89.4 bn), Banco di Desio e della Brianza (7.2 bn), BPER Banca
(47.7 bn), Credito Artigiano (6.5 bn), Credito Bergamasco (12.3 bn), Credito
Emiliano (25.9 bn), FinecoBank (19.3 bn), Intesa Sanpaolo (484 bn), IW Bank
(1.9 bn), Mediobanca (55.1 bn), Meliorbanca (3.5 bn), Unicredit (664 bn), Unione
di Banche Italiane (108 bn)
Netherlands ABN AMRO (394 bn), Binckbank (2.2 bn), ING Groep (988 bn),KAS Bank (6.2 bn), SNS Reaal (120 bn), Van Lanschot (16.3 bn)
Portugal Banco BPI (34.9 bn), Banco Comercial Portugues (75.9 bn), Banco Espirito Santo(57.6 bn), Banif Financial Group (9.4 bn), Finibanco (2.0 bn), Montepio (21.2 bn)
Spain
Banca Civica (69.8 bn), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (466 bn), Banco De
Andalucia (7.6 bn), Banco de Castilla (3.3 bn), Banco de Credito Balear (1.4 bn),
Banco de Galicia (2.8 bn) Banco De Sabadell (99.8 bn), Banco De Valencia
(14.1 bn), Banco de Vasconia (2.5 bn) Banco Espanol De Credito (84.1 bn), Banco
Guipuzcoano (7.3 bn), Banco Pastor (19.1 bn), Banco Popular Espanol (98.8 bn),
Banco Santander (862 bn), Bankia (228 bn), Bankinter (43.6 bn), Caixabank








Aareal Bank (42.3 bn), BHW Holding (94.4 bn), Baader Bank (0.37 bn),
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (539 bn),
Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank (40.2 bn), Comdirect Bank (9.2 bn),
Commerzbank (544 bn), Deutsche Bank (1410 bn), Deutsche Hypothekenbank
(29.8 bn), Deutsche Pfandbriefbank (63.4 bn), Deutsche Postbank (185 bn),
Eurohypo (182 bn), HSBC Trinkaus and Burkhardt (13.5 bn), Hypo Real Estate
(252 bn), IKB (34.6 bn), Landesbank Berlin Holding (154 bn), Merkur Bank
(0.7 bn), Net-M Privatbank (0.065 bn), Oldenburgische Landesbank (11.9 bn),
Quirin Bank (4.1 bn), Umweltbank (1.7 bn), Varengold Bank (0.49 bn)
Table A.2.8: List of non-Eurozone countries used for instrument in Section 2.3.2
Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rus-
sia, Singapore, South-Africa, South-Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela
Table A.2.9: Non-Eurozone countries that are “large borrowers” of a Eurozone country as
defined in Section 2.3.2
Eurozone country “Large borrower” countries (non-Eurozone)
Austria Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia
Belgium Bahrain, Czech Republic, Hungary
France
Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Egypt, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom
Greece Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey
Ireland
Italy Bulgaria, Croatia, Egypt, Hungary, Peru, Poland, Russia
Netherlands Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden,United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom
Portugal
Spain Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom,Venezuela
Table A.2.10: Description and sources of variables
Variable Description Source
Bank-specific Variables (all return variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile)
Weighted Bank Stock
Returns
Daily change in the natural logarithm of bank stocks
weighted with yearly total asset size of bank in that
country. Return is set to missing within a quarter if the
stock had no turnover or no stock value was
reported for more than seven consecutive trading days.
Datastream






Daily change in natural logarithm of a world stock index
of bank stocks that excludes stocks from the EZ. Datastream
Eurozone Bank
Returns
Asset-weighted bank stock returns on the Eurozone-level,
i.e. of all banks in the panel. Variable is orthogonalized
with respect to World Stock Returns Banks (Excl. EZ).
NationalBankDistress BankReturns minus EurozoneBankReturns.Variable is then multiplied times -1.
Non-Eurozone Exposure Variables (all return variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile)
Bank Claim
Consolidated claims of a banking sector towards all
sectors in a non-Eurozone country (Immediate




Weight Share of Bank Claims towards a non-Eurozonecountry compared to total Bank Claims.
Stock Market
Returns
Daily change in natural logarithm of (market-wide) stock






Weight towards non-Eurozone country times
StockMarketReturn of the same non-Eurozone country.
NonEZStockReturns Sum of ExposureWeightedReturns of every Eurozonecountry in the sample.
Daily Financial Market Data (all return variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile)
Sovereign Distress
Daily change in the natural logarithm of the benchmark
10-year Datastream government bond index of Germany
minus the corresponding index change of a sample country.
Datastream
VIX Daily change in VIX volatility index. CBOE
US Corporate
Credit Spread
Daily change in spread between the Thomson Reuters
corporate benchmark BBB 10-years yield and the
corresponding AAA 10-years yield.
Thomson
Reuters
US Term Spread Daily change in spread between 10-years US Treasuryyield and the 3-Months US T-Bill yield.
Datastream,
Federal Reserve
VSTOXX Daily change in Vstoxx volatility index. STOXX
Nominal Euro
Exchange Rate
Daily change of natural logarithm of nominal effective
exchange rate of the Euro. JP Morgan
Non-Financial
Itraxx
The daily change of the natural log of the 10-year Itraxx
Europe is regressed against the daily change of 10-Year
Itraxx senior and subordinated financial indices. The




Daily change in the natural log of current account holdings
(sum of minimum and excess reserves by banks at the ECB). ECB
Eurozone
Term Spread
Daily change in the spread between EuroMTS Government







Daily change in the natural logarithm of the non-financial
stock indices is orthogonalized towards NationalBankDistress
and daily changes in the Eurozone total stock market returns.
Datastream





Daily change in the yield spread between a country’s
benchmark 10-year government bond and the corresponding
German bond.
Datastream
CDS Spread Daily change in CDS spread of a 5-year US Dollar CDSrate of a country and the corresponding German CDS rate.
Thomson
Reuters
Bank Distress BankReturns times -1.
NationalBankDistress
by Orthogonalization
BankReturns orthogonalized to EurozoneBankReturns.
Variable is then multiplied times -1.
NonEZBankStock




NonEZStockReturns is orthogonalized towards the first
principal component of BankReturns.
NonEZStockReturns
Excluding EU borrowers
NonEZStockReturns excluding EU countries without




NonEZStockReturns excluding non-EZ countries that
hold claims equal or beyond 90th percentile towards
an EZ country from portfolio.
Trade-Weighted Shocks
Export weight of EZ towards non-EZ country
times non-financial stock market returns.






Daily change in natural logarithm of non-financial stock




The daily change in the natural logarithm of the non-financial
stock indices of every country is orthogonalized towards
daily changes in the Eurozone total stock market returns.
Datastream
Euro-Dollar ER Daily change in the natural log of the Euro to Dollar rate. Thomson Reuters
Trading Liquidity Ratio of each bank’s stock turnover to stocks outstanding;Then asset-weighted and aggregated on country level. Datastream
Interaction Variables applied in appendix chapter (all variables trimmed at 1st and 99th percentile)
Debt to GDP General government consolidated gross debt in % of GDP. Eurostat
GDP Growth Quarterly GDP growth in market prices (quarterly). OECD
Unemployment Rate Harmonised unemployed rates, all persons, all ages,seasonally adjusted (monthly). OECD
Fiscal-Deficit-to-
GDP
Net lending (-) / net borrowing (+) of general government
in % of gross domestic product (quarterly); Oxford Economics
data used for all countries except Netherlands and
Portugal, which uses Eurostat data, as Oxford data





to GDP Current Account to GDP Ratio (quarterly). OECD
Inflation Annual rate of change of harmonised index of consumerprices (monthly). Eurostat
Government Bond
Issuance to GDP
Gross issuance of debt securities of general government
in % of GDP (monthly). The data (and all other




Gross redemption of debt securities of general government




Dummy variable equal to one in months in which the
gross issuance of government debt securities was above
the sample median of this country.
ECB
High Redemption
Dummy variable equal to one in months in which the gross
redemption of government debt securities was above the
sample median of this country.
ECB
Home Share Share of domestic government bonds held by a bankingsector in relation to total government bonds held. ECB
Non-Performing
Loans Ratio
Non-Performing loans to total gross loans ratio (quarterly).
Adjustment in case of reporting gaps:
If gap is two periods or shorter: gap is interpolated.













Bank Asset to Public
Revenue Ratio
Ratio of monthly total balance sheet size of banking sector
towards total general government revenue. The latter uses










Index aggregating the number of implemented
macroprudential instruments (quarterly). Data is only
available until 2014:Q4.
Cerutti et al. (2016)
Non-Financial
Securities to GDP
Monthly outstanding securities issued by non-financial
corporations in ratio to GDP (monthly). ECB
Policy Uncertainty
Europe Economic policy uncertainty index for Europe (monthly).
policy
uncertainty.com
Baker et al. (2016)
Policy Uncertainty
Euro
First component of principal component analysis of




Baker et al. (2016)
Election Dummy that is 1 if the country held a parliamentaryelection in that month. ParlGovDatabase
Left/Right
Government
Weighted index of left/right party preference of cabinet
coalition. Preferences of ruling parties are weighted based on






Weighted index of state/market-friendly party preference of
cabinet coalition. Preferences of ruling parties are weighted






Weighted index of contra/pro-EU party preference of
cabinet coalition. Preferences of ruling parties are weighted
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Chapter 3:
What drives the Commodity-Sovereign Risk Dependence in
Emerging Market Economies?
Abstract: Using daily data for 34 emerging markets in the period 1994-2016, we find robust
evidence that higher export commodity prices are associated with lower sovereign default risk,
as measured by lower EMBI spreads. The economic effect is especially pronounced for heavy
commodity exporters. Examining the drivers, we find that, first, commodity dependence is
higher for countries that export large volumes of commodities, whereas other portfolio charac-
teristics like volatility or concentration are less important. Second, commodity-sovereign risk
dependence increases in times of recessions and expansionary U.S. monetary policy. Third,
the importance of raw material prices for sovereign financing can likely be mitigated if a
country improves institutions and tax systems, attracts FDI inflows, invests in manufac-
turing, machinery and infrastructure, builds up reserve assets and opens capital and trade
accounts. Fourth, the country’s government indebtedness or amount of received development
assistance appears to be only of secondary importance for commodity dependence.
3.1 Introduction
Global commodity price cycles have been among the most influential drivers of sovereign
defaults in history (Reinhart et al. 2016). Higher export commodity prices improve sovereign
solvency by spurring economic growth and tax revenues, by increasing the profitability of
state-owned commodity enterprises and by generating inflows of foreign exchange thus in-
creasing the government’s ability to service its external debt. Fluctuations in commod-
ity prices are therefore important business cycle drivers, in particular for emerging market
economies (Fernández et al. (2018), Fernández et al. (2017)), while also comprising political
considerations: In the upturn of the commodity cycle, especially autocratic regimes with poor
institutions tend to build up unsustainable debt levels, which can lead to debt overhangs and
default in the downturn of the cycle (Arezki & Brückner 2012).
Commodity cycles matter, as during the 2013-2017 period, 102 out of 189 countries in
the world were considered to be commodity-dependent according to UNCTAD (2019). Both
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the literature and policy reports often make commodity dependence responsible for creating
vulnerabilities: Globally determined raw material prices steer the economic performance and
the costs to borrow money on financial markets of commodity-dependent countries beyond
their control.21 Despite its relevance, a comprehensive study of the economic drivers of
commodity-sovereign risk dependence is lacking in the literature.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the magnitude and determinants of commodity-
sovereign risk dependence from the viewpoint of daily financial market investors. To this end,
we build a daily panel of 34 emerging market economies from January 1, 1994 to December
31, 2016. We measure commodity-sovereign risk dependence as the relationship between a
country’s sovereign creditworthiness (measured by changes in the Emerging Market Bond
Index (EMBI) yield spread relative to US Treasuries) and the returns of its export-weighted
commodity price index. We control thoroughly for global developments on financial markets
and most importantly for a country’s general stock return which should account for major eco-
nomic movements each day. Any impact of commodity prices on sovereign creditworthiness
beyond these controls is likely due to raw material prices affecting the fiscal situation, invest-
ment possibilities and general economic outlook of a country and hence imply commodity
dependence.
Our empirical approach tests the hypothesis if and by how much export-weighted com-
modity returns affect sovereign risk. We find that an increase in our commodity performance
measure by one standard deviation is associated on average with a reduction of the EMBI
yield spread of 33 basis points (bps), which corresponds to 3.5% of the EMBI spread’s stan-
dard deviation and indicates a decrease in sovereign risk. For countries with a commodity
export share on total exports equal or above the 90th percentile,22 a one standard deviation
increase in export commodity prices is associated with a 47.5 bps decrease in the EMBI
spread (corresponding to 5% of the EMBI’s standard deviation). Although we can only ex-
plain a modest fraction of bond price changes in absolute terms, the standardized effect of
commodity prices on EMBI bond yield spreads are around 40% as large as for the VIX or the
U.S. corporate bond spread and thus relatively important in pricing emerging market bonds.
21An article by the World Economic Forum (2019) from 17 May 2019 entitled “We must help developing
countries escape commodity dependence” says: “When a country’s economy is not diversified and relies heavily
on basic products, it puts itself at the mercy of international market prices. When prices go down, employment,
exports and government revenue suffer. (...) [P]utting too many eggs in one basket renders the country
vulnerable.”
22Affected countries are Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Peru and Venezuela.
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Our second contribution focuses on the heterogeneous nature of commodity-sovereign
risk-dependence. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine a broad set of
hypotheses on possible conditioning factors shaping the size of this dependence such as a coun-
try’s commodity exporting structure, its macroeconomic conditions, and the implementation
of policy measures that might reduce commodity dependence. We find strong heterogeneous
effects that differentiate the average magnitude of commodity dependence reported above.
Looking at the structure of the country’s commodity export industry, we find that coun-
tries with greater commodity exports on total export shares are significantly more commodity-
dependent (pointing to a higher relevance of commodity price fluctuations for economic
growth, tax revenues or direct cash flows from the commodity sector due to public stakes
or royalties). When analyzing specializations into different commodity subgroups, we ob-
serve that countries which export predominantly energy face larger, while countries focusing
on industrial metals are subject to smaller commodity dependence. We do not find signifi-
cant evidence that the volatility of exported commodities and the degree of diversification of
commodity exports affect the commodity-sovereign risk dependence.
When analyzing the impact of macroeconomic factors on commodity-sovereign risk depen-
dence, we find that the reliance on commodities for sovereign funding increases in economic
recessions (lower GDP growth) and, likely associated therewith, when public or private sec-
tors lack fiscal resources (lower tax revenues or corporate profits). We find no statistically
significant connection between commodity dependence and GDP per capita or the inflation
rate. A surprising coefficient is the interaction of commodity performance and public debt,
which suggests higher commodity dependence at lower debt levels, however, the coefficient is
only weakly significant.
We find only weak evidence that commodity dependence increases in times of sovereign
debt crises. However, we uncover that the repayment history of a sovereign matters in that
countries with a very distant or no incidents of sovereign default display lower commodity
dependence.
Beyond national macroeconomic factors, we find that commodity dependence of emerging
markets increases significantly in times of more expansionary U.S. monetary policy. This
observation is in line with findings in the literature that an accommodative U.S. monetary
weakens the dollar, which tends to boost commodity prices (Akram 2009). Moreover, U.S.
89
Chapter 3
interest rates affect demand and supply conditions in commodity markets (Frankel 2006) and
lower U.S. interest rates lead to lower risk aversion, rising capital flows and foreign lending
activities into emerging markets (Bräuning & Ivashina 2020, Ahmed & Zlate 2014, Temesvary
et al. 2018).
When turning to policy measures that are likely able to mitigate commodity dependence,
we find clear support that countries with stronger institutions are significantly less reliant on
the price performance of their main commodity exports for their sovereign creditworthiness.
Improving institutional quality, measured with control of corruption, rule of law, political
stability or more progressive tax systems, likely makes sure that clear ownership rights for
extracted raw materials exist, that rent extraction is limited or that gains from commodity
exports are efficiently distributed.23 Some papers stress that larger endowments of natural
resources make it more difficult to improve institutional quality (Arezki & Brückner 2011a,
Gylfason 2001). We take this issue into account by limiting our estimation to those countries
that are heavy commodity exporters. Our main results continue to hold, suggesting that
even among strong commodity exporters, those with better institutions seem to fare better
in terms of lower commodity dependence, which is also in line with Bhattacharyya & Hodler
(2010), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Arezki & Brückner (2011b).
Further measures that are associated with alleviating commodity dependence are attract-
ing more FDI inflows, investing in physical capital and infrastructure, and building larger
manufacturing sectors. We conclude from these results that fostering downstream produc-
tion technologies and diversifying economic activities can be successful ways for countries to
reduce commodity dependence. On the other hand, we find only limited evidence that speaks
in favor of mitigating commodity dependence by means of development assistance or loans.
Countries that build up higher reserve assets in relation to GDP face significantly lower
commodity dependence by reducing their reliance on foreign exchange inflows via commodity
exports. This result suggests that low official reserve buffers make emerging markets particu-
larly vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations. Lastly, we find that countries
23For instance, Frankel (2010) discusses the successful fiscal rule of Chile that is also mentioned in an
article in The Economist (2017) from 5th October 2017 entitled “Commodities are not always bad for you” :
“Resource-rich economies need equally resourceful macroeconomic policies. One of the best examples is Chile.
Its fiscal rule curbs government spending when the copper price exceeds its long-term trend, as judged by an
independent committee of experts. During good times, fiscal restraint makes room for mining to boom without




with shielded trade and financial accounts are subject to a significantly stronger commodity
dependence.
Our work builds on seminal papers in the literature such as Deaton (1999), Sachs &
Warner (1995) and Sachs & Warner (2001) that highlight the tight connection between GDP
growth and commodity prices of raw material exporting countries, and which is also shown
in more recent work by Drechsel & Tenreyro (2018) and Fernández et al. (2017). Several
papers discuss the implications of the “resource curse” of developing countries (see Frankel
(2010) for an overview) which is, however, disputed by other authors (James 2015, Alexeev
& Conrad 2009, Davis 1995).
Several papers study the relevance of commodity prices for determining sovereign risk.
Arezki & Brückner (2011b) study the effect of windfall gains from commodity price shocks on
sovereign bond yield spreads. They find that higher commodity prices reduce sovereign yield
spreads in democratic regimes and increase yield spreads in autocratic regimes, pointing to
the resource curse in countries with poor institutions. Similar results are found for countries’
external debt ratios in Arezki & Brückner (2012). Hilscher & Nosbusch (2010) use export
commodity prices to instrument terms of trade and their effect on sovereign bond spreads
at an annual frequency. They find that the level and volatility of terms of trade explain
a huge fraction of annual variation of sovereign yield spreads. Aizenman et al. (2016) find
that higher volatility of commodity terms of trade is associated with an increase in sovereign
CDS.24
We contribute to this literature by studying the channels shaping the commodity depen-
dence of sovereign default risk (such as the size, volatility or diversification of the country’s
commodity exporting regime, the stance of the domestic economy, monetary policy, capi-
tal controls, as well as institutional and policy factors). Thereby, we aim at explaining the
heterogeneity of the effects of commodity price shocks to sovereign solvency across different
emerging markets which informs the policy debate on how to curb the commodity-sovereign
risk-nexus. Furthermore, we use daily data instead of quarterly or yearly averages. Daily
variation in sovereign bond and commodity prices is less susceptible to endogenously formed
policy decisions: On a yearly basis, policy makers might adjust e.g. institutions with respect
24A related literature shows that commodity prices determine the value of commodity currencies, by shaping
terms of trade and the generation of foreign exchange revenues (Chen & Rogoff (2003); Cashin et al. (2004);
Kohlscheen et al. (2017)).
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to longer-term commodity price changes. On a daily basis, institutional quality is given and
cannot be adjusted to cushion, for instance, the impact of a negative commodity price shock
hitting a country on this day.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we describe the data we
use in order to isolate commodity dependence. Section 3.3 presents our empirical strategy
and reports our baseline results. Following on this, Section 3.4 investigates the drivers of
commodity dependence and discusses the effect of policy measures to tackle it. We conduct
encompassing robustness checks in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Sovereign Default Risk
Our sovereign default risk measure is drawn from the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI)
provided by J.P. Morgan. Sovereign bonds that are issued by emerging markets and included
in the EMBI are US dollar-denominated which rules out exchange rate risk. Issued debt must
furthermore have more than one year to maturity and exceed an outstanding face value of $500
million to be eligible for the EMBI. For these reasons, EMBI returns are a well standardized,
widely used and liquid measure to track the daily performance of emerging market sovereign
debt. For our analysis, we use EMBI Global data as it covers more instruments than the
original EMBI+ index and has better data availability.
The introduction of the EMBI Global at the end of 1993 determines the beginning of
our estimation period which is set from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2016, though some
countries enter only at later points in time. We collect EMBI Global data for a panel of 34
countries which can be found in Table 3.1. Though more countries with EMBI data exist,
data availability with respect to other variables, in particular stock returns, restricts our
sample to the set of the countries listed below. To make sure every country included has
sufficient variation, we include a country if it has liquid EMBI data for at least nine years,
i.e. at least since 2008.25
25Though we could also choose a ten year inclusion rule, the countries Ghana, Jamaica, Kazakhstan and
Sri Lanka start reporting EMBI data in 2007. Also, Thailand reports a nine year EMBI period from 1997 to
2006. To include these countries, we set the threshold at nine years.
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Africa Egypt -0.0215 0.00292 3910
Ghana -0.0967 0.0125 1665
Ivory Coast 0.839 0.00503 1937
Morocco -0.187 0.0177 3349
Nigeria -0.240 0.0142 3658
South Africa -0.0733 0.00888 4149
Tunisia -.00262 0.0224 2255
Americas Argentina 0.316 0.0108 5975
Brazil -0.405 0.00502 5833
Chile -0.0173 0.0181 4519
Colombia -0.145 0.0135 5142
Ecuador -0.136 0.0263 4746
Jamaica 0.0173 0.0212 2186
Mexico -0.133 0.0217 5971
Panama -0.118 0.0135 2137
Peru -0.169 0.0103 5116
Venezuela -0.0985 0.0393 4826
Asia China -0.0126 0.00739 5796
Indonesia -0.139 0.0187 3225
Kazakhstan -0.109 0.0128 2436
Malaysia -0.0250 0.0219 5131
Pakistan -0.192 -0.000387 3243
Philippines -0.0937 0.00231 4889
Russia -0.125 0.0155 4928
Sri Lanka -0.0458 0.0236 2328
Thailand -0.153 0.0183 2209
Turkey -0.185 0.00126 5315
Vietnam -0.0810 0.0137 2573
Europe Bulgaria -0.306 0.0109 2229
Croatia -0.169 .0153 2374
Hungary -0.0385 -0.00276 4641
Poland -0.0748 0.0114 5681
Serbia -0.0909 0.0102 2229
Ukraine -0.171 0.00612 2715
Sample period is 01/01/1994–31/12/2016. ∆EMBI (first difference of natural log of Emerging-Market-
Bond-Index) is winsorized at 5th and 95th, ∆CommodityPerformance (export-weighted commodity re-
turns) is winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. See Table A.3.3 for definitions and sources.
Data is drawn on a daily frequency to exploit maximum data variation and give our
estimation strategy the perspective of market participants that incorporate daily news into
their investment behavior. Our dependent variable is the daily first difference of a country’s
EMBI yield spread (relative to the U.S. treasury rate), so that positive changes in the EMBI
spread indicate declining sovereign creditworthiness (or increasing sovereign risk).
While all other data is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, we winsorize EMBI
spread data on the 5th and 95th percentile because the raw spread differences have occasion-
ally extreme values. We account for episodes with temporarily illiquid country EMBI indices
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by dropping observations with zero changes in the EMBI spread that occur for more than
two consecutive trading days. In a robustness check, we also drop all countries exhibiting
such periods of low liquidity and find results in line with our main specification.
3.2.2 Deriving Country-specific Commodity Performance
We construct the daily export-weighted commodity performance by weighting commodity
price returns with the country’s commodity export shares. In order to determine which
commodities are to be included in the export portfolio of each country, we refer to the
commodities comprising the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) provided by S&P. The
GSCI provides daily spot index data of 24 commodities in the main index. Each commodity
can be grouped either under agriculture, livestock, industrial metals, precious metals or
energy. Each of these sub-groups also has its own aggregated group price index. The GSCI
includes commodity types based on global production values and the availability of active
and liquid futures markets. Commodities in the index are therefore frequently traded and
priced in U.S. dollar which is in contrast to many regional commodity price data sources
that often suffer from periods of poor liquidity. By using GSCI data, we make sure that our
commodity portfolio measures include both highly relevant and globally-priced commodities.
Table 3.2 contains a list of all commodities.
We match commodity price to commodity export data derived from the UN’s Comtrade
Database and ITC’s Trade Map. Most commodity export volumes can be directly matched to
their corresponding prices. However, some price series start after the beginning of our sample
period in 1994 or have only a roughly corresponding export match. This issue concerns energy
and petroleum-based commodity prices which are included in the GSCI as WTI crude oil,
Brent crude oil, gas oil, heating oil, gasoline and natural gas. As there is no perfect export
match for all of these commodities, for instance if a crude oil export is classified under WTI or
Brent standards, and because price data for Brent crude oil and gas oil starts only after 1994,
we aggregate these commodities under their sub-group price index, i.e. energy. The matching
export data includes all crude oil and petroleum gas exports. Since all price returns within
the energy group are highly correlated, we believe that this sub-group-level aggregation is the
most precise way to capture and price petroleum-based exports and to avoid a potentially
biasing match between not fully overlapping price and export data.
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We further aggregate the GSCI price series Kansas wheat and CBOT wheat under the
aggregated price series “All Wheat” and the series for feeder cattle and live cattle under the
aggregated spot index of “All Cattle”. Table 3.2 reports the final match between commodity
price and export data.
Export volumes for different commodities are available on a yearly () frequency only.
We therefore calculate the share of each commodity on the total commodity exports of each
country as a yearly-varying weighting factor.
Each daily commodity price return is then multiplied by its country-specific weighting
factor. However, we lag the export weights by one year in order to rule out commodity
prices mechanically affecting commodity export weights. In a robustness check in Section
3.5, we also report results with constant commodity weights observed at the beginning of the
sample, which leads to robust conclusions. We aggregate the weighted commodity returns
over all commodities  on a daily basis  for each country , arriving at a country-specific





We will also test different versions of the commodity performance index to control for




















Coffee 090111: Coffee (excludingroasted and decaffeinated)
Corn 1005: Maize or corn
Cotton 52: Cotton
Soybeans 1201: Soya beans,whether or not broken
Sugar 1701: Cane or beet sugarand chemically pure sucrose
Wheat (CBOT) All





cattle 010229: Live cattleLive Cattle
Brent Crude Oil
Energy
2709: Petroleum oils and oils
obtained from bituminous
minerals, crude
































7108: Gold, (...) unwrought or
not further worked than semi-
manufactured or in powder form
Silver
261610: Silver ores and
concentrates
7106: Silver, (...) unwrought or
in semi-manufactured forms,
or in powder form
Match between commodity prices (from GSCI) and export quantities (from
UN’s Comtrade Database and ITC’s Trade Map). We use each commod-
ity export and its corresponding single GSCI price index to construct our
weighted commodity performance measure. Exceptions are for the sub-
groups wheat, cattle and energy, which are in bold type, and for which we
use the GSCI sub-group price index.
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3.2.3 Set of Control Variables
In order to isolate the impact of country-specific commodity performance on sovereign risk, we
introduce a broad set of explanatory variables to capture international and national financial
market developments.
To distinguish the effects of country-specific commodity price shocks from general eco-
nomic fluctuations affecting a country, we control for a country’s daily stock market returns.
Stocks returns should partly capture the effects of commodity prices either via stock prices
of commodity exporting companies or by signaling the overall stance of the economy. Con-
trolling for stock returns, we aim to measure the impact of exported commodity prices on
sovereign risk beyond these effects. Deriving daily, liquid stock market data for emerging
markets can be challenging and therefore restricts our sample as described above. We draw
equity returns from either MSCI, Datastream or S&P, depending on which provider has the
longest and most complete series. We handle liquidity concerns the same way as we did for
EMBIs by setting zero returns to missing if they occur for more than two consecutive trading
days. All of our series are in U.S. dollar in order to match with EMBI and GSCI returns.
Introducing EMBI and contemporaneous stock returns could lead to reverse causality con-
cerns. We therefore lag the stock returns by one day, though our results do not depend on
this choice. We expect higher lagged stock returns to have a negative effect on sovereign risk.
As a second country-specific control variable, we introduce exchange rate returns of each
country’s currency towards the U.S. dollar. Higher commodity prices could lead to an appre-
ciation of a country’s currency which could affect the export performance of non-commodity
exporting firms and therefore impact sovereign risk. Exchange rate movements are measured
as a daily percentage change and drawn from Thomson Reuters. We again lag the returns
by one day as higher EMBI spreads could otherwise drive the exchange rate of the same day.
Higher values indicate depreciation of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar.
We further control for daily changes in the VIX to capture the implied volatility of U.S.
equity markets. Also, we include the U.S. corporate credit spread which is the yield difference
between the S&P U.S. high yield corporate bond index and the corresponding S&P investment
grade corporate bond index. Both variables capture volatility and risk premiums in U.S.
financial markets that could easily spill-over to emerging market financing conditions, given
the importance of global factors for sovereign creditworthiness (Longstaff et al. 2011). We
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expect them to enter with a positive sign in describing EMBI spreads of a country. We also
control for the U.S. term spread, i.e. the yield difference between a 10-year U.S. treasury
bond and a 3-month U.S. T-Bill. The term spread approximates the premium investors
receive for long-term investments. We furthermore control for changes in the yield of 10-year
U.S. treasury bonds to approximate the general interest rate environment. Lastly, we want
to control for general effects in the market for government debt. We do so by including the
daily return of the BofA Merrill Lynch global government bond index and expect a negative
correlation with emerging market sovereign risk.
All control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to alleviate the impact
of outliers. Summary statistics for all daily variables in our baseline estimation can be found
in Table 3.3, all precise variable definitions and sources can be found in Table A.3.3.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Baseline Specification and Results
We estimate the following OLS panel regression model using daily data for 34 countries from
 = January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2016:
∆ = 1∆ + ∆() +  +  +  (9)
∆ measures daily changes in the EMBI Global Spread of country  relative to U.S.
Treasuries. Higher EMBI spreads indicate rising sovereign risk. ∆
is the right-hand-side variable of interest and captures export-weighted commodity price
returns of each country, as described in Section 3.2.2. Our hypothesis is that 1 is negative,
i.e. higher prices of a country’s key commodity exports are associated with lower sovereign
risk.
∆() encompasses all control variables introduced in the previous section, i.e.
lagged stock returns, lagged exchange rate returns, global government bond index returns
and changes in the VIX, U.S. corporate spread, U.S. term spread and 10-year U.S. treasury
yields.  are country fixed effects which account for time-invariant country-specific factors,
such as permanent market structures in a country’s commodity exports. We also include
time fixed effects  for every month to capture time-specific, market-wide developments
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of all variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max
∆EMBI 148,973 -0.0808 -0.0808 9.433 -21 21.00
∆CommodityPerformance 175,583 0.0130 0.0130 1.333 -5.226 5.108
∆StockIndex 165,407 0.00902 0.00902 1.623 -5.478 5.187
∆ExchangeRate 196,316 0.0203 0.0203 0.543 -1.906 2.197
∆VIX 204,000 -0.00248 -0.01 1.315 -3.875 4.755
∆GlobalGovernmentBondIndex 204,000 0.0177 0.0126 0.377 -1.004 1.048
∆TermSpread 204,000 -0.000149 0 0.0591 -0.161 0.186
∆CorporateSpread 204,000 -2.30e-05 -0.00136 0.0811 -0.246 0.285
∆10YearTreasuryYield 204,000 -0.000595 0 0.0560 -0.150 0.164
CommodityExportShare 177,928 22.91 14.27 23.47 0.319 99.65
CommodityStandardDeviation 180,313 1.225 1.130 0.505 0.0692 3.780
CommodityHHI 180,551 0.499 0.440 0.254 0.124 1.000
SpecializationAgriculture 177,928 0.170 0 0.376 0 1
SpecializationLiveStock 177,928 0 0 0 0 0
SpecializationEnergy 177,928 0.323 0 0.467 0 1
SpecializationIndustryMetals 177,928 0.0704 0 0.256 0 1
SpecializationPreciousMetals 177,928 0.0601 0 0.238 0 1
GDPGrowth 204,034 0.973 1.081 2.297 -10.83 9.019
TaxRevenueToGDP 163,848 15.74 15.38 4.643 1.830 26.49
CorporateProfitToGDP 90,145 0.252 0.208 0.229 5.91e-05 1.951
DebtToGDP 172,721 47.00 42.55 28.01 5.350 143.5
Inflation 203,740 10.19 6.180 12.02 0.570 50.04
SovereignDebtCrisis 204,000 0.0141 0 0.118 0 1
YearsSinceLastRestructuring 204,000 22.47 19 15.17 0 40
GDPPerCapita 202,699 5,600 4,765 3,808 505.1 15,202
FederalFundsRate 204,034 2.694 2 2.345 0.0400 7.800
ControlOfCorruption 186,320 42.54 45.16 19.78 0.510 91.88
RuleOfLaw 186,320 42.41 43.19 19.14 0.470 89.47
PoliticalStability 186,320 35.13 34.12 20.99 0.470 91.49
GiniRedistribution 198,815 5.381 4.200 5.985 -6.200 24.10
ManufacturingShare 196,467 16.47 15.75 5.340 6.553 31.55
FDI-Inflows 202,990 3.439 2.680 2.828 -0.250 13.90
GFCF 202,728 22.46 21.66 6.102 9.790 43.59
ReservesToGDP 199,385 0.152 0.129 0.0970 0.00110 0.453
KOF 204,034 62.14 61.97 9.699 32.06 86.10
ChinnIto 195,948 -0.0883 -0.136 1.308 -1.910 2.360
IBRDLoans 196,466 0.0381 0.0206 0.0561 0 0.394
NetAidGNI 185,512 1.080 0.350 2.062 -0.220 12.11
Sample period is 01/01/1994–31/12/2016. Variables with ∆ are in daily growth rates, all other variables
are in levels. ∆EMBI is winsorized at 5th and 95th, all other variables at 1st and 99th percentile. See
Table A.3.3 for definitions and sources.
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that have a common effect on all countries. We cluster standard errors at the country level
to allow for the correlation of unobserved factors in the error terms within countries.
The results if and by how much export-weighted commodity prices affect sovereign risk
are reported in Table 3.4. Model (1) uses neither control variables, nor fixed effects. Model
(2) includes fixed effects. Baseline model (3) uses the full set of control variables and fixed
effects. Model (4) interacts the commodity price index with a dummy variable indicating as
to whether the country is a heavy commodity exporter, which is defined as having a share
of commodity exports on total exports equal or above the 90th percentile. This percentile
starts at a commodity export share of 56.5% and applies to Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan,
Nigeria, Peru and Venezuela. In all specifications, we can reject the null hypothesis of a zero
effect of commodity price returns on sovereign bond returns at the 1% level of statistical
significance. Investors appear to anticipate an increase in sovereign risk when the prices of a
country’s exported commodities deteriorate. This result has a strong footing in the literature,
for example, Hilscher & Nosbusch (2010) show that commodity prices are a key determinant
of a country’s terms of trade, which are known to affect sovereign risk.
Turning to the economic significance, an increase in the commodity performance variable
by one standard deviation is associated with a 33.2 bps (0.2488  1.3328) increase in EMBI
spread differences on average which corresponds to roughly 3.5% of the standard deviation
of EMBI differences (0.3316  9.4332) which is economically meaningful (column (3)). For
heavy commodity exporters (with a commodity share on total exports equal or above the
90th percentile, see column (4)) we find that a one standard deviation increase in export
commodity price returns is associated with a 47.5 bps increase in EMBI spread differences
(corresponding to 5% of the EMBI’s standard deviation). This amount equals around 40% of
the standardized effects of the VIX and the corporate bond spread. Commodity price changes
are therefore an important driver of the sovereign debt performance of emerging markets in
the daily perspective of financial markets.
Regarding the remaining control variables, we find signs and significance levels broadly in
line with our expectations. Stock market returns enter with a negative sign in the regression
and are both statistically and economically highly significant. Positive changes in the VIX, the
corporate spread and exchange rate depreciations are associated with higher EMBI spreads,
whereas rising global government bond returns and U.S. treasury bond yields enter with a
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negative sign and all with statistically significant coefficients. The term spread carries a
positive sign but is not statistically significant. Our evidence for the importance of these
global variables is well-embedded in the literature (Longstaff et al. 2011).
Table 3.4: Baseline results: commodity performance and sovereign risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.855*** -0.812*** -0.249*** -0.202***





















Constant -0.0692* -0.0697*** -0.101*** -0.135***
(0.0381) (0.000844) (0.00356) (0.0155)
Observations 143,075 143,075 129,316 128,031
R-squared 0.016 0.040 0.217 0.219
Time & Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily first difference of a country’s Emerging
Market Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s
exported commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994
to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3. HighComExport is a dummy variable
being 1 if a country’s share of commodity exports on total exports is equal or above the 90th percentile of
countries in the panel and 0 otherwise. Estimations include country and time fixed effects on the monthly
level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.3.2 Alternative Specifications
In this section, we address possible concerns in our empirical specification. First, we con-
sider the effects of market power of domestic commodity exporters. Most papers argue that
commodity prices traded at highly centralized world markets are exogenous to domestic fun-
damentals (e.g. Chen & Rogoff (2003)). Still, the largest exporters of a commodity may not
have to take global commodity prices as given, but can strategically manipulate raw mate-
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rial rates through domestic production decisions (Clements & Fry (2008)). If so, domestic
concerns such as deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness could impact commodity produc-
tion which would then affect global commodity prices and thus entail a reversal effect in our
econometric inference. To test the importance of this concern, we specify a version of our
commodity portfolio variable that is more precise in affecting only price takers of a raw ma-
terial. To do so, we construct the shares of each country’s commodity exports on the global
export volume of this specific commodity. We then remove a commodity in the weighted
portfolio of a country if this country has at any point in our sample period a global export
share of more than 10% for the respective commodity. This threshold is fairly low and Table
A.3.1 shows that almost every commodity is affected by one or more of such dominant global
exporters. If a commodity is removed from a country’s portfolio due to this procedure, the
remaining commodity weights are re-adjusted. We repeat our baseline estimation with this
world market-adjusted commodity performance version. The estimated coefficient of the ad-
justed commodity variable remains statistically highly significant and is even somewhat larger
than the baseline version (Table 3.5, column (1)). This result could indeed suggest that there
is strategic behavior in price-setting decisions. Nevertheless, this specification underlines our
main result that emerging markets’ sovereign creditworthiness is commodity-dependent, and,
if anything, price-taking commodity exporters are even stronger affected.
Second, we want to make sure that the variation in our export-weighted commodity vari-
able is not driven by re-exported commodities. Should raw materials actually be imported
from other countries and then get re-exported, we would falsely classify countries as commod-
ity exporters even though actual net exports are much lower. A related issue could be that
price increases of key import goods could dominate favorable price fluctuations of important
export products. To address these concerns, we construct a portfolio variable capturing the
net export values of commodity sales. To this end, we first multiply a country’s absolute
export value (in U.S. dollars) of each commodity with its daily price change. This measure
gives an indication of the extra export revenue generated or lost due to the commodity’s price
change. We do the same procedure for absolute import values (in U.S. dollars) and aggre-
gate revenue changes for imports and exports for each country on a daily basis. Second, we
subtract the import-weighted price changes from the export-weighted price changes. The re-
sulting variable gives us the net-export values we are after by allowing for negative net-exports
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and hence negative returns, for instance if a country that imports more energy commodities
than it exports faces rising energy prices. Lastly, we scale the derived net returns by dividing
the net-export return variable by each country’s GDP in U.S. dollars. In sum, this variable
adjusts the original commodity performance by taking the price fluctuations of a country’s
most important import commodities into account. In this way, the variable approximates the
commodity-specific terms of trade of a country, which were shown to matter for sovereign
risk in Hilscher & Nosbusch (2010). Results in column (2) of Table 3.5 illustrate that the
derived variable has a negative effect on sovereign risk that is statistically significant at the
1% level. Commodity prices are therefore, even when only regarding net exports, affecting
the sovereign debt performance of emerging markets.
Lastly, our baseline models (plausibly) assume a continuous price impact so that a one unit
change in commodity prices results in a given impact on yield spreads (no matter how large
the price change in commodities). In the following robustness check, we assume that investors’
attention is rather focused on trading days with large price changes in commodity prices rather
than a continuous pricing. To do so, we change our commodity performance variable in a
way that takes both the economic importance of exported commodities (affectedness) and key
price events (treatment) into account. To this end, we mark the (at most) five commodities
in a country’s portfolio that have the greatest weight as long as this weight share is over 10%
of total commodity exports. No country has a higher number of commodities than five for
which this criterion applies. These commodities are coded with 1, other commodities with
0. We then mark all trading days in which a commodity had a positive price shock which
is defined as having a price change above the respective 75th percentile (positive shock).
We do the same for negative shocks, defined as a price change below the 25th percentile.
We multiply the dummies for a country’s most important commodities with their respective
positive and negative price shock variables, separately. The resulting country-specific and
daily-varying variable for each commodity is 1 if the commodity is economically important
for the respective country and has a positive price shock event on this day. We then aggregate
these dummies over all commodities, separately for the positive and negative price shocks.
The resulting positive-shock variable can take values from 0 (no price shock for economically
important commodities) to 5 (all economically important commodities for a country are
subject to a positive price shock on the same day). Finally, we subtract the aggregated
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negative shocks from the aggregated positive shocks and arrive at a net-shock-indicator that
ranges between -5 (all important negative shocks materialize) and +5 (all important positive
shocks materialize). Note that a value of e.g. 0 on a given day can imply that either no
price shock that mattered for the respective country took place or that occurring positive
and negative shocks canceled each other out. We use the net-shock-indicator as our new
commodity performance measure in our baseline. Column (3) reports a statistically significant
effect at the 1% level. Economically, if the indicator increases by 1 unit, the EMBI spread
differences decrease by roughly 18.7 bps.
















Observations 129,901 126,483 129,901
R-squared 0.216 0.219 0.216
Number of Countries 34 34 34
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily first difference of a country’s Emerging
Market Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s
exported commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Column (1) excludes a commodity from
a country’s portfolio if the country had at any point in time a world market share of more than 10% for
this commodity (see Table A.3.1 for affected commodities). Column (2) takes imported commodities in
the calculation of ∆CommodityPerformance into account. Column (3) captures relevant commodities for
each country and daily price events and aggregates them to a net-shock index. Estimation period is from
01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables include a
country’s stock index and exchange (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S.
corporate spread, U.S. 10-year treasury yield and global government bond index. Estimations include
country and time fixed effects on the monthly level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.4 Drivers of the Commodity-Sovereign Risk Dependence
We now turn to investigate potential drivers of the spillover of export-weighted commodity
price changes to sovereign risk. If emerging markets are commodity-dependent, as the previ-
ous section indicated, it is important for policy makers to know what affects this dependency
and which macroeconomic factors or policy measures can potentially reduce commodity de-
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pendence. These policy-parameters are so far hardly explored. For instance, Bouri et al.
(2017) find that the spillover of commodity prices on sovereign risk varies across countries
and over time, which the authors argue to be due to politically, economically or monetary
policy related factors. We intend to identify these driving factors. We test the hypothe-
ses if commodity-sovereign risk is driven by channels approximating commodity-related fac-
tors (3.4.1), macroeconomic and international factors (3.4.2), and a range of possible policy
measures to limit commodity dependence (3.4.3). For each channel under investigation we
estimate the baseline regression (9) and interact, in order to rule out reverse effects, with
the yearly-, quarterly-, monthly- or daily-lagged value of the respective channel unless stated
otherwise:2627
∆ =1∆  1 + 21+
3∆ + ∆() +  +  + 
(10)
We expect channels that increase the commodity dependence of emerging markets to enter
with a negative sign for the respective interaction term, while channels that could mitigate
the spillover to have a positive interaction coefficient.
Following Nizalova & Murtazashvili (2016) and Bun & Harrison (2019), we argue that our
interaction coefficients are consistently estimated, as long as one variable in the interaction
term is exogenously determined. This assumption holds plausibly for weighted commodity
prices which are largely world-marked determined. Furthermore, we demonstrated in Section
3.3.2 that potentially biasing effects are small in size and do not disturb our main results.
Therefore, even if some channels could be endogenous with respect to sovereign risk, we
argue that the interaction terms allow for exogenous interpretation. Summary statistics on
interaction variables are in Table 3.3, all data sources are reported in Table A.3.3.
3.4.1 Commodity-related Factors
A natural starting point is to check if countries that have a larger share of commodity ex-
ports on their total export volume also face a more forceful commodity price spillover. To
test this, we interact with the share of total commodity exports on total exports of each coun-
26Since we use an emerging market panel, not all countries have full data on all interaction variables. We
report on this when it becomes an issue. Definition and sources of all variables can be found in Table A.3.3
27In order to ensure correct specification, interaction models also contain the single linear terms of interacted
variables (Brambor et al. 2006).
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try. As expected, the interaction coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level as reported in Table 3.6, column (1). The margin plot depicted in Figure 3.1 shows the
marginal effect of increasing commodity performance on sovereign risk depending on the level
of the commodity-export share. It suggests that commodity price changes turn statistically
significant in impacting sovereign risk at an export share of roughly 5% and increase their
impact further beyond this threshold.28 Thus, a larger commodity export industry increases
the commodity-sovereign risk dependence. Possible explanations for this result may be that
a larger commodity export industry is associated with a more pronounced impact of com-
modity prices on economic growth and thus fiscal revenues and public expenditures. A larger
commodity export industry should also increase potential direct cash flows to the government
via publicly owned commodity firms or royalties to the government.
We next test if higher volatility of a country’s export commodity prices is associated
with a more intense commodity-sovereign risk dependence. To do so, we calculate the rolling
standard deviation of each country’s export-weighted commodity returns on a 23-day basis,
which is roughly the number of trading days each month. The respective interaction coeffi-
cient is, however, statistically insignificant (column (2)). In addition, the resulting margin
plot reported in Figure 3.1, does not lead to the conclusion that with more volatile price
fluctuations of a country’s key commodities in the previous month, current price changes
have stronger effects on sovereign risk.
Having a high concentration in just one commodity could be associated with a stronger
commodity dependence of a country since it has no diversification benefits in case of a shock
to its key raw material. We test this hypothesis by constructing the yearly Hirschman-
Herfindahl-Index (HHI), i.e. the sum of squared commodity export weights for each country.
The HHI varies from roughly 0.15 for well-diversified export countries such as Poland, to
almost 1 for oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria or Venezuela. The interaction of the
contemporaneous HHI with the commodity portfolio yields a coefficient with positive sign
that is, however, small and statistically insignificant (Table 3.6, column (3)). This ambiguous
relationship is also confirmed in the margin plot depicted in Figure 3.1 and was also found
similarly in the latest report by UNCTAD (2019). One explanation of this result could be that
28The GSCI, from which we derive the included commodities, covers the most important but not all
commodities. It is unlikely that our results are biased because of this, nevertheless, calculated ratios such as
commodity export shares are not comparable one-to-one with those reported e.g. in UNCTAD (2019).
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as long as a country is commodity-dependent, it does not matter much if this dependency is
towards several or only one raw material. We therefore conclude that the volatility, variety or
concentration of commodities is only of secondary importance for understanding commodity-
sovereign risk dependence of emerging markets.
Next, we test if exporting certain commodities entails stronger commodity dependence
than others. We focus on the commodity subgroup level depicted in Table 3.2. We define a
country as being specialized in a certain commodity subgroup if this subgroup has a share
on total exports above the 10% ratio. This criterion has the advantage that more diversified
countries can be specialized in several commodity subgroups. Also, we capture economically
critical specialization patterns. Interacting with the five dummies representing the subgroups,
we find that commodity price dependence is slightly larger for countries specializing in energy
with the interaction term statistically significant at the 10% level (column (4)). Bouri et al.
(2017) and Bouri et al. (2018) find a similar effect. On the other hand, countries specializing
in exporting industrial metals reveal statistically significantly lower commodity dependence
at the 5% level. One reason could be that industrial metal sectors could facilitate the fostering
of manufacturing sectors and other downstream technologies, which we show to be important
drivers in reducing commodity dependence in the following sections. Another explanation
could be that the public sector share of energy exports (such as crude oil) is larger compared
to the public sector share in exporting industrial metals.
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Table 3.6: Drivers of commodity-sovereign risk dependence: commodity-related factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.0824 -0.290*** -0.351** -0.151***











































Observations 128,478 128,097 128,031 128,031
R-squared 0.220 0.218 0.218 0.219
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily first difference of a coun-
try’s Emerging Market Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted
price index of a country’s exported commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. In-
teraction terms of ∆CommodityPerformance with CommodityExportShare ((1), share of commod-
ity exports on total exports), CommodityStandardDeviation ((2), rolling standard deviation of
∆CommodityPerformance of past 23 business days), CommodityHHI ((3), concentration index of export
weights in ∆CommodityPerformance), specialization in different commodity subgroups ((4) subgroup ex-
ports are at least 10% of total exports) are estimated. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016.
Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables include a country’s stock index and ex-
change rate (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year
U.S. treasury yield and global government bond index. Estimations include country and time fixed effects
on the monthly level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effects of commodity performance on EMBI spread returns interacted
with commodity-related factors. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Distribution of
interaction variable is shown. Results of the corresponding regressions are in Table 3.6.
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3.4.2 Macroeconomic and International Factors
We turn to investigate the impact of broader macroeconomic factors with respect to the
commodity dependence of emerging markets. Different macroeconomic environments could
ease or strengthen a country’s dependence on its commodities. For instance, one could
hypothesize that during a business cycle downturn, income streams from raw materials matter
more for countries than in good times because they can provide the fiscal means to address
the recession. We therefore start by interacting the export-weighted commodity portfolio
with lagged GDP growth, measured on a quarter-to-quarter basis. The resulting interaction
term, reported in column (1) of Table 3.7, enters with a positive sign that is statistically
significant at the 10% level. The margin plot in Figure 3.2 additionally confirms that prices
of exported commodities matter more for countries if they are in a business cycle downturn.
Commodity price spillovers turn insignificant at a quarterly GDP growth level of roughly
4%. This result fits into the general finding in the literature, that asset price co-movement
is intensified during crisis periods (see, e.g., Hartmann et al. (2004)).
We dig deeper into the importance of the business cycle, first, by interacting with the tax
revenues of a government scaled by GDP. Since tax revenues vary positively with the business
cycle but also, if higher, make a country less dependent on export gains from commodities,
we would also expect a positive coefficient for the interaction term of lagged tax revenues
and weighted commodity price changes. We find some confirmation for this with the positive
margin plot in Figure 3.2 in which commodity shocks become statistically insignificant in
explaining sovereign risk at higher levels of tax revenues. The corresponding coefficient in
column (2) is positive but not statistically significant. One further measure for business cycle
effects are profits achieved in the corporate sector. We therefore interact our commodity vari-
able with the lagged ratio of corporate sector profits to GDP which is, however, only available
for 16 countries in our sample. The resulting coefficient has the expected positive sign and is
statistically significant at the 10% level (column (3)). In addition, the margin plot depicted
in Figure 3.2 lends support to the hypothesis that with higher corporate profits, commod-
ity price spillovers eventually matter less than in times of lower private profits. Taking the
reduced sample size into account, we interpret these first three estimations as evidence that
commodity price shocks hit countries harder if their business cycle is in downturn and if both
private and public sectors have less capacity in terms of profits or tax revenues to fend off
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negative shocks. Our result is connected to Aizenman et al. (2013) who find a country’s fiscal
space to be important for its sovereign risk level.
The indebtedness of a country could be important for its reliance on commodities. Export
gains from raw materials might matter more for a country as an income source to stabilize
debt ratios if sovereign debt is larger which would speak for increased commodity depen-
dence. When interacting with the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio of a country, we find, however, a
positive interaction coefficient that is weakly statistically significant (column (4)). A possible
explanation for this surprising result may be that countries with on average higher public
debt ratios are less reliant on commodity exports because they can issue even more debt to
buffer commodity price shocks due to their higher fiscal capacities. On the contrary, countries
with low debt ratios may already have reached their country-specific critical debt levels and
may therefore not be able to issue new debt.
We next test the hypothesis that higher rates of inflation could be linked to commodity
price spillovers of emerging markets. If money loses its purchasing power through inflation,
income gains from commodities that are measured in U.S. dollar might matter more to
stabilize sovereign creditworthiness. However, we find no empirical confirmation for this
hypothesis. We report an estimated interaction term with lagged annual inflation (column
(5)) that is negative but statistically insignificant. The margin plot depicted in Figure 3.2
supports this finding. Though other papers like Aizenman et al. (2016) find inflation to be
an important determinant of sovereign risk, it could be the case that inflation dynamics do
not work through commodity prices in achieving this impact.
Related to the previous interactions, we test if commodity dependence increases if a coun-
try suffers a sovereign debt crisis. To this end, we exploit the systemic banking crises database
by Laeven & Valencia (2018). We interact commodity performance with a contemporaneous
dummy that indicates the year in which a country had a sovereign debt crisis. However, with
results shown in column (6), we find only weak confirmation that commodity price shocks
have a stronger spillover on sovereign creditworthiness during a sovereign debt crisis. While
we find the expected negative interaction coefficient, it is statistically insignificant. One rea-
son for this could be measurement error in that the crisis dummy is on a yearly basis which
is too imprecise given the daily frequency of our data.
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Digging deeper into the sovereign repayment history of a country and using an approach
that is less susceptible to the data issue above, we interact with a continuous variable that
measures the number of years since the last debt restructuring event occurred. We also
include those restructuring events that happened before the start of our sample period in
1994. Overall, 22 countries in our panel negotiated at least one sovereign debt restructuring.
The highest number of years since the last restructuring event is 36. For the twelve non-
defaulters, we therefore set the variable to 40 as a measure for a sovereign repayment history
without any restructuring events. The continuous variable enters negatively and statistically
significantly at the 10% level in interaction with commodity price changes (column (7)).
The margin plot in Figure 3.2 furthermore confirms the hypothesis that a country with a
distant or no sovereign debt restructuring history is hit significantly less by price shocks of
its commodity exports compared to a country with only recent cases of bond renegotiations.
This result could imply that financial markets pay closer attention to the commodity price
performance of countries with a less stable debt repayment history in recent years as suggested
by Reinhart et al. (2003), so that, for instance, negative price shocks of key commodities also
have a more forceful impact on the riskiness of the respective country’s debt.
Next, we test if the level of economic development matters for commodity related spillovers.
To this end, we build an interaction term between commodity performance and GDP per
capita of each country. The resulting interaction term has a negative sign but is small and
statistically insignificant (column (8)). This result could indicate that with regard to the
within variation of economic development that we are capturing, commodity dependence is
sticky for emerging market economies even if a country grows in terms of GDP. It could also
be because the countries in our sample are somewhat more developed since they report EMBI
and stock market data which leaves out poorer countries e.g. in Sub-Sahara-Africa. Never-
theless, this result gives us some confirmation that our remaining results are not driven by any
biases between richer and poorer countries, e.g. when it comes to institutional characteristics



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lastly, we want to analyze the effect of U.S. monetary policy on commodity dependence
of emerging markets. Interest rates set by the Federal Reserve are determined with regard
to the U.S. economy and likely only partially driven by economic developments of emerging
markets or commodity prices. However, as shown by Bräuning & Ivashina (2020), monetary
policy decisions in the U.S. have powerful effects for emerging markets in that expansionary
measures by the Federal Reserve increase international capital flows and borrowing behavior
by foreign firms. Furthermore, Frankel (2006) argues that U.S. monetary policy affects the
decision for commodity exporters when to extract raw materials, to hold inventories or for
investors to go into emerging markets rather than U.S. treasury bills. We therefore hold the
hypothesis that more expansionary monetary policy is associated with increasing commodity
dependence. Our interaction coefficient in column (9) that shows the effect of commodity
performance depending on the U.S. federal funds rate is in line with this hypothesis and
the literature. We find a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient at the 1%
level and a margin plot in Figure 3.2 which suggests that commodity dependence increases
significantly at a federal funds rate lower than 5%. While we cannot say more on the precise
channel, one interpretation could be that looser global financing conditions and capital flows
are used by emerging economies predominantly to increase economic activity in commodity
sectors.
Figure 3.2: Marginal effects of commodity performance on EMBI spread returns interacted
with macroeconomic and international factors. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Dis-








3.4.3 Policy Measures against Commodity Dependence
In order to inform the policy debate, we want to analyze what our model suggests to be
promising ways to lower commodity dependence. We focus on policy measures that are to
some degree more under government control than the broader macroeconomic or international
variables tested above.
First, we want to investigate if countries with higher institutional quality are less commodity-
dependent. To this end, we draw yearly data from the World Bank Governance Indicators
which conduct extensive surveys to approximate different forms of institutional quality. We
draw three indicators which we hypothesize to be related to the extraction process of com-
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modities or the usage of incomes from commodity sales and thus to the spillover of commodity
prices on sovereign risk: control of corruption, rule of law and political stability (and absence
of violence), which are all available from 1996 onwards.29
When interacting separately with the lagged yearly values of the three measures for in-
stitutional quality, we find clear results: All interaction terms are positive and strongly
statistically significant, with control of corruption and rule of law at the 1% level and po-
litical stability at the 5% level (Table 3.8, columns (1)-(3)). The margin plots depicted in
Figure 3.3 support the hypothesis that with better institutional quality, commodity price
shocks are less effective in impacting sovereign risk. This result implies that countries are
more commodity-dependent if institutional quality is worse, for instance when ownership or
legal frameworks in the production process of raw materials are less clearly structured. These
findings could indicate that with improving control of corruption and a stronger rule of law,
countries can mitigate rent extraction behavior in the production and selling of raw materi-
als, reinvest gains from commodity exports more effectively, or smooth negative commodity
price shocks. Our results are in line with Mehlum et al. (2006) who suggest that institutional
quality is the decisive criterion for commodities to be a curse or a source of wealth.
One could be concerned that institutional quality is more difficult to improve for commodity-
exporting countries (Arezki & Brückner 2011a). While our daily data structure in which in-
stitutional quality can be considered as given alleviates this concern somewhat, we also test
if our results hold if we repeat the analysis for heavy commodity exporters, defined as having
a commodity export share of more than 10% on total exports. We find that the statistical
significance of our result remains, except for the political stability interaction (Table A.3.2).
Therefore, even among stronger commodity exporters, those with effective institutions seem
to fare better in terms of reducing commodity dependence.
We test the differentiating impact of commodity prices on sovereign creditworthiness on a
further variable that approximates institutional quality namely the progressiveness of the tax
system. We draw yearly data on the Gini coefficient of emerging markets from the database by
Solt (2019).30 We build an interaction term with commodity performance and the amount
of tax redistribution, i.e. the difference between the pre- and post-tax Gini indices. This
29The indicators, ranging from 0 to 100, have occasional gaps in the early years which we close by linearly
interpolating the series.
30We aware that data on inequality of emerging markets is imperfect, even though the data quality by Solt
(2019) is considered to be standardized as best as possible. See Lang & Tavares (2018) for a discussion.
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measure approximates the progressiveness of the tax system and how much elites are taxed,
which could be related to the overall progressiveness of a country’s institutional framework.
The interaction term enters positive as shown in column (4) but is marginally insignificant
before the 10% level. However, the margin plot in Figure 3.3 additionally suggests that more
progressive tax systems are associated with less commodity dependence.
Next, we test three interactions that might alleviate emerging markets’ commodity depen-
dence. In a direct way, building stronger manufacturing sectors should lead to less dependence
on global price fluctuations of exported commodities. In a more indirect manner, attracting
FDI inflows can lead to technological spillovers which could also improve the economic struc-
ture of a country beyond pure commodity exporting. Lastly, increasing gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF) i.e. investments in plant, machinery, schools and infrastructure could
also diversify the economic structure of a country. We therefore interact, separately, with
lagged manufacturing value-added, net FDI inflows and GFCF investments, all as a share of
GDP. All interaction coefficients (columns (5), (6) (7)) are positive, with manufacturing and
FDI statistically significant at the 5% level but GFCF being statistically insignificant. Still,
all margin plots in Figure 3.3 strongly support the conclusion, speaking more broadly, that
fostering downstream production, investing in infrastructure and technology and diversifying
economic structures can be promising ways to reduce commodity dependence.
Figure 3.3: Marginal effects of commodity performance on EMBI spread returns interacted
with policy measures against commodity dependence (1). Bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals. Distribution of interaction variable is shown. Results of the corresponding regressions




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In recent years, several countries have started to build up foreign-exchange reserves as a
buffer e.g. for balance of payment crises. Higher foreign reserves could also affect commodity
dependence by providing sufficient security against balance of payment crises and hence more
stable macroeconomic environments. Negative terms of trade shocks, for instance through
lower commodity export prices, can also be better absorbed with higher reserves. Testing this
channel, we find evidence that countries with higher monthly foreign exchange reserves (rel-
ative to their GDP) are significantly less commodity-dependent as suggested by the positive
and statistically significant coefficient (1%) in column (1) in Table 3.9 and the margin plot in
Figure 3.4. Higher foreign exchange reserves could indeed reduce the dependence on foreign
exchange inflows via exporting commodities and serve as a buffer for commodity-induced
terms of trade shocks as suggested by Aizenman et al. (2012), thus mitigating the emergence
of sovereign distress caused by balance of payments problems.
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of capital controls and trade openness in associa-
tion with commodity price changes on sovereign creditworthiness. Aizenman et al. (2016) find
trade openness to be one of the key factors in determining sovereign risk. We hypothesize that
trade and capital openness is also related to commodity exports, for instance, by providing
transparent market access for foreign buyers or by making sure international capital inflows
can finance promising commodity projects that are difficult to fund domestically. We first use
the yearly KOF globalization index by Gygli et al. (2019) as an interaction term. This index
measures along several dimensions how open a country is towards trade and international
financial flows. Our evidence suggests that more open countries are significantly less depen-
dent on the price performance of their exported commodities, as shown by a significant (10%
level, column (2)) and positive interaction term coefficient and the margin plot in Figure 3.4.
Disentangling the KOF index into the de facto and de jure version shows that the de facto
variation matters more for this effect, which enters positive and statistically significant at the
5% level (Table A.3.2). This result is in line with the findings of Aizenman et al. (2016) who
underline the importance of trade openness for sovereign risk.
When using the Chinn-Ito-Index from Chinn & Ito (2006) as a measure for current and
capital account openness instead of the KOF index, we find largely similar if somewhat weaker
results. Though the interaction effect is positive but statistically insignificant, the marginal
effect depicted in Figure 3.4 lends support to the hypothesis that more closed-off economies
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have a stronger dependency on their commodities for their sovereign risk, as the marginal
effect of such spillovers decreases and eventually turns insignificant the more open capital
accounts are. This result could suggest that more open economies could be able to better
fend off a negative shock to their commodity performance because of deeper financial markets
and a broader set of financing choices. The stronger effects of the de facto KOF could imply
that attracting trade flows and financial investments can be a further means for diversifying
economic structures away from pure commodity extraction.
Lastly, we want to investigate the effects of development assistance measures on commod-
ity dependence. Development assistance is targeted to reduce poverty or improve health and
education systems. Theoretically, more development funding could also affect commodity de-
pendence by diversifying economic activities, incentivizing institutional reforms or investing
in infrastructure projects which we showed previously as effective ways to reduce commodity
dependence. We therefore interact commodity performance, first, with a country’s yearly ex-
posure of loans to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the International Development Association (IDA) scaled to GDP. Both institutions are the
main World Bank entities that extend loans to spur economic activity and to fight poverty
(see Dreher et al. (2019) for a paper on the political economy of IBRD). Second, we interact
with the yearly amount of net development assistance received scaled to GNI. However, we
find only weak confirmation that development assistance or World Bank loans are promis-
ing ways to reduce raw material reliance of emerging markets. For both interactions, the
coefficient has the expected positive sign, i.e. more assistance tends to decrease commod-
ity dependence (columns (4) and (5)). But both coefficients are statistically insignificant
and the slopes of the interaction effects, depicted in Figure 3.4, are small. If anything, we
find stronger effects for IBRD loans, in that a country is more commodity-dependent if it
has none or only small loan exposure compared to countries that have at least some IBRD
loan exposure. Therefore, we conclude that development assistance can potentially impact
commodity dependence, however, the more promising results were with regard to improving




Table 3.9: Drivers of commodity-sovereign risk dependence: policy measures (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.444*** -1.059** -0.257*** -0.335*** -0.271***































Observations 129,316 129,316 127,087 124,170 117,413
R-squared 0.217 0.217 0.215 0.213 0.210
Number of Countries 34 34 33 34 34
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily difference of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Interaction terms of ∆CommodityPerformance
with ReservesToGDP ((1), official reserve assets in U.S. Dollar to GDP in U.S. Dollar), KOF ((2), KOF
globalization index by Gygli et al. (2019)), ChinnIto ((3), Chinn-Ito capital account openness index by
Chinn & Ito (2006)), IBRDLoans ((4), outstanding International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and International Development Association loans to GDP) and NetAidGNI ((5), net official development
assistance to GNI) are estimated. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions
are provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables include a country’s stock index and exchange rate (to U.S.
Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield
and global government bond index. Estimations include country and time fixed effects on the monthly
level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of commodity performance on EMBI spread returns interacted
with policy measures against commodity dependence (2). Bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals. Distribution of interaction variable is shown. Results of the corresponding regressions




3.5.1 Dropping Countries with Liquidity Issues
We perform a range of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
First, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by liquidity issues some emerging
markets might have in their EMBI or stock market data. To do so, we first drop all countries
from the sample if their EMBI index turned temporarily illiquid during our estimation period,
which we define formally as a constant EMBI spread for at least seven consecutive trading
days. So far, we handled these periods by setting the affected EMBI changes to missing
for the respective countries. Dropping the eight affected countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Ivory
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Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia) and repeating our baseline estimation
(9) shows that the coefficient of export-weighted commodity price shocks is of similar size
and statistical significance as in our main specification (Table 3.10, column (1)).
We then exclude the five countries (Ecuador, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Panama)
whose stock market data has temporarily been varying only on a weekly instead of the daily
level, which we previously handled the same way as with the EMBI returns. Results in
column (2) report a commodity performance coefficient that is statistically significant at the
1% level, comparable to our main results.
Lastly, we drop all countries from the baseline estimation if they have less than 3000
business days of both stock market and EMBI return data which is somewhat over twelve
years of data. This criterion affects 13 countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Ghana, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Panama, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vietnam).
Results for this specification in column (3) yield a commodity performance coefficient that is
extremely close to our main specification and statistically significant at the 1% level. These
robustness checks indicate that our way of handling periods of lower liquidity in EMBI or
stock data, by setting the respective data to missing if zero returns occur for at least two
business days, was already a thorough method to deal with this issue and that any biases
from low liquidity periods are limited in importance.
Table 3.10: Robustness: dropping countries with liquidity issues
(1) (2) (3)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.269*** -0.243*** -0.268***
(0.0488) (0.0462) (0.0519)
Observations 108,062 116,645 100,043
R-squared 0.222 0.218 0.199
Number of Countries 26 29 21
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily differences of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Robustness checks repeat baseline equation and
include: (1): dropping all countries for which EMBI data turned, at some point, temporarily illiquid.
(2): dropping all countries for which stock market data turned, at some point, temporarily illiquid. (3):
dropping countries for which there are less than 3000 business days (roughly 12 years) of common EMBI
and stock market data. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are
provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables include a country’s stock index and exchange rate (to U.S.
Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield
and global government bond index. Estimations include country and time fixed effects on the monthly
level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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3.5.2 Alternative Specifications for EMBI and Commodity Performance
Next, we want to further alleviate concerns that our main results only hold because of the
way we measured our variable of interest, i.e. export-weighted commodity price changes.
We propose an alternative specification to capture price changes of key commodities of an
emerging market that is similar to the procedure we used to take commodity imports into
account in Section 3.3.2. We multiply price changes of a commodity with the absolute export
value (in U.S. dollars) of the specific commodity for every country. We aggregate these value-
weighted returns and then divide them by the GDP of each country. In this way, we take the
importance of commodity exports on the share of a country’s total economy into account,
similarly as with the interaction model for the share of commodity exports on total exports.
Our results are robust with respect to our previous findings, in that we report a coefficient of
GDP-weighted commodity export returns that is statistically significant in affecting sovereign
creditworthiness at the 1% level (Table 3.11, column (1)).
Though they are not part of the main GSCI index, there are additional GSCI spot price
series for orange juice, palladium, platinum, bio-fuel, soybean oil and tin. We match these
price series with the respective export volume of our sample countries and extend our com-
modity performance measure by these extra raw materials (except for orange juice which has
no clear export match). Reassuringly, we find a slightly stronger commodity performance
coefficient that is reported in column (2). However, the difference to the main specification is
small, likely because these extra commodities otherwise would have been in the main index.
We already made sure that commodity prices cannot influence contemporaneous com-
modity weights by lagging all weights by one year. We take an additional step to make sure
that export weights are unaffected by the price movement of the corresponding commodity
by fixing each weight at its first observed value. For most countries, this first observation is
in 1994. We hold this value constant for all periods thereafter. Our result is line with our
baseline coefficient, and also statistically significant at the 1% level (column (3)), reassuring
that most variation comes from commodity prices, whereas the weights are largely sticky.
In another robustness check we use sovereign credit default swap (CDS) premiums instead
of EMBI spreads to measure sovereign risk. We draw CDS data from Thomson Reuters which
is, however, only available since 2008 and only for 29 of our 34 sample countries. Comparable
to our main specification, we take the first difference of the CDS spread as a new dependent
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variable. Even despite the data limitations, our commodity performance measure continues
to have the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level (column (4)).
Table 3.11: Robustness: alternative specifications for EMBI and commodity performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)














Observations 127,357 129,901 129,901 54,982
R-squared 0.217 0.216 0.216 0.165
Number of Countries 34 34 34 29
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily difference of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Robustness checks repeat baseline equation and
include: (1): scaling CommodityPerformance to GDP. (2): including additional GSCI commodities in
CommodityPerformance. (3): Holding the first observed commodity export weight constant. (4): us-
ing CDS spreads (first difference) as a dependent variable. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to
12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables include a country’s stock
index and exchange rate (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate
spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield and global government bond index. Estimations include country and
time fixed effects on the monthly level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level,
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.5.3 Alternative Control Variables
We further check that we have sufficiently controlled for any influences that could impact the
relationship between commodity prices and sovereign risk. One further variation we might
want to control for comes from credit risk in the U.S. interbank market that could spill
over to emerging markets and which can be approximated by the TED spread. Though the
TED spread enters with a positive sign and statistical significance when added to our main
estimation, it does not change the significance level of our commodity performance measure
which remains at the 1% level (Table 3.12, column (1)).
So far, we have not controlled for the economic performance of the U.S. Therefore, another
potential variable worth including could be U.S. stock market returns, as they might affect
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both commodity prices and sovereign creditworthiness of emerging markets. However, adding
the daily natural log returns of the S&P 500 to our main specification leaves the coefficient
size and significance of the commodity performance almost unchanged (column (2)).
We also split up the term spread we included in our main specification and add changes
in the 3-month U.S. treasury bill rate as an additional control variable. Our main results are
not affected (column (3)).
Table 3.12: Robustness: alternative control variables
(1) (2) (3)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI








Observations 115,634 129,316 129,316
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.217
Number of Countries 34 34 34
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily differences of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Robustness checks repeat baseline equation and
include: (1): adding TED-Spread as additional control variable. (2): including S&P-500 return as ad-
ditional control variable. (3): including 3-month-TBill-yield instead of TermSpread as additional control
variable. Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table
A.3.3. Control variables include a country’s stock index and exchange rate (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes
in the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield and global government
bond index. Estimations include country and time fixed effects on the monthly level. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.5.4 Alternative Fixed Effects, Frequency, Clustering and Time Series Results
In order to account for market-wide changes at a higher frequency, we replace the month
fixed effects in our baseline estimation by week fixed effects. The commodity performance
coefficient becomes just slightly smaller in size due to this procedure but remains statistically
significant at the 1% level (Table 3.13, column (1)).
One further concern we want to alleviate is that the daily frequency in our data could be
too noisy for a robust inference. We therefore collapse our data to the monthly frequency and
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repeat our baseline estimation. We obtain a somewhat higher coefficient of export-weighted
commodity price shocks that is statistically significant at the 5% level (column (2)).
Furthermore, we cluster standard errors of our baseline both on the country and on
the week level, to also allow for the correlation of errors within weeks. Our results remain
statistically significant at the 1% level with this procedure (column (3)).
Next, we include day-of-the-week fixed effects to make sure our results are not driven by
trading anomalies on certain business days, e.g. Fridays. Our main results are not affected by
this approach (column (4)). We therefore conclude that the daily data structure is unlikely to
be too noisy or biased with respect to our research design, but rather captures the maximum
variation and information in the data.
Finally, we use time series regressions for each country to check for country-specific dif-
ferences in the commodity-sovereign risk-dependence (Table 3.14). Overall, 26 out of the 34
sample countries have the expected negative sign of commodity performance in explaining
sovereign risk. The coefficients are strongest for Argentina, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan,
Peru, Philippines and Venezuela, which is reasonable, as these countries are in general large
commodity exporters. Positive coefficients, though they are never statistically significant, are
obtained e.g. for Poland or Hungary, which rely to lesser extends on commodity exports.
Table 3.13: Robustness: alternative fixed effects, frequency and clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.209*** -0.433*** -0.249*** -0.249***
(0.0421) (0.205) (0.0541) (0.0441)
Observations 129,316 6,264 129,316 129,316
R-squared 0.256 0.285 0.217 0.217
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34
Week Time & Country FE Yes No No No
Month Time & Country FE No No Yes Yes
Year Time & Country FE No Yes No No
DayOfWeek FE No No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country& Week Country
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily differences of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. Robustness checks repeat baseline equation and
include: (1): applying weekly instead of monthly fixed effects. (2): collapsing data at monthly frequency.
(3): clustering on country- and week-level. (4): including day-of-the-week fixed effects. Estimation period
is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3. Control variables
include a country’s stock index and exchange rate (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes in the VIX, U.S. term
spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield and global government bond index. Estimations
include country and time fixed effects on the monthly level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper investigates the economic importance of commodity dependence on emerging
markets’ sovereign creditworthiness and derives macroeconomic and policy conditions that
could propagate or curb this dependence. Using daily data for 34 emerging market economies
from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2016, we measure dependence as the impact of country-
specific, export-weighted commodity price changes on EMBI sovereign bond yield spreads
relative to U.S. Treasuries (controlling for a large set of major national and international
financial indicators, country and time fixed effects). We obtain a statistically robust and
economically meaningful commodity-sovereign risk dependence channel.
For the full set of countries, a one standard deviation increase in commodity price re-
turns is associated on average with a 33.2 bps decrease in the EMBI spread differences. For
heavy exporters (with a commodity export share on total exports equal or above the 90th
percentile), the standardized effect yields a 47.5 bps decrease in EMBI spread differences
which corresponds to 5% of the EMBI’s standard deviation, and compares to around 40%
of the standardized effects of the VIX and the corporate risk spread. Thus, particularly for
commodity-dependent countries, commodity price fluctuations are a major determinant of
sovereign creditworthiness. This average effect can be further differentiated along the char-
acteristics of a country’s commodity portfolio, national and international macroeconomic
conditions and set of policy measures that affect commodity extraction.
We find, first, that commodity dependence increases with a larger share of commodity
exports on total exportations. Exporting predominantly energy is associated with tighter
commodity sensitivity, while the export of industrial metals with lower commodity depen-
dence. Diversification within the commodity portfolio, i.e. being less concentrated on a
single commodity, or exporting less price volatile commodities, however, does not seem to
be associated with lower commodity dependence. As our later results show, a country can
likely do more to tackle commodity dependence if it diversifies its economic structure towards
downstream production and manufacturing sectors, instead of an additional commodity.
Second, we present evidence that commodity dependence increases in times of recession
and lower public and private revenue streams. We do not find evidence that the outbreak
of sovereign debt crises affect commodity dependence. Still, financial markets seem to pay
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attention to more recent incidents of sovereign defaults, which are associated with stronger
commodity dependence the lower the number of years they date back. We also obtain strong
evidence that more expansionary U.S. monetary policy spins the commodity cycle and in-
creases commodity dependence significantly.
Third, we show consistent evidence that improving institutional quality can be a promising
way to mitigate commodity dependence. All of our interactions variables, i.e. control of
corruption, rule of law, political stability but also the progressiveness of a country’s tax
system, indicate that institutional quality is a decisive factor to tackle the dependence of a
country’s creditworthiness on raw material prices. We argue that better institutions likely
increase transparency, provide clear ownership rights and limit corruption in the extraction
process. The result also holds when focusing only on heavy commodity-exporting countries.
We also present results indicating that attracting more FDI flows, having larger man-
ufacturing sectors and investing more in physical capital like machinery or infrastructure
can be fruitful ways to reduce commodity dependence by fostering downstream production
technologies. In contrast, having a low stock of foreign exchange reserves is associated with
increasing commodity dependence. We also uncover that more open trade and financial ac-
counts are associated with a weaker reliance on raw material prices. Lastly, development




A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A.3.1: Commodities towards which certain countries have world-market power
Commodity Countries with world-market power
Cocoa Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Nigeria
Coffee Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Vietnam









Copper Chile, Indonesia, Peru





This table shows which countries in the panel have world-market power in a certain commodity, as discussed
in Section 3.3.2 with results reported in Table 3.5. For this test, commodities towards which a country has
world-market power are removed from the commodity portfolio. World-market power is defined as having
a global export share in a commodity of at least 10%. Meeting this criterion at least once at any point in
time during our sample period leads to a world-market power classification.
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Table A.3.2: Drivers of commodity-sovereign risk dependence: additional specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
∆CommodityPerformance -0.545*** -0.688*** -0.424*** -0.989*** -0.833*































Observations 74,073 74,073 74,073 129,316 129,316
R-squared 0.232 0.233 0.231 0.217 0.217
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Time & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results from OLS-panel regressions of the daily difference of a country’s Emerging Market
Bond Index Spread (∆EMBI) on the daily returns on the weighted price index of a country’s exported
commodities (∆CommodityPerformance) and controls. The interactions with ControlOfCorruption (1),
RuleOfLaw (2) and PoliticalStability (3) of Table 3.8 are repeated, however, they are specified for a
subgroup of countries that have a commodity export share of more than 10% on total exports. In columns
(4) and (5) the KOF globalization index of Table 3.9 is disentangled into the de facto and the de jure part.
Estimation period is from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2016. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.3.3.
Control variables include a country’s stock index and exchange rate (to U.S. Dollar) returns, changes in
the VIX, U.S. term spread, U.S. corporate spread, 10-year U.S. treasury yield and global government
bond index. Estimations include country and time fixed effects on the monthly level. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table A.3.3: Description and sources of variables
Variable Description Source
Variables in Baseline Regression (Section 3.3.1)
(all variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile, unless otherwise stated)





Lagged-export-share weighted commodity price
changes as described in Section 3.2.2
UN Comtrade,
ITC Trade Map, S&P






Daily percentage change of a country’s local currency
exchange rate towards the U.S. Dollar Thomson Reuters
∆VIX Daily change in VIX volatility index CBOE
∆Corporate
Spread
Daily change in spread between the S&P U.S. high yield




Yield Daily change in the yield of 10-year U.S. Treasury bond Datastream





Daily change in natural logarithm of Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Global Government Index Merrill Lynch





CommodityPerformance excluding a commodity if










CommodityPerformance using dummies for relevant
commodities and extreme price events (see Section 3.3.2)
Variables in Interaction Regressions (Section 3.4)
(all variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile, except indices)
Commodity Export





Rolling standard deviation of CommodityPerformance
over past 23 business days (one month)





1 if respective subgroup has share on total exports of
at least 10%, 0 otherwise.
GDP in local
currency
GDP in constant prices, seasonally adjusted, local
currency Oxford Economics
GDP in U.S. Dollar GDP in current prices and U.S. Dollar World Bank
GDP Growth Quarterly natural log growth rate of local currency GDP
Tax Revenues to GDP Government tax revenue (% of GDP, linearly interpolated) World Bank
Corporate Profits
to GDP Corporate sector profits (% of GDP) Oxford Economics
Debt to GDP General gross government debt (% of GDP) Oxford Economics
31For Ecuador, we merge local Quito Stock Exchange (in $) and S&P data to receive maximum coverage.
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Inflation Annual consumer price increase (winsorized at 5th and95th percentiles to rule out hyperinflation periods) World Bank




Number of years since last sovereign debt restructuring.
Value of 40 if no sovereign debt restructuring took place
Laeven & Valencia
(2018)
GDP per Capita GDP per capita in constant prices and U.S. Dollar World Bank
Federal Funds Rate U.S. federal funds effective rate Federal Reserve
Control of Corruption
Control of corruption rank (The extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the
state by elites and private interests; linearly interpolated)
World Bank
Rule of Law Rule of law rank (The extend of which agents have confi-dence in and abide by the rules of society; linearly interplt.)World Bank
Political Stability
Political stability rank (The likelihood that the government
will be destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means,
including terrorism; linearly interpolated)
World Bank
Gini Redistribution Absolute income redistribution (market-incomeinequality minus net-income inequality) Solt (2019)
Manufacturing Share Manufacturing value-added (% of GDP) World Bank
FDI-Inflows Net foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) World Bank
Reserves to GDP Total reserve assets (% of GDP) IMF
KOF
KOF Globalisation Index (composite index measuring
globalization along several criteria such as trade and
financial flows and regulation)
Gygli et al. (2019)
KOF (de facto/de jure) KOF Globalisation Index disentangled into de facto andde jure component of index Gygli et al. (2019)
Chinn-Ito
KAOPEN index of Chinn & Ito (2006) (index measuring
regulatory controls over current or capital account
transactions and exchange rate regimes)
Chinn & Ito (2006)
IBRD Loans
Outstanding loans from International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and International
Development Association (% of GDP)
World Bank
Aid to GNI Net official development assistance received (% of GNI;for Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and Russia: % of GDP) World Bank
Variables in Robustness Regressions (Section 3.5) (all variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile)
∆CDS Spread Daily difference CDS spread (winsorized at 5th and 95hpercentile) Thomson Reuters
∆TED Spread Spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on U.S.dollars and 3-Month Treasury Bill Fed St. Louis
∆S&P 500 Daily change in natural log of Standard and Poor’s 500Composite S&P
∆3-Month T-Bill Yield U.S. treasury bill 3-month yield Federal Reserve
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Financial Linkages and Sectoral Business Cycle
Synchronization: Evidence from Europe
Abstract: We analyze whether financial integration leads to converging or diverging business
cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of
shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar
measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten
European countries from 1996-2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average
but much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle
synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value-added growth of ten major industries,
we observe that spillover intensities vary significantly.
4.1 Motivation
Countries with stronger economic, cultural and political ties tend to have more synchronized
output fluctuations. However, whether financial integration is one of such synchronizing
factors for international business cycles is unresolved in the literature. On the one hand,
Kose et al. (2003), Imbs (2006) and Morgan et al. (2004) find a positive relationship be-
tween financial integration and business cycle synchronization. On the other hand, results
by Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou & Perri (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou & Pey-
dró (2013) suggest that a higher degree of financial integration entails diverging patterns of
economic activity. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2019) argue that the nature of the shock, common
(negative effect) or country-specific (positive effect), is what matters for synchronization.
We contribute to this literature, first, by assessing the effect of financial integration on
economic activity not only among country pairs but across a multilateral network of directly
and indirectly linked countries. More specifically, we use a flexible spatial model recently de-
veloped by Blasques et al. (2016) that combines time-varying matrices of economic distances,
reflecting financial linkages, with a dynamic parameter approach.32 Our dynamic spatial
32(Static) spatial models have recently become popular in the empirical finance literature, see, e.g., Tonzer
(2015), Herskovic et al. (2018), and Denbee et al. (2018).
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model takes endogenous feedback and third-country effects into account.33 In this way, we
retrieve a scalar intensity parameter that reflects the extent of positive or negative business
cycle co-movement over time. This set-up allows us to compare the extent of spillovers during
recessions and tranquil periods. A static spatial model, in comparison, would only reveal the
net effect of positive and negative spillovers, potentially hiding the heterogeneity of gross
spillover shocks. As a second contribution, we dismantle the business cycle into its main
industrial sectors, similarly to Schnabel & Seckinger (2015). As different industries can be
exposed by different extents to shocks transmitted through financial links, this decomposition
can give further insights on the conflicting results above.34
The analysis is based on a sample of 10 European countries over the period from 1996 to
2017, for which gross domestic product (GDP) growth is dissected into the value-added by 10
industries. We find that financially more integrated countries tend to have on average positive
business cycle synchronization. This finding means that shocks are transmitted across coun-
tries via their financial linkages resulting in positive co-movements of GDP growth. However,
the effect depends crucially on time and industry. Positive synchronization effects of financial
integration on GDP and industries with business-sensitive cycles such as industrial produc-
tion or wholesale & retail trade are much larger during crisis periods. Hence, for our sample
of European countries, we can confirm previous findings in the literature (Kalemli-Ozcan, Pa-
paioannou & Perri (2013)) while providing a more nuanced view on spillover intensities and
their composition over time. Other industries are subject to small positive synchronization
effects which are, interestingly, almost constant over both recessions and normal times (e.g.
agriculture, construction). Cycle synchronization of a few industries is not subject to any
positive or negative spillover effect stemming from financial integration, suggesting that these
industries (arts & entertainment, public administration, real estate) are relatively closed-off
and hardly affected by integrated financial markets. Therefore, time, industry-specification
and feedback effects matter for the finance-business-cycle nexus. The paper is structured as
follows. In the next section, we describe the data and the empirical method. Results are
presented in Section 4.3. The last section concludes the paper.
33Acemoglu et al. (2012), for example, emphasize the relevance of the network structure for spillover effects
between sectors.
34International co-movement through firms in one country and their cross-border links are analyzed by, for
example, Di Giovanni et al. (2018) and Kleinert et al. (2015). The role of trade among countries for business





We proxy the degree of financial integration using data on direct bilateral cross-border claims
of banks from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).35 Similar to Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou & Perri (2013), Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2019) and many others, we make use of
the locational banking statistics as they are well-suited for this task. Compared to the
consolidated banking statistics, cross-border inter-office positions between banks of the same
group are not netted out. Thus, the locational statistics deliver a clear picture on cross-border
linkages with the potential of generating spillovers.36 From a theoretical perspective, this
feature is important to consider as the activities of global banks matter for the transmission
of shocks and effects on synchronization: Shocks in the real sector in one country should
result in lower synchronization if global banks redirect their lending to unaffected countries.
Shocks in the financial sector of some countries would induce global banks to retrench more
globally, which in turn increases co-movement (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou & Perri 2013).
For Europe, the BIS currently reports complete data for 10 countries since 1995.37 Based
on this data, we can span a sizable network of European countries.38 A snapshot of the net-
work can be seen in Figure 4.1 for 2017:Q4. The graph reveals that some countries are more
strongly interlinked than others, as reflected by the width of the links. The network overall
shows a dense degree of interconnections. The sample period on which the estimations are
based extends from 1996 until 2017 such that we can trace out whether the financial crisis
starting in 2007/08 changes spillover dynamics permanently, or whether synchronization de-
clines again, as one could hypothesize following the findings by Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou
& Perri (2013) for the tranquil period before the financial crisis. In Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we
show examples for the weighting matrix at different points in time.
35While financial integration can take different forms, Hoffmann et al. (2019) find that banking integration
dominates equity market integration in the euro area with the latter being still limited in size.
36The locational statistics have also the advantage of a stable coverage. While inter-office positions might
change faster between inter-related offices compared to other cross-border positions, the series are still suffi-
ciently stable such that no concerns due to volatility emerge.
37Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.
38We focus on European countries to obtain consistent data on value-added at the sectoral level from
Eurostat. We thoroughly checked the data to have the best possible coverage of European countries and over
time. Given that we are interested in time-varying spillovers, we have chosen those countries that report
cross-border positions to the BIS over a long time period.
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Figure 4.1: Bilateral cross-border claims (based on BIS Locational Banking Statistics) of
countries’ banking systems for 2017:Q4
Table 4.1: Network matrix of banking systems’ cross-border claims for 1996:Q1
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
Belgium 1374 1526 28657 10514 5974 14907 3855 5348 47685
Denmark 2038 1341 3136 1533 2533 850 5507 969 15507
Finland 617 470 786 372 17 316 3914 233 3916
France 29439 6380 2241 39688 3529 15750 4918 16766 146083
Germany 13509 5466 4576 28134 11273 21636 6820 13429 116563
Ireland 1126 650 794 2400 8621 1647 1474 479 12090
Netherlands 21963 2280 703 14368 21862 6041 3768 7602 40884
Sweden 1351 1594 1656 897 1746 277 2117 778 17531
Switzerland 36673 1475 927 31597 23261 1868 34426 2498 173198
UK 41960 9614 9224 96405 161291 17703 33092 25833 39088
This table shows the network matrix based on BIS locational banking statistics for 1996:Q1. Data on a country’s banking
system claims (from row-country towards column-country) in millions of US dollars is depicted. In the empirical analysis, we
use row-normalized versions of these matrices.
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Table 4.2: Network matrix of banking systems’ cross-border claims for 2017:Q4
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
Belgium 2423 1150 71463 52457 20012 72993 2444 14870 72486
Denmark 1998 7661 12851 47964 2114 3039 83375 3520 31498
Finland 1318 12614 5858 8170 496 2583 21551 143 8985
France 122957 10260 7133 118875 67037 108142 18416 76632 372761
Germany 36694 20771 22328 216641 34132 173043 41449 79548 322777
Ireland 6312 4006 908 19655 16158 26158 2445 2416 94892
Netherlands 61170 4268 10620 85493 81552 6724 29611 318205
Sweden 2930 104404 96840 12968 29685 1102 9286 5897 64214
Switzerland 9654 5510 1109 57596 49264 8158 23053 4374 148994
UK 56175 22008 17182 507496 439557 163186 315718 44461 199079
This table shows the network matrix based on BIS locational banking statistics for 2017:Q4. Data on a country’s banking
system claims (from row-country towards column-country) in millions of US dollars is depicted. In the empirical analysis, we
use row-normalized versions of these matrices.
To capture the business cycle in a country and as our main dependent variable, we use
quarterly GDP growth in constant prices drawn from the OECD. We then decompose GDP
into quarterly gross value-added growth, also in constant prices, of 10 major industries down-
loaded from Eurostat.39 All growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Figure
4.2 shows the average pattern of GDP growth and sectoral growth over time. Obviously, a
sharp decline can be detected for aggregate GDP growth as well as for most sectors following
the financial crisis starting in 2007/08. The growth path of some sectors closely resembles
the one of aggregate GDP growth (e.g., industry (except construction) or wholesale & retail
trade) while some sectors have notably different dynamics.
39Agriculture, forestry and fishing. Arts, entertainment, recreation and other services. Construction.
Financial and insurance activities. Industry (except construction). Information and communication. Pro-
fessional, scientific and tech activities. Public administration, deference, education, human health and social
work. Real estate activities. Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food.
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Figure 4.2: Quarterly growth rates of GDP and industrial sectors across panel countries
(1996-2017)
In Tables 4.3-4.5, we show that quarterly GDP growth rates across countries are cor-
related to different extents. However, we take a purely bilateral perspective in this case.
In the estimations, we explicitly account for the fact that also indirect links can contribute
to business cycle synchronization. Still, such simple descriptive statistics reveal important
facts. On average, there is less evidence for negative co-movements. Supporting the find-
ings by Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou & Perri (2013), during the crisis period (Table 4.4),
correlations go up, which does apply to most country pairs but excludes those with Ireland.
Comparing the pre- and post-crisis periods, no general pattern emerges. Partially, correla-
tions are lower, while for some other country pairs they are still at a higher level (Tables
4.3 and 4.5). In sum, these patterns support the idea to control for time-varying spillover
dynamics instead of taking a static view.
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Table 4.3: Correlation of pre-crisis GDP growth rates between countries (1996:Q1–2007:Q4)
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
Belgium 1.000
Denmark 0.175 1.000
Finland 0.214 -0.141 1.000
France 0.432 0.303 0.315 1.000
Germany 0.365 0.274 0.133 0.368 1.000
Ireland 0.339 0.234 0.144 0.176 0.095 1.000
Netherlands 0.425 0.424 0.136 0.507 0.448 0.218 1.000
Sweden 0.222 0.121 0.141 0.411 0.094 0.074 0.348 1.000
Switzerland 0.462 0.060 0.233 0.469 0.345 0.202 0.348 0.307 1.000
UK 0.006 -0.064 -0.009 0.104 -0.007 0.214 0.082 -0.005 0.160 1.000
Table 4.4: Correlation of financial crisis GDP growth between countries (2008:Q1–2009:Q4)
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
Belgium 1.000
Denmark 0.846 1.000
Finland 0.830 0.743 1.000
France 0.889 0.751 0.849 1.000
Germany 0.918 0.752 0.875 0.991 1.000
Ireland 0.152 -0.081 0.148 0.137 0.109 1.000
Netherlands 0.721 0.546 0.811 0.860 0.873 -0.111 1.000
Sweden 0.764 0.510 0.794 0.748 0.762 0.433 0.780 1.000
Switzerland 0.925 0.775 0.874 0.860 0.912 0.005 0.811 0.761 1.000
UK 0.922 0.680 0.685 0.891 0.907 0.139 0.684 0.619 0.805 1.000
Table 4.5: Correlation of post-crisis GDP growth between countries (2010:Q1–2016:Q4)
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
Belgium 1.000
Denmark 0.369 1.000
Finland 0.551 0.188 1.000
France 0.399 0.018 0.423 1.000
Germany 0.626 0.082 0.450 0.564 1.000
Ireland 0.181 -0.318 -0.140 0.381 0.205 1.000
Netherlands 0.338 0.026 0.446 0.441 0.327 0.265 1.000
Sweden 0.062 -0.229 -0.038 -0.118 0.008 0.094 0.534 1.000
Switzerland 0.088 0.072 0.136 0.187 0.302 0.170 0.134 -0.102 1.000
UK 0.137 0.045 0.192 0.132 0.325 0.155 0.189 0.237 0.220 1.000
To get a first glimpse of which sectors correlate most closely with aggregate growth, we
show in Table 4.6 correlations between GDP growth and industrial sector growth rates. In line
with the graphical evidence (Figure 4.2), correlations are highest between GDP growth and
the industry (except construction) as well as the wholesale & retail trade sectors. The lowest
correlation emerges with the agricultural sector. These differences highlight that economies’
aggregate growth paths can be determined by diverging sectoral developments such that































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We require further national and global control variables that might affect the finance-
business-cycle nexus. On the country-level, we include quarterly growth rates of labor pro-
ductivity, consumer confidence, labor force, gross fixed capital formation, government ex-
penditure, credit to the non-financial sector (in percent of GDP). Furthermore, we include
the quarterly growth rate of exports of goods and services (in percent of GDP) as export
reliance might be related to business cycle fluctuations. The role of global factors has, e.g.,
been analyzed by Kose et al. (2012) or Cerutti et al. (2019), and on the international level,
we control for the quarterly change of the VIX and the Euro to U.S. Dollar exchange rate.
More information on the variables can be found in Table A.4.12. Summary statistics on the
dependent and explanatory variables can be found in Table 4.7. We provide a correlation
table between the dependent variable and the controls in Table 4.8.
Table 4.7: Summary statistics of all variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
∆GDP 910 0.553 0.532 0.897 -2.275 4.004
∆Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishing 906 0.178 0.128 5.205 -19.24 19.72
∆Arts, Entertainment
and Recreation 906 0.320 0.295 1.756 -5.420 5.914
∆ Construction 906 0.279 0.296 2.468 -8.088 7.895
∆Financial and
Insurance Activities 906 0.636 0.538 3.019 -9.018 10.46
∆Industry 906 0.445 0.429 2.699 -9.753 11.16
∆Information and
Communication 898 1.488 1.236 2.667 -6.968 12.06
∆Professional, Scientific
and Tech Activities 906 0.835 0.784 1.828 -4.825 6.882
∆Public Administration 906 0.312 0.305 0.624 -1.486 2.267
∆Real Estate Activities 906 0.405 0.336 1.089 -2.785 3.901
∆Wholesale and Retail
Trade, Transport 898 0.521 0.592 1.274 -4.337 4.053
∆ Productivity 916 0.313 0.270 1.197 -5.830 21.71
∆Credit to Non-Financial
Sector 910 0.482 0.374 1.912 -9.325 28.86
∆LabourForce 910 0.202 0.179 0.533 -1.650 7.990
∆Consumer Confidence 907 0.0159 0.0413 0.562 -2.327 2.274
∆GFCF 910 0.867 0.674 7.326 -46.95 161.1
∆Government Expenditure 910 0.410 0.388 0.926 -4.893 6.657
∆ExportsToGDP 910 0.392 0.509 2.784 -14.75 13.66
∆Euro-to-Dollar
Exchange Rate 910 0.000484 0.00282 0.0490 -0.116 0.118
∆VIX 910 -0.00367 -0.0120 0.274 -0.664 1.052
Sample period is 1996:Q1–2017:Q4. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our empirical methodology comes from the literature on time-varying spatial dependence as
established by Blasques et al. (2016). Compared to the related literature, we do not cal-
culate bilateral correlations between countries’ GDP growth and explain those correlations.
Instead, we model each country’s GDP growth as a weighted function of all financially in-
terlinked countries’ GDP growth. The spatial modeling approach has the advantage that
interdependencies between a large set of countries can simultaneously be taken into account,
and that the possibility of contemporaneous spillovers of shocks is incorporated.
Spatial models require the specification of a spatial weights matrix, which is typically
chosen as a function of physical or economic distances between units. In our case, economic
distance is defined by the cross-border bank claims two countries hold towards another, which
is a measure of the degree of financial integration. We use a spatial lag model, which implies
that each country’s dependent variable may react to shocks to both the regressors and the
disturbances of neighboring countries. Third-country and feedback effects are automatically
taken into account. Additionally, we employ a time-varying spatial dependence parameter
approach as suggested in Blasques et al. (2016). In this way, the magnitude of cross-sectional
spillovers transmitted by financial integration can vary over time, allowing us to compare the
effects during different stages of the economic and financial cycle.
The score-driven spatial lag model is given by
 =  +  +    (0; Σ )  = 1   (11)
where  denotes an   1- vector of country-specific growth rates of GDP or industrial
value-added at time .  is a matrix of country-specific and international regressors and  =
(1   ) is a vector of unknown coefficients. The dependent variable and the explanatory
variables are demeaned to control for country fixed effects. We control for time-varying
dynamics affecting all countries alike by including global controls.  denotes the density
of the vector of disturbances  and Σ is a positive definite covariance matrix. We consider
normally and Student’s -distributed disturbances. In the case of Student’s -distributed
disturbances,  also depends on a degrees of freedom parameter .
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The key ingredient of a spatial model is the term . The matrix  reflects the degree
of financial integration between countries at time  and is assumed to be weakly exogenous.
Tables 4.1-4.2 provide examples of such a matrix for one point in time. The scalar spatial
dependence parameter  measures the intensity of cross-country shock spillovers of real
output  that are induced by financial links. To ensure stability, we specify  = () where
() is a monotone transformation such that   (1 1). To describe the dynamics of , we
adopt the autoregressive score framework of Creal et al. (2011, 2013) and Harvey (2013).
The score framework centers around the use of the scaled score of the conditional density
 to drive the time-variation in . The updating equation for  is given by
+1 =  +  +  (12)
where , , and  are fixed unknown parameters, and  =  is the scaled score function,
which serves as innovation term for the time-varying parameter.
The spatial dependence coefficient  may be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of
business cycle synchronization driven by financial links: A positive coefficient would reveal
evidence for business cycle synchronization, while a negative coefficient would point towards
desynchronization. Importantly, the modeling approach takes into account that in highly
integrated markets, business cycle synchronization does not only occur between two countries
in isolation. For example, shocks to country A can spill over to the directly linked country B
but also affect country C, which has in turn financial links to country B.
Our approach has the advantage that we can gain information on the strength of direct
versus indirect (or third-country) spillovers. The econometric mechanism behind that is ex-
plained in the following. Repeatedly inserting the model for the vector of dependent variable
observations gives rise to a power series expansion
 =  +  + 2  2  +  +  +  + 2  2  +  (13)
which is useful to disentangle “ordinary” impacts of shocks to regressors and disturbances of
each unit (measured by the term  +) from “first-round” spillovers from direct neighbors
( + ) and “third-country” effects, which are contained in the higher-order terms.
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Under stability, equation (13) converges to the nonlinear reduced form
 =  +  (14)
with  = (  )1. Equation (14) shows that shocks to country ’s regressors  or
disturbance  can spill over to potentially many other countries’ GDP growth, as  is in
general a full matrix. Feedback effects to country  itself occur if, for example, the weights
 and  are non zero. If no spillovers are present, i.e.  = 0, the model reduces to the
linear regression model
 =  +  (15)
Instead of imposing a particular model specification ex ante, we determine empirically
whether GDP growth rates and industrial value-added are indeed driven by shock spillovers
from other countries. In particular, we estimate three versions of the model, each assuming
either normally or Student’s  distributed disturbances: (1) a baseline specification without
any spillovers, i.e.  = 0,  = 1   , (2) a static version with  = ,  and (3) the
dynamic specification given in equation (11). Model selection is conducted using the Akaike
Information Criterion corrected for small sample sizes (AICc). This way, we are agnostic
about whether spillovers are present or not as well as whether spillovers are constant or time-
varying. By identifying the model that best fits the data, we gain insights into the nature
of spillovers, which might bear important policy implications. For example, if spillovers are
time-varying, spillover dynamics need to be monitored more closely and policy measures to
curb them need to be flexible enough.
4.3 Estimation Results
4.3.1 Results for Overall Output Fluctuations (GDP)
Our formal approach tests which spatial model is the most appropriate to analyze business cy-
cle propagation. In doing so, we address the hypothesis if business cycles between financially
integrated countries can be considered as static and independent from another, or if there
are dynamic spillovers present between countries. Table 4.9 shows the results using quar-
terly GDP growth as the dependent variable for different specifications of the spatial model.
Columns (1) and (2) report results obtained using a model without spillovers, columns (3)
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and (4) show findings allowing for spillovers with a static dependence coefficient, and columns
(5) and (6) display results for a model with time-varying spillover effects of financial integra-
tion on GDP growth. The errors are assumed to be either normally or -distributed. Values
of the AICc indicate that the data favor the model using time-varying spillover effects and a
-distribution with the AICc being lower by 83 points than the no spillover model and by 16
points compared to the static model. Allowing for time-varying spillovers as introduced in
Section 4.2.2 therefore seems to be the most appropriate way to measure the effect of financial
integration on output fluctuations.
Turning to the coefficients, we find strong evidence for spatial dependence both in the
static and the dynamic model, with  as well as  and , the parameters entering the
dynamic updating equation (12), being large and statistically highly significant. This result
thus supports that, from a regional perspective, business cycles should not be considered
in isolation in financially integrated countries as dynamics can propagate via financial links
towards a country’s own GDP growth.
All other coefficients enter with largely expected signs in all models. For example, pro-
ductivity growth enters with a positive and economically and statistically highly significant
coefficient. In our preferred specification, that features dynamic spillovers and -distributed
errors (column (6)), we obtain that rising consumer confidence, labor force, government ex-
penditure, export growth, and a depreciating Euro towards the U.S. Dollar are positively and
statistically significantly associated with higher GDP growth. Gross fixed capital formation
growth (with a positive coefficient) and credit ratios (with a negative coefficient) also have a
significant impact, but only on a 10% level. Changes in the volatility index VIX enter with
a positive sign, which is, however, statistically insignificant.40
Having established that dynamic spillover effects from financial integration matter for
European countries’ GDP growth, we now turn to the evolution of the spillover intensity
parameter over time. The spillover parameter varies between minus and plus one which
represents diverging or respectively converging impacts of financial integration on business
cycle spillovers. Depicting the parameter over time, as in Figure 4.3, allows us to address
the research question if, when and by how much financial integration induces business cycle
synchronization. We observe a strong cyclical component in Figure 4.3. While the parameter
40The results are robust and similar towards employing an alternative model specification using OLS
regressions with country and year fixed effects, see Table A.4.1.
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Table 4.9: Baseline results: gross domestic product
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
normal t normal t normal t









ln(2) -0.699*** -1.408*** -0.938*** -1.422*** -0.955*** -1.439***
(0.048) (0.095) (0.048) (0.088) (0.047) (0.086)
constant -0.192*** -0.231*** -0.153*** -0.234*** -0.146*** -0.234***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
∆VIX 0.054 0.188** 0.030 0.133** 0.040 0.093
(0.089) (0.079) (0.079) (0.070) (0.075) (0.063)
∆EuroToDollar -0.370** 0.956 -0.063 0.486 0.812** 1.001***
(0.490) (0.405) (0.435) (0.379) (0.399) (0.348)
∆Productivity 0.494*** 0.717*** 0.438*** 0.679*** 0.434*** 0.669***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.113*** -0.011 -0.093*** -0.017 -0.094*** -0.018
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.229*** 0.144*** 0.103** 0.091** 0.118*** 0.108***
(0.045) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.034)
∆GFCF 0.010*** 0.005* 0.007** 0.005* 0.007** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆LabourForce 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.098** 0.128*** 0.089** 0.116***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.056***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
∆ExportToGDP 0.070*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
 4.209*** 5.428*** 5.697***
(0.760) (1.071) (1.147)
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880
logLik -941.016 -800.064 -850.217 -765.314 -836.895 -754.370
AICc 1907.506 1628.289 1728.594 1561.546 1707.544 1545.406
This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers, dy-
namic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors are
reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in
bold for the model with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly GDP growth.
The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector
growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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is positive on average, it peaks during times of financial stress, in particular the dotcom
bubble (around 2000), the financial crisis (around 2008) and the European debt crisis (2011-
2013). In calmer times (mid-1990s or mid-2000s), the spillover strength is lower, whereas
in the recent time period (mid-2010s) characterized by financial disintegration, the spillover
strength even becomes negative. Despite our focus on a sample of European countries, this
result is broadly in line with Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou & Perri (2013) who identify that
financial integration has stronger effects on business cycle synchronization in times of crisis.
By tracing the spillover intensity over the sample period, we contribute to the literature by
showing in a more granular way time-varying dynamics of spillovers. For example, we can
detect whether spillover intensity slowly trends upward or quickly peaks. From Figure 4.3,
it can be seen that movements, especially in times when spillover intensity increases, tend to
occur relatively fast suggesting that policy instruments that are aligned to the cycle and can
be quickly activated might work best.
Figure 4.3: Time-varying spillover strength for gross domestic product
This graph shows the time-varying spillover strength for the model with quarterly GDP growth as the de-
pendent variable and the sample period 1996-2017. The corresponding estimation results are in Table 4.9.
The model is estimated based on a score-driven model with Student’s -distributed (solid line) and normally
distributed (dashed line) disturbances.
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As laid out in Section 4.2.2, the score-driven spatial model can be used to disentangle
spillover effects from shocks that occur because two countries are directly linked, and shocks
that are due to second- or higher-order effects. For example, consider an isolated unit shock
to the disturbance of the first unit in vector , i.e. suppose  = (1 0    0) in equation
(11).41 Equations (13) and (14) show that apart from the unit impact that the shock has on
country 1’s GDP growth itself, there are spillovers to its first-degree “neighbors”, which are
contained in the first column of , and, additionally, third-country feedback effects that
can be summarized in the first column of the matrix
(I  )1  I   (16)
We report the average magnitude of such direct and third-country spillover effects in Table
4.10. That is, we compute in how far a shock to one of the sample countries would lead
to “direct” spillovers to all other countries with which it maintains financial linkages, and
compute the average effect across these interlinked countries. Furthermore, we compute
the average “third-country” effect, that arises due to indirect linkages between the shocked
country and all other countries. The results show that there is substantial heterogeneity
across countries as concerns the relative sizes of the average direct and indirect effects. For
example, spillover effects are the largest following a shock to the United Kingdom reflecting
its role as a financial center. In contrast, shocks in Finland and Switzerland have reduced
direct and third-country effects. Yet there are also countries which induce relatively large
direct effects but third-country effects are small such as Sweden, which might reflect that
Sweden maintains strong links with neighboring countries but plays a minor role for indirect
spillovers. In sum, the results show that only considering direct shock spillovers affecting
output correlation leads to an underestimation of the full spillover that arises due to third-
country effects.
41For simplicity, we abstract from the regressor term here.
161
Chapter 4












This table reports the average total spillover effects after separate unit shocks to each country’s disturbance.
Column “direct” corresponds to the column sums of matrix ̄̄ where a bar denotes the sample average.
Column “third-country” corresponds to the column sums of the sample average of the matrix in equation
(16).
4.3.2 Results for Industrial Output Fluctuations
We now apply the analysis to individual industrial sectors. This dissection can shed light
on the components that drive the aggregated effects on GDP we discussed in the previous
section. Note that certain sectors are highly sensitive towards the business cycle, such as
industrial output or wholesale and retail trade. For these sectors, we therefore expect similar
patterns, both in terms of the best-fitting model and for the graph of the time-varying
spillovers, compared to GDP growth. For other industrial sectors, we do not expect the same
sensitivity towards growth shocks from other countries. An example is public administration,
a largely nationally determined sector that should not vary much with business cycle spillovers
due to international financial integration.
As before, we estimate six versions of each model (no spillovers, constant and dynamic
dependence parameter, and both normal and -errors), but for brevity, we only show the
respective best model in Table 4.11 according to the AICc.42 The results in Table 4.11 can
be summarized as follows. Time-varying spillover dynamics fit the data best for four out of
ten industrial sectors: industry (excluding construction); information & communication; pro-
fessional, scientific and tech activities; wholesale & retail trade. Three different sectors show
the best fit for a model that allows for spillovers, which are, however, driven by a constant
instead of a time-varying parameter: agriculture, forestry and fishing; construction; financial
and insurance activities. Finally, there are three cases, arts and entertainment, public ad-
ministration and real estate, for which we do not find evidence for any spatial dependence.
42The full tables covering all models per industrial sector be seen in the Appendix, Table A.4.2 and following.
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Figure 4.4 depicts the time-varying dependence parameters for the four industries, for which
the time-varying model turned out to be the best fit.
The patterns of three industrial sectors’ spillover parameters are similar to the graph for
GDP, see Figure 4.3. The resemblance is most obvious for the wholesale & retail trade sector,
but it is also present for industry (excluding construction) as well as for professional, scientific
and tech activities.43 These three industries have in common that they strongly depend on
the current business cycle, making them similarly affected towards spillovers from financial
integration as overall GDP. Hence, both our estimation results and the graphs suggest that
interlinked countries specializing in these sectors are very likely to face a higher extent of
business cycle synchronization, which relates to the results by Imbs (2004). Our findings
also suggest that in these industries, cross-border links of banks play a prominent role by
creating a network in which shocks are transmitted for the same sector across countries.44 One
reasoning can be that within the above mentioned sectors the banking sector is channeling
more funds because there is a larger presence of multinational firms resulting in cross-country
investments.45 A further explanation can go back to the fact that some sectors rely more on
external finance and might thus also depend more on cross-border capital flows.46
We also observe strong, time-varying spillovers across European countries’ IT sectors
(information & communication). However, the pattern in the upper right panel of Figure
4.4 differs from the ones for the other three sectors. Our interpretation of this finding is
that IT sectors do face growth spillovers driven by financial interconnections, but in a more
idiosyncratic way, potentially reflecting the more volatile and disruptive nature of this sector.
There is no evidence for spatial dependence for the public administration sector. One
likely explanation is that reliance on cross-border capital is lower in this sector, which in turn
implies a lower degree of financial integration and thus potential links to transmit shocks.
43This sector comprises mostly legal, management or engineering activities, see: https:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:F1_Sectoral_analysis_of_
Professional,_scientific_and_technical_activities_(NACE_Section_M),_EU-28,_2016.png.
44The role of shock spillovers between interconnected sectors depending on the network structure is discussed
by Acemoglu et al. (2012).
45The presence of multinational firms as such can result in international co-movements (Cravino &
Levchenko (2017), Di Giovanni et al. (2018), Kleinert et al. (2015)). Such co-movements can be fueled in
case multinational banks follow their multinational customers (Buch (2000)), in this context, it is also impor-
tant that we do not net out inter-office positions between banks.
46E.g., for the United States, Laeven & Valencia (2013) show high values of external dependence for
machinery, other industries or professional goods. Kroszner et al. (2007) find that sectors relying more on
external finance via banks are hit more by banking crises and consequently tighter financial constraints (see






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similar results can be observed for the sector arts & entertainment and the real estate sector,
which makes sense as both are largely nationally influenced. In the estimation results, these
sectors showed the best fit for a no-spillover model, suggesting that they are largely unaffected
by spillover effects stemming from financial market integration.
We observe positive but rather small spillover effects for the agricultural, construction
and financial sectors. Furthermore, the data for all these sectors favor a model with a static
spillover coefficient.47 These results may indicate that the mentioned sectors are exposed to
spillovers due to financial integration, but not as prime candidates and/or in a cyclical man-
ner. From a policy perspective, this bears the implication that rescue measures during crisis
times should be internationally coordinated, but also take the country-specific characteristics
of each sector sufficiently into account.
Figure 4.4: Time-varying spillover strength for four industrial sectors
The graph shows the time-varying spillover strength for the four industrial sectors for which the time-varying
model is the best. The dependent variable is the quarterly sectoral growth rate and the sample period spans
1996-2017. The corresponding estimation results are in Table 4.11. The sectors comprise: Upper left: Industry
(except construction); Upper right: Information and Communication; Lower left: Professional, scientific and
tech activities; Lower right: Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food). The model is
estimated based on score-driven model with Student’s -distributed disturbances.
47The time-varying spillover coefficients for these three sectors are almost constant throughout our estima-




Whether financial integration between countries leads to diverging or converging patterns of
GDP growth is still not fully resolved in the literature. We shed new light on this issue by
modeling a group of financially developed European countries as a financial network, thereby
extending the pure bilateral framework used in the literature, and taking dynamic feedback
effects within the network into account. We arrive at two major results.
First, spillover effects via the channel of financial integration on business cycles vary
over time and are much stronger during periods of financial turmoil. Second, business-
sensitive sectors like industrial production, wholesale & retail trade, or professional, scientific
& tech activities are strongly exposed to spillover effects from financial integration, with
time-variation following a similar cyclical pattern as for overall GDP. Industrial sectors such
as agriculture, construction or finance also feature positive spillover effects, but are less
affected, and the spillover intensity does not vary over time. Nationally influenced sectors
such as public administration, arts & entertainment and real estate are not subject to relevant
spillovers, positive or negative, due to financial integration.
Our results bear important policy implications. As we consistently find evidence for pos-
itive spillover dynamics across European countries and over time, our results show that in
a densely financially integrated network of countries, business cycles are co-moving. Con-
sequently, focusing only on national approaches to stabilize business cycles is likely to have
limited effects, especially during times of crisis. In contrast, national measures should be
accompanied by supranational actions mitigating spillovers of shocks via cross-border links
among banking system, which supports policy measures such as the establishment of a Euro-
pean Banking Union. Furthermore, we show that industries are exposed to growth spillovers
at different extents. This finding implies that in order to evaluate the exposure of a coun-
try’s economy to business cycle synchronization and to mitigate negative effects during crisis
times, sectoral specializations have to be taken into account. Only then can policy rescue
programs be more effectively designed to support the sectors in distress.
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A.4 Appendix to Chapter 4




























This table shows estimation results of an OLS regression of the same variables as in the dynamic model
in Table 4.9. Country and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are reported in brackets below
coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is quarterly GDP growth. The sample period spans 1996-
2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. See the data description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.2: Additional estimation results: agriculture, forestry and fishing
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















ln(2) -0.019 -0.464 -0.032 -0.488 -0.054 -0.489
(0.048) (0.094) (0.048) (0.094) (0.044) (0.094)
Constant 0.025 -0.009 0.025 -0.003 0.023 0.000
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.037)
∆ VIX 0.089 0.092 0.093 0.095 0.057 0.089
(0.126) (0.103) (0.125) (0.100) (0.106) (0.098)
∆EuroToDollar -0.001 -0.482 0.003 -0.483 0.479 -0.465
(0.688) (0.572) (0.683) (0.557) (0.690) (0.549)
∆ Productivity 0.024 0.080 0.024 0.079 0.018 0.078
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.094 0.036 0.078 0.021 0.088 0.019
(0.063) (0.054) (0.063) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053)
∆GFCF 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
∆LabourForce -0.088 -0.088 -0.082 -0.088 -0.084 -0.092
(0.063) (0.057) (0.063) (0.056) (0.061) (0.056)
∆GovernmentExpenditure -0.022 -0.008 -0.023 -0.012 -0.021 -0.013
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
∆ExportToGDP -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
 4.961 4.927 4.926
(1.027) (1.019) (1.016)
logLik -1240.245 -1190.744 -1235.842 -1184.567 -1230.286 -1183.974
AICc 2505.963 2409.649 2499.845 2400.052 2494.326 2404.615
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Agriculture,
forestry and fishing”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP
and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data description
in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.3: Additional estimation results: arts, entertainment, recreation and other services
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



























ln(2) -0.033 -0.372 -0.034 -0.378 -0.036 -0.377
(0.048) (0.086) (0.048) (0.086) (0.048) (0.086)
Constant -0.057 -0.073 -0.055 -0.069 -0.048 -0.064
(0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036)
∆ VIX -0.070 -0.098 -0.071 -0.098 -0.066 -0.102
(0.125) (0.103) (0.125) (0.102) (0.124) (0.102)
∆EuroToDollar -1.141 -1.076 -1.111 -0.986 -1.061 -0.978
(0.683) (0.609) (0.684) (0.608) (0.681) (0.603)
∆ Productivity 0.078 0.055 0.077 0.054 0.075 0.053
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.010
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
∆ConsumerConfidence -0.048 -0.029 -0.048 -0.030 -0.041 -0.028
(0.063) (0.055) (0.063) (0.055) (0.063) (0.055)
∆GFCF 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.116 0.145 0.113 0.142 0.112 0.141
(0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.011 0.036 0.011 0.036 0.012 0.036
(0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
∆ExportToGDP 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
 6.502 6.399 6.429
(1.485) (1.457) (1.470)
logLik -1234.141 -1199.966 -1233.930 -1199.251 -1233.088 -1198.969
AICc 2493.756 2428.092 2496.019 2429.421 2499.929 2434.604
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited
to estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the
model with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Arts,
entertainment, recreation and other services”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are
in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. See the data description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.4: Additional estimation results: construction
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















ln(2) -0.115 -0.292 -0.150 -0.324 -0.150 -0.327
(0.048) (0.074) (0.048) (0.072) (0.048) (0.072)
Constant -0.100 -0.059 -0.085 -0.057 -0.086 -0.048
(0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
∆ VIX 0.002 0.033 -0.040 -0.005 -0.040 0.000
(0.120) (0.119) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) (0.115)
∆EuroToDollar 1.507 1.408 1.462 1.339 1.457 1.376
(0.656) (0.653) (0.644) (0.619) (0.640) (0.622)
∆ Productivity 0.152 0.147 0.132 0.129 0.132 0.126
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.058 -0.051 -0.050 -0.045 -0.051 -0.043
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.118 0.145 0.085 0.106 0.085 0.104
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.058)
∆GFCF 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.172 0.149 0.153 0.136 0.153 0.134
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.064 0.053 0.064 0.052 0.064 0.052
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
∆ExportToGDP 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 11.903 12.481 12.220
(3.736) (3.805) (3.691)
logLik -1198.092 -1186.048 -1186.254 -1173.074 -1186.253 -1172.761
AICc 2421.657 2400.257 2400.669 2377.066 2406.259 2382.189
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Construction”.
The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial
sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data description in Table A.4.12
for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.5: Additional estimation results: financial and insurance activities
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















ln(2) -0.048 -0.184 -0.066 -0.210 -0.075 -0.211
(0.048) (0.070) (0.048) (0.071) (0.048) (0.071)
Constant -0.056 -0.050 -0.050 -0.044 -0.048 -0.040
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)
∆ VIX -0.000 -0.038 0.010 -0.016 0.010 -0.019
(0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
∆EuroToDollar 0.165 0.128 0.154 0.103 0.152 0.144
(0.678) (0.670) (0.672) (0.655) (0.669) (0.653)
∆ Productivity 0.134 0.118 0.135 0.118 0.147 0.118
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.003 -0.008 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.099 0.077 0.100 0.080 0.109 0.080
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
∆GFCF -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.006 0.017 0.001 0.009 -0.011 0.006
(0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.006
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
∆ExportToGDP 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 15.432 14.569 14.594
(5.646) (5.171) (5.202)
logLik -1227.501 -1219.476 -1221.485 -1213.063 -1220.851 -1212.825
AICc 2480.475 2467.112 2471.130 2457.044 2475.455 2462.316
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Financial and
insurance activities”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates.
GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data in
Table A.4.12 description for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.6: Additional estimation results: industry (except construction)
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
normal t normal t normal t









ln(2) -0.442 -0.897 -0.562 -0.896 -0.588 -0.886
(0.048) (0.086) (0.048) (0.082) (0.050) (0.081)
Constant -0.129 -0.121 -0.103 -0.123 -0.083 -0.116
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
∆ VIX -0.151 -0.094 -0.073 -0.056 -0.099 -0.074
(0.102) (0.082) (0.096) (0.081) (0.095) (0.082)
∆EuroToDollar -1.505 -0.621 -0.970 -0.592 -0.759 -0.528
(0.557) (0.476) (0.527) (0.460) (0.500) (0.482)
∆ Productivity 0.385 0.451 0.334 0.428 0.324 0.424
(0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.093 -0.036 -0.074 -0.035 -0.068 -0.030
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.154 0.108 0.040 0.059 0.038 0.048
(0.051) (0.044) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.045)
∆GFCF 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
∆LabourForce 0.047 0.042 0.017 0.036 0.015 0.025
(0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.025 0.041 0.024 0.034 0.038 0.041
(0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
∆ExportToGDP 0.083 0.057 0.057 0.051 0.052 0.050
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
 5.865 6.792 7.641
(1.181) (1.482) (1.814)
logLik -1054.129 -980.087 -1011.261 -968.525 -995.992 -960.739
AICc 2133.731 1988.335 2050.681 1967.969 2025.738 1958.145
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Industry
(except construction)”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates.
GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data
description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.7: Additional estimation results: information and communication
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

































ln(2) -0.078 -0.391 -0.122 -0.420 -0.136 -0.437
(0.048) (0.084) (0.048) (0.081) (0.048) (0.082)
Constant -0.061 -0.129 -0.048 -0.090 0.011 -0.107
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.038)
∆ VIX 0.263 0.164 0.173 0.097 0.214 0.081
(0.122) (0.114) (0.120) (0.107) (0.123) (0.104)
∆EuroToDollar 1.386 0.952 1.126 0.765 0.579 0.889
(0.668) (0.666) (0.655) (0.616) (0.647) (0.599)
∆ Productivity 0.193 0.200 0.186 0.190 0.175 0.187
(0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.018 -0.003 -0.020 -0.005 -0.013 -0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
∆ConsumerConfidence -0.036 -0.077 -0.060 -0.097 -0.054 -0.101
(0.061) (0.056) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055)
∆GFCF -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
∆LabourForce 0.027 0.023 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
∆GovernmentExpenditure -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 0.001 -0.011
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
∆ExportToGDP 0.023 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
 7.010 7.630 7.257
(1.635) (1.793) (1.655)
logLik -1214.319 -1183.970 -1199.730 -1168.358 -1198.060 -1165.225
AICc 2454.112 2396.101 2427.619 2367.636 2429.873 2367.117
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Information
and communication”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates.
GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data
description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.8: Additional estimation results: professional, scientific and tech activities
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







































ln(2) -0.113 -0.369 -0.213 -0.384 -0.230 -0.386
(0.048) (0.079) (0.048) (0.074) (0.048) (0.074)
Constant -0.071 -0.001 -0.050 -0.023 -0.001 0.007
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
∆ VIX -0.010 -0.054 -0.033 -0.045 0.119 0.038
(0.120) (0.116) (0.114) (0.108) (0.107) (0.109)
∆EuroToDollar 0.058 0.057 0.171 0.139 0.929 0.489
(0.656) (0.670) (0.624) (0.621) (0.516) (0.585)
∆ Productivity 0.153 0.116 0.125 0.111 0.107 0.103
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.074 -0.059 -0.061 -0.056 -0.049 -0.049
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.114 0.115 0.080 0.075 0.083 0.074
(0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
∆GFCF 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.078 0.055 0.040 0.044 0.016 0.028
(0.060) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.054)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.040 0.049 0.042 0.049 0.050 0.050
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
∆ExportToGDP 0.059 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.027
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
 8.721 11.919 12.981
(2.278) (3.810) (4.449)
logLik -1198.953 -1174.457 -1164.015 -1153.135 -1155.719 -1147.117
AICc 2423.379 2377.073 2356.191 2337.188 2345.191 2330.900
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Professional,
scientific and tech activities”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth
rates. GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data
description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.9: Additional estimation results: public administration, deference, education, hu-
man health and social work
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



























ln(2) -0.082 -0.249 -0.082 -0.249 -0.083 -0.249
(0.048) (0.074) (0.048) (0.074) (0.048) (0.073)
Constant -0.121 -0.146 -0.121 -0.146 -0.122 -0.150
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
∆ VIX -0.007 -0.079 -0.007 -0.081 -0.010 -0.083
(0.122) (0.115) (0.122) (0.115) (0.121) (0.114)
∆EuroToDollar -0.787 -0.880 -0.791 -0.890 -0.747 -0.770
(0.666) (0.618) (0.667) (0.619) (0.672) (0.630)
∆ Productivity 0.041 0.035 0.041 0.034 0.041 0.036
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
∆ConsumerConfidence -0.014 -0.026 -0.014 -0.026 -0.012 -0.026
(0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059)
∆GFCF -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.067 0.087 0.066 0.087 0.068 0.093
(0.061) (0.063) (0.0619 (0.063) (0.061) (0.063)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.261 0.282 0.261 0.282 0.262 0.282
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
∆ExportToGDP -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 12.532 12.496 12.416
(4.112) (4.095) (4.012)
logLik -1212.554 -1202.135 -1212.531 -1202.043 -1212.203 -1201.847
AICc 2450.581 2432.430 2453.222 2435.005 2458.160 2440.361
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited
to estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the
model with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Public
administration, deference, education, human health and social work”. The sample period spans 1996–2017.
All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. See the data description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.10: Additional estimation results: real estate activities
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















ln(2) -0.032 -0.187 -0.032 -0.188 -0.036 -0.193
(0.048) (0.073) (0.048) (0.073) (0.048) (0.073)
Constant -0.041 -0.068 -0.040 -0.066 -0.025 -0.072
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
∆ VIX 0.025 0.083 0.025 0.081 0.057 0.068
(0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.127) (0.124)
∆EuroToDollar 0.084 -0.098 0.072 -0.119 0.140 -0.222
(0.683) (0.656) (0.684) (0.654) (0.692) (0.658)
∆ Productivity 0.106 0.094 0.105 0.093 0.103 0.092
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
∆ConsumerConfidence -0.141 -0.111 -0.140 -0.111 -0.145 -0.114
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
∆GFCF -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
∆LabourForce 0.061 0.041 0.062 0.042 0.056 0.040
(0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.017 0.031 0.017 0.031 0.015 0.029
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
∆ExportToGDP 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 13.456 13.446 13.021
(4.644) (4.620) (4.375)
logLik -1234.731 -1225.420 -1234.618 -1225.193 -1233.297 -1224.760
AICc 2494.935 2479.001 2497.395 2481.306 2500.348 2486.187
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Real estate
activities”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and
industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. See the data description in
Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Table A.4.11: Additional estimation results: wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommo-
dation and food
no spillovers static spillovers dynamic spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



























ln(2) -0.240 -0.564 -0.315 -0.573 -0.337 -0.568
(0.048) (0.083) (0.048) (0.080) (0.048) (0.078)
Constant -0.122 -0.056 -0.104 -0.077 -0.056 -0.052
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
∆ VIX 0.117 0.168 0.092 0.133 0.147 0.173
(0.112) (0.107) (0.108) (0.101) (0.106) (0.101)
∆EuroToDollar -0.923 0.145 -0.500 -0.047 0.095 0.229
(0.616) (0.591) (0.596) (0.558) (0.594) (0.555)
∆ Productivity 0.263 0.211 0.233 0.206 0.215 0.201
(0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029)
∆CreditToNonFinancialSector -0.082 -0.053 -0.067 -0.053 -0.057 -0.050
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
∆ConsumerConfidence 0.209 0.179 0.135 0.141 0.115 0.128
(0.057) (0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052)
∆GFCF 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
∆LabourForce 0.186 0.137 0.154 0.128 0.152 0.135
(0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051)
∆GovernmentExpenditure 0.024 0.049 0.022 0.046 0.028 0.046
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
∆ExportToGDP 0.068 0.053 0.054 0.050 0.040 0.042
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
 7.054 8.315 9.201
(1.630) (2.123) (2.494)
logLik -1142.829 -1107.144 -1116.689 -1093.062 -1104.064 -1085.503
AICc 2311.132 2242.449 2261.539 2217.043 2241.881 2207.672
Notes: This table shows estimation results for different model specifications (no spillovers, static spillovers,
dynamic spillovers) based on normal or t-distribution as indicated in the column header. Standard errors
are reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. Empty standard errors imply that the numerical
matrix of standard errors is not positive and that the corresponding spillover model is not well suited to
estimate this industrial sector. The Akaike information criterion (AICc) is depicted in bold for the model
with the best fit (smallest value). The dependent variable is quarterly growth of the sector “Wholesale
and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food”. The sample period spans 1996–2017. All variables
are in quarterly growth rates. GDP and industrial sector growth rates are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. See the data description in Table A.4.12 for more information on data sources.
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Figure A.4.1: Time-varying spillover strength for all industrial sectors
This graph shows the time-varying spillover strength for the model with industrial sector growth as the
dependent variable and the sample period 1996-2017. The industrial sectors comprise in the first row:
Agriculture, forestry and fishing. Arts, entertainment, recreation and other services. Construction. Financial
and insurance activities. In the second row: Industry (except construction). Public administration, deference,
education, human health and social work. Real estate activities. Professional, scientific and tech activities.
In the third row: Information and communication. Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation
and food. The model is estimated based on score-driven model with Student’s -distributed disturbances.
Table A.4.12: Description and sources of variables
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables (variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile)




Quarter-to-quarter growth rates of
gross value-added in constant 2010
prices, season and calendar adjusted.
Industries according to Eurostat’s A*10 industry
breakdown are:
Agriculture, forestry and fishing.
Arts, entertainment, recreation and other services.
Construction.
Financial and insurance activities.
Industry (except construction).
Information and communication.
Professional, scientific and tech activities.
Public administration, defence, education, human
health and social work.
Real estate activities.






BIS locational banking statistics, total claims of all reporting




∆Productivity Labour productivity, growth rate, seasonally adjusted. OECD
∆Consumer Confidence Consumer confidence indicator, growth rate,seasonally adjusted. OECD
∆Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (GFCF)
Gross fixed capital formation, growth rate,
constant prices, seasonally adjusted. OECD
∆Labour Force Labour force, growth rate, seasonally adjusted. OECD
∆Government
Expenditure
Government final consumption expenditure, growth rate,




Credit to private non-financial sector, growth rate,
provided by all sectors, in percent of GDP. BIS
∆Exports to GDP Exports of goods and services, in percent of GDP. OxfordEconomics
∆VIX Volatility VIX, growth rate. CBOE
∆Euro-to-Dollar
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Chapter 5:
Physical Climate Change Risks and the Sovereign
Creditworthiness of Emerging Economies
Abstract: I show that rising temperatures can detrimentally affect the sovereign creditworthi-
ness of emerging economies. To this end, I collect long-term monthly temperature data of 54
emerging markets. I calculate a country’s temperature deviation from its historical average,
which approximates present-day climate change trends. Running regressions from 1994m1-
2018m12, I find that higher temperature anomalies lower sovereign bond performances (i.e.
increase sovereign risk) significantly for countries that are warmer on average and have lower
seasonality. The estimated magnitudes suggest that affected countries likely face significant
increases in their sovereign borrowing costs if temperatures continue to rise due to climate
change. However, results indicate that stronger institutions can make a country more resilient
towards temperature shocks, which holds independent of a country’s climate.
5.1 Introduction
As of 2020, human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0C of global
warming compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC 2018). Climate-related natural disasters,
infectious diseases, species extinction and threats to economic prosperity as well as food,
health and water supply are projected to increase dramatically with further warming. How-
ever, the IPCC (2018) also emphasizes that the 1.0C increase witnessed so far has already
led to more extreme weather events, changing natural systems and economic damages. Fur-
thermore, the report states that the burden of climate change will be particularly heavy for
developing countries in the global South.
In this paper, I exploit temperature fluctuations of past years which represent physical
climate change risks in line with the 1.0C warming witnessed so far. I contribute to the
literature by linking these movements in temperature to the sovereign creditworthiness of,
potentially climate-vulnerable, emerging market economies. Though the literature on the
economic effects of temperature fluctuations is rich, the link to sovereign bond performances
or sovereign risk has so far been missing.
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Despite this gap in the literature, climate change can pose a significant threat for the
creditworthiness of sovereigns according to several regulatory bodies. For instance, a report
on the financial risks from climate change by the Bank of England (2018) states:
“The increasing frequency of severe weather events could also impact macroeco-
nomic conditions through sustained damage to national infrastructure and weaken
fundamental factors such as economic growth, employment, and inflation. This
could have implications for the market price of sovereign debt for those countries
most susceptible to the physical impacts of climate change.”48
Furthermore, rating agencies such as Moody’s (2016) have started incorporating the
credit implications of climate change for sovereign issuers.49 These developments matter,
as sovereign creditworthiness and associated bond costs are crucial for all governments. Ris-
ing borrowing costs compensate bondholders for higher risks, but can also push countries
into crisis and default. Even in the absence of debt crises, any unit of currency that is spent
on borrowing costs can no longer be used for other expenditures such as adaptions to climate
change.
Therefore, I extend the literature on climate risks, in the form of temperature fluctuations,
in connection with financial markets, in the form of sovereign bond returns. Figure 5.1
illustrates the main idea of my empirical approach. It depicts the mean annual temperature
of the 54 countries in my panel from 1901 to 2018, showing an upward trend since the second
half of the 20th century. The red line shows the constant temperature average from 1901 to
1950. From 1994 onward, which is the start of my estimation period and the shaded area in
the graph, I calculate a country’s temperature deviation from its 1901-1950 average. This
temperature anomaly variable has a mean of 0.84C which is close to the global warming
trend of 1C estimated by the IPCC (2018).
In my estimation, I follow the “new approach” outlined by Dell et al. (2014). Using
monthly data for 54 emerging economies from 1994 to 2018, I regress market returns of the
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), a common measure for sovereign debt performance,
on the described temperature anomaly fluctuations. I control for precipitation and include
48Similar remarks can be found by the ECB (2019), stating: “sovereign risks could increase for countries
with carbon-intensive industries.”
49Moreover, governments are increasingly facing legal consequences for not disclosing climate risks in their
sovereign bond disclosures, as described in a Bloomberg (2020) article from 22 June 2020: “Australia Sued
For Not Disclosing Climate Risk in Sovereign Debt”
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Figure 5.1: Average annual temperature of 54 emerging economies in the sample from 1901-
2018 and 1901-1950 temperature average
country and region-time fixed effects on the month-year level. The captured temperature
shocks are thus idiosyncratic and account for weather trends common to each region. Building
on a rich literature that links temperature increases to lower GDP growth in poorer and
warmer countries (Burke et al. 2015, Dell et al. 2012), reduced firm productivity and output
(Zhang et al. 2018, Adhvaryuy et al. 2020), decreasing labor supply (Graff Zivin & Neidell
2014) and more interpersonal and civil conflict (Hsiang et al. 2013), I empirically test the
hypothesis if rising temperatures compared to a country’s historical temperature average lead
to lower sovereign debt performance (i.e. increasing sovereign risk).
My results indicate that the effect of rising temperature anomalies on sovereign credit-
worthiness critically hinges on a country’s economic and climatic profile: Warm countries are
significantly more susceptible to temperature shocks than cold or mild-tempered countries,
which is line with the results of Burke et al. (2015). For countries with very high average an-
nual temperatures (> 25C), a 1C increase in monthly temperature compared to a country’s
historical average lowers EMBI returns by 0.464 percentage points on average. This effect
corresponds to 11.9% of the EMBI returns’ overall standard deviation. Thus, in a 2C global
warming scenario, EMBI returns (in percentage points) could be lowered for affected countries
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by roughly a quarter of their overall standard deviation. This magnitude is non-negligible
and could lead to rising sovereign borrowing costs or even defaults for warmer countries in
the next decades. Such out-of-sample projections must of course be treated carefully, as they
abstain from countries’ adaption strategies towards climate change but also from potentially
non-linearly aggravating weather effects that are entailed by continuously rising temperatures
(see Bolton et al. (2020)). However, if the past temperature anomaly shocks captured in this
paper are any guidance, warm countries could bear a major burden from future temperature
increases in the form of lower sovereign creditworthiness.
Related to the warmness of a country, I find that countries with lower temperature-
seasonality suffer statistically and economically significantly more from temperature increases
with respect to their sovereign risk level than countries with more volatile seasons. This
result holds either for grouping countries into different bins of seasonality or for dividing the
temperature anomaly measure by a country’s standard deviation of monthly temperature.
Next, I exploit the monthly frequency of my data. I test if temperature shock effects differ
in warmer compared to colder months or in summer compared to winter. However, after
adjusting the months in southern hemisphere countries to the northern hemisphere scale,
I find no statistical evidence that a temperature shock in warmer months has significantly
different implications for sovereign creditworthiness than shocks in colder months, or differs
in summer compared to winter. Put together with the previous evidence, this result suggests
that the overall warm- or coldness of a country is what matters for temperature-induced
sovereign risk, not the within-year seasonality of the weather.
Following the analysis of a country’s climatic profile, I test if different economic sector
specializations could be related to the strength of historical temperature shocks on sovereign
debt performance. To this end, I interact the temperature anomaly measure with the spe-
cialization of a country in terms of agriculture, manufacturing, services or natural resources.
However, these specifications do not yield any statistical patterns indicating that countries
with higher agricultural shares on GDP, more service sector employees or larger rents from
natural resources such as oil are more (or less) susceptible to temperature shocks with respect
to their sovereign risk. My results do not rule out that potentially stranded industries, such
as fossil fuels, may affect sovereign debt prices in the future, once their business models have
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become under stronger pressure. Still, the effect seems to be weak during my estimation
period or not connected to temperature shocks.
What instead holds remarkably well throughout the analysis is the conditioning impact
of institutional quality on temperature-induced sovereign risk. Countries with weaker rule
of law, control of corruption, civil rights, democratic governments or less progressive tax
systems face a statistically significantly stronger marginal effect of temperature increases that
is detrimental to their sovereign creditworthiness. Next to these more traditional institutional
variables, climate-related metrics yield a similar conclusion: Countries with lower values in
the ND-Gain index, which measures both the adaptiveness and vulnerability of a country
towards climate change, face significantly higher temperature shock effects on their sovereign
risk level. Disentangling the ND-Gain index reveals that this effect is driven more by the
adaptive readiness than the vulnerability part of the index. These results suggest that higher
overall institutional quality, both traditional and climate-related, could improve the resilience
and adaptiveness of emerging economies towards climate change.
I conduct encompassing robustness tests to demonstrate the stability of my results. These
procedures include changing the fixed effects specification, dependent variable, historical
average period and lag structure of temperature shocks. I also drop certain countries from the
analysis, firstly if they have few EMBI data points, secondly if their landmass is among the ten
largest countries. In addition, I test if more volatile weather periods can also impair sovereign
bond performance, for which I find confirmation. Lastly, I analyze if the temperature effects
changed after the Paris Agreement in December 2015, which does not seem to be the case.
In sum, my evidence suggests that historical temperature deviations, approximating phys-
ical climate change, lower sovereign bond performances (i.e. increase sovereign risk) signif-
icantly for countries that are: (i) warmer, (ii) have lower seasonality, (iii) and have lower
institutional quality, both for traditional and climate-related metrics. I also find evidence
that poorer countries suffer more from temperature shocks. However, these factors are cor-
related as poorer countries tend to have worse institutions. In addition, it is difficult to
disentangle the long-run effects of climate zones on the creation of institutions or the wealth
of nations (see Acemoglu et al. (2002) for a discussion).
I shed some light on these interrelations by combining all relevant channels, i.e. warmness,
poverty and institutional quality, in one regression. My evidence suggests that the effect
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of poorer countries suffering stronger from temperature shocks is indeed driven by these
countries’ tendencies to have worse institutions. However, both the institutional and the
warmness channel remain statistically significant in the same specification, suggesting that
stronger institutions can provide resilience towards temperature shocks, independent of the
warmness of a country.
Though any further disentanglement of these channels is beyond the scope of this paper,
what matters for the policy implications is the finding that countries with warmer weather and
lower institutional quality have so far been hit significantly harder by temperature anomaly
shocks with respect to their sovereign creditworthiness. This result is an important extension
to the still young literature on climate risks and financial markets. If past trends are any
guidance, affected countries could face meaningful increases in their sovereign debt costs or
even debt crises as climate change intensifies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides a framework on how
to think about physical climate change risk and its connection to sovereign risk. Section 5.3
introduces the data and provides summary statistics. In the following, Section 5.4 describes
the empirical framework and main regression results. Section 5.5 investigates the climatic
and economic profiles of countries and their connection to temperature-induced sovereign risk.
The subsequent Section 5.6 provides encompassing robustness checks. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Physical Climate Change Risk
5.2.1 Physical Climate Change Risk in Contrast to Transition Risk
The following section provides a framework on how to think about climate change risks in
a sovereign bond context. Table 5.1 by the Bank of England (2018) depicts the distinction
between physical and transition risks as the two main channels of how climate change can
lead to economic impairments.
Physical risks describe the materializing damages from climate change. They can arise
from extreme weather events or natural disasters such as droughts, wildfires, sea level rises
or floods. Regions hit by such disasters can face losses in terms of human lives, critical
infrastructure, food supply, firm assets or their capital stock (see also Bolton et al. (2020)). As
further global warming likely entails irreversible tipping points, these damages could lead to
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Table 5.1: Distinction between physical and transition climate change risks. Source: Bank
of England (2018)
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non-transitory, lasting disruptions (Ripple et al. 2019). According to the insurance data used
by NGO Germanwatch (2019), the damages from extreme weather events worldwide between
1999 and 2018 amounted to $3.54 trillion (in purchasing power parities). Physical climate
risks can materialize as a mortgage risk for homeowners that lose their property, a credit
risk for banks that lend to e.g. flood-impaired firms (Koetter et al. (2020)), an underwriting
risk for insurance companies (Financial Stability Institute 2019) and, as demonstrated in
this paper, a market risk for sovereigns bonds of countries most susceptible to the physical
impacts of climate change.
In contrast, transition risks describe the adjustment towards a low-carbon economy and
the expected damages and costs associated therewith. Therefore, these risks are more
forward-looking as (expected) changes in environmental policies or sentiments could threaten,
for instance, the business model of certain firms. Should investors reassess the viability of e.g.
a fossil-energy-intensive industry as tougher climate laws are implemented, the stock price
of affected firms might fall. Such a shock would likely spill-over to banks, pension funds and
other investors with exposures towards stranded industries, which is referred to as a “carbon
bubble” (see ESRB (2016) for an associated systemic risk analysis and Delis et al. (2018) for
how banks price carbon bubble risks).
An example of transition risks in a government bond context that contrasts the physical
risks in this paper is by Painter (2020). He shows that US municipalities that face stronger
sea level increases in the future have higher issuance costs for their municipality bonds today.
Because of its forward-looking nature, this effect demonstrates a transition risk. As projected
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climate damages from sea level increases rise over time, the results are driven by long-term
bonds. In addition, the pricing effect increased around the release of the Stern report on
climate change in 2006. Though not shown by Painter (2020), it could likely be the case
that such re-pricing of climate-sensitive assets was even more pronounced in recent years as
global warming became a major concern for the financial industry (see Boston Common Asset
Management (2018) for a survey of global banks and Bolton & Kacperczyk (2020) for asset
pricing effects of firms’ CO2 emissions).
In contrast to forward-looking transition risks, this paper, and the literature on tempera-
ture effects in general, analyze already materialized impacts of past temperature fluctuations.
Temperature increases are associated with extreme weather events or hotter years and in-
fluence economic activities along several dimensions, as the next section demonstrates. Of
course, both risk channels cannot be isolated completely from another: A wildfire might en-
tail vast economic damages (physical risk), but also change perceptions of investors regarding
the susceptibility of the affected region towards more wildfires in the future (transition risk).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle these risk effects. Nevertheless, I will
label temperature fluctuations as a form of physical risk in the following due to their primary
impact on current economic activities.
5.2.2 Physical Climate Change and Sovereign Creditworthiness
Temperature fluctuations have economic effects that can likely spill-over to sovereign risk.
Dell et al. (2012) show that higher temperatures reduce the GDP growth rate of poorer coun-
tries. This effect is driven by lower agricultural and industrial value-added and increasing
political instability during warmer years. Related, Burke et al. (2015) show that temperature
has a non-linear effect on GDP growth, with warmer countries’ economies being hit signif-
icantly more negatively by higher temperatures than colder or milder-tempered countries
for which temperature increases are negligible or even beneficial. Heal & Park (2014) and
Deryugina & Hsiang (2014) obtain similar results. Regarding this paper’s research agenda,
it is likely that macroeconomic fundamentals like GDP growth or related fiscal conditions
impact sovereign bond pricing (see Hilscher & Nosbusch (2010) or Gupta et al. (2008)).
With respect to the microeconomic channels behind the temperature-GDP connection,
Zhang et al. (2018) find that more hot days per year in a Chinese region significantly re-
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duce output and productivity of local firms. Using climate prediction models, the authors
derive that these effects could lower Chinese manufacturing output by 12% annually by 2050.
Adhvaryuy et al. (2020), Cachon et al. (2012) and Somanathan et al. (2018) obtain simi-
lar evidence, confirming that labor becomes less productive with hotter days. In addition,
Graff Zivin & Neidell (2014) demonstrate that individual labor supply decreases with more
warm days in a year. Pankratz & Schiller (2019) show that climate shocks can negatively im-
pact global production networks. One notable exception to this micro evidence is by Addoum
et al. (2020) who find weak effects of temperature shocks on US firm sales.
Climate and weather patterns also influence conflict and political stability. Hsiang et al.
(2013) summarize in a meta-study several contributions that link increasing temperatures
to more interpersonal conflict and crime, but also riots, civil conflict or ultimately civil war
(see also Burke et al. (2009)). Sovereign bond yields are known to respond to political con-
ditions (Eichler 2014) and it is highly plausible for temperature-induced political instability
to increase sovereign risk.
Though not every natural disaster can be directly linked to climate change, the IPCC
(2018) projects climate-related disasters to increase with further global warming. Figure 5.2
depicts the total number of climate-related natural disasters such as floods, droughts and
wildfires of the countries in my panel next to the average sample temperature from 1901
to 2018. There is a positive correlation between the rising occurrence of natural disasters
and increasing temperature, however, this relationship is at least partially driven by better
detection and recording of disasters. Nevertheless, the temperature anomaly measure in
this paper picks up natural disasters to some extent, as shown in the next section, and it
is intuitive to assume that severe disasters are detrimental to the economy and sovereign
creditworthiness of a country (Felbermayr & Gröschl 2014).
As I use the market return of a financial asset as my dependent variable, it is worth
noting that Bansal et al. (2016) demonstrate that most US equities have a negative expo-
sure coefficient towards long-run temperature fluctuations. Temperature patterns and other
climate-related measures are thus priced in financial assets (Bolton & Kacperczyk 2020).
The literature on the effects of temperature anomalies on sovereign creditworthiness is so
far scarce, which is why this paper adds significant value to this debate. Next to cited work by
Painter (2020), another paper that looks at the relationship between sovereign borrowing costs
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Figure 5.2: Number of climate-related natural disasters and average temperature of panel
countries
and climate change more general is by Kling et al. (2018). The authors regress bond costs on
climate-related vulnerability metrics of countries, finding that more vulnerable countries pay
higher debt costs. Though the specifics of the estimation strategy and the included countries
differ, the results in my paper point in a similar direction.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 Sovereign Creditworthiness
I measure sovereign creditworthiness using the Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBI)
provided by J.P. Morgan. EMBI data has several advantages: Included sovereign bonds are
US Dollar-denominated which rules out exchange rate risk. Eligible debt must furthermore
have more than one year to maturity and exceed an outstanding face value of $500 million.
These features make EMBI data well standardized, liquid and widely-used to track sovereign
debt performances of emerging economies.
The start of the EMBI Global at the beginning of 1994 determines my estimation period,
which runs from 1994m1 to 2018m12. I collect monthly EMBI Global data for all countries
available and calculate month-to-month returns using natural log differences. Positive returns
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imply improving sovereign creditworthiness.50 I winsorize the returns at the 1st and 99th
percentile to control for outliers. The panel is unbalanced because some countries enter only
in later years. As some countries’ EMBI series turn temporarily illiquid and hence constant
in the index level, I drop all observations with a zero percent EMBI return. To make sure
every country in the sample has sufficient variation, I only include those countries with liquid
EMBI returns of at least six years (72 months). This criterion is not critical for my results, as
shown in a robustness test. The final panel consists of 54 countries and can be found, together
with region classifications from Dell et al. (2012), in Table 5.2. Definition and sources of all
variables are in Table A.5.5.
Table 5.2: List of included countries and region classification
Region Countries
Asia-Pacific China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan,Philippines, Vietnam
Eastern Europe & Central Asia Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine
Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Middle East & North Africa Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey
Sub-Sahara Africa Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Nigeria,Senegal, South Africa, Zambia
5.3.2 Temperature Data
I obtain average monthly temperature data for every panel country since 1901 from the
Climate Research Unit (CRU). The data is land-weighted and based on an extensive network
of interpolated weather station data (see Harris et al. (2020) for details).51
My main variable of interest, as graphically depicted in Figure 5.1, measures the difference
in the observed temperature of a country during 1994m1-2018m12 towards this country’s
1901-1950 historical temperature average of that month:
 =   (19011950) (17)
50I obtain somewhat stronger results using direct EMBI returns. However, the results also hold when
using EMBI spread data as shown in the robustness section. Since both measures are market returns, their
interpretation, except for the switched signs, is very similar.
51Data is freely available at: https://crudata.uea.ac.uk/cru/data/hrg/cru_ts_4.03/.
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For instance, temperature in March of 2003 (year-month ) in Argentina (country )
is compared to the temperature of all months March of Argentina from 1901-1950. This
historical temperature anomaly is a proxy for the degree of global warming witnessed so far.
Table 5.3 listing the summary statistics shows a corresponding mean of 0.842C for the full
sample period. This value approaches the 1C temperature increase estimated by the IPCC
(2018) and lies well within their reported confidence range of 0.8C to 1.2C. For the sample
of temperature anomalies used in the main regressions, the mean is even at 0.896C, likely
because several countries enter the estimation only in later and thus warmer years.
In line with the IPCC (2018)’s assessment that the 1C warming so far has already led to
impacts on natural and human systems and considering the evidence on the economic effects
of temperature fluctuations gathered in Section 5.2, I interpret 
as a measure for warmer than normal periods and extreme weather events. Some statistical
confirmation for this perception comes from Table 5.4, showing that the mean of temperature
anomalies is higher during periods of heat-related natural disasters such as droughts (0.898),
droughts for which there is a damage estimate (0.946), wildfires (0.989) and heat waves
(0.988).52 In addition, I collect GDP growth, stock market and government primary surplus
data, which is for the latter two variables only available for a subsample of countries. Table 5.5
shows that the overall mean of these economic conditions is differentiated during high and low
temperature anomalies. The mean of stock returns (overall: 0.233) is lower if temperature
increases are above the 75th percentile (-0.0478) and higher when temperature is below
the 25th percentile (0.434). Similarly, primary surpluses (overall: -0.235) decrease during
higher (-0.693) and rise during lower (0.400) temperature anomalies. Historical Temperature
increases are thus responsive to both climate- and economy-related news.





I divide the anomaly measure by a country’s historical standard deviation of monthly tem-
perature. This adjustment is suggested by Dell et al. (2014) and applied, among others,
by Barrios et al. (2010). It sets the temperature shock in relation to the usual variation in
52Wildfires or heat waves with reported damages also have higher averages but lower number of observation.
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warm- or coldness of a country. In this way, temperature anomalies in countries with lower
seasonality are stronger emphasized.
Table 5.3: Summary statistics of all variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
∆EMBI 10,006 0.686 0.729 3.921 -16.23 13.47
∆EMBI (baseline) 9,957 0.691 0.729 3.898 -16.23 13.47
HistoricalTempAnomaly 16,200 0.842 0.694 1.190 -5.514 8.830
HistoricalTempAnomaly (baseline) 9,957 0.896 0.742 1.129 -5.254 8.830
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly 16,200 0.355 0.223 0.514 -1.627 4.007
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly (baseline) 9,957 0.418 0.257 0.574 -1.627 4.007
Precipitation 16,200 0.0960 0.0610 0.0971 0 1.072
∆VIX 16,146 0.0656 -0.0800 4.219 -10.85 15.35
∆GlobalGovernmentBondIndex 16,146 0.367 0.307 1.817 -4.967 5.365
∆US-TermSpread 16,146 -0.00640 -0.0430 0.272 -0.551 0.800
∆US-CorporateRiskPremium 16,146 0.00347 -0.0257 0.480 -1.207 1.944
∆US-10-YearTreasuryYield 16,146 -0.00858 -0.0151 0.252 -0.744 0.635
AgricultureToGDP 16,032 10.36 8.300 6.952 2 38.96
ManufacturingToGDP 15,624 14.85 15.09 5.688 0.650 35.01
ServicesToGDP 16,032 51.42 52.65 9.533 10.57 75.85
ResourceRentsToGDP 15,348 7.069 2.950 9.825 0 64.15
RuleOfLaw 14,904 41.50 42.09 20.29 0 89.47
ControlOfCorruption 14,904 41.88 42.55 21.25 0.510 91.88
CivilRights 16,032 3.513 3 1.474 1 7
PoliticalRights 16,044 3.426 3 1.933 1 7
IncomeRedistribution 14,136 10.86 5.977 12.27 -21.01 46.68
Polity2 15,504 4.429 7 5.752 -9 10
DemocraticGovernments 15,264 5.971 7 3.469 0 10
AuthoritarianGovernments 15,264 1.481 0 2.459 0 9
ND-GAIN 15,552 47.72 47.02 6.398 32.61 62.80
ReadinessIndex 15,552 0.388 0.382 0.0851 0.181 0.609
VulnerabilityIndex 15,552 0.433 0.423 0.0541 0.322 0.569
GDPPerCapita 16,164 5,556 4,548 3,882 541.6 17,709
∆EMBISpread 9,694 -0.589 -2.406 80.76 -310.2 371.9
∆CDSSpread 4,328 1.911 -0.260 71.05 -281.1 410.7
HistoricalDeviationAnomaly 16,200 0.118 0.0508 0.452 -2.312 2.630
DebtToGDP 14,076 51.25 43.29 43.63 3.22 925.24
YearsSinceLastSovDebtRestructuring 16,200 22.71 23 13.18 0 36
PrimaryNetLendingGDP 11,340 -0.235 -0.431 3.72 -31.3 22.02
AgricultureLandShare 14,760 44.73 45.52 20.36 3.190 85.49
AgricultureEmploymentShare 16,200 26.93 23.23 15.73 0.0600 72.26
IndustrialEmploymentShare 16,200 21.09 21.40 6.441 6.240 35.99
ServicesEmploymentShare 16,200 51.97 52.57 12.48 20.55 78.80
Sample period is 1994:m1–2018:m12. Variables with ∆ are in monthly growth rates and winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile, all other variables are in levels. See Table A.5.5 for information on data sources.





















Mean of HistoricalTempAnomaly is shown for periods with occurring natural disasters in panel countries.
Number of observations for each event is shown below in brackets.
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Table 5.5: Mean of economic variables during high and low temperature anomalies








(38 Countries) 0.233 -0.0872 0.412
Quarterly GDP Growth
(full sample) 0.981 0.937 1.061
Government Primary Surplus
in % of GDP (42 Countries) -0.235 -0.693 0.400
Mean of an economic variable is shown over all periods, for periods with high temperature anomalies
and for periods with low temperature anomalies. HistoricalTempAnomaly is on monthly frequency for
stock returns (75th percentile 1.382C, 25th percentile 0.286C), collapsed to quarterly frequency for GDP
growth (75th percentile 1.245C, 25th percentile 0.321C), and collapsed to yearly frequency for government
surplus (75th percentile 1.178C, 25th percentile 0.447C) to match the respective frequency.
5.4 Empirical Specification and Results
Following what Dell et al. (2014) call the “new approach”, I estimate an OLS panel regression:
∆ =  + + + + (19)
Natural log changes in the EMBI (∆) are regressed on a
temperature anomaly measure and fixed effects. The sample runs from 1994m1 to 2018m12
and consists of 54 countries. Temperature anomalies are either the difference of temperature
from its historical average () or the historical anomaly divided by
monthly temperature standard deviation () as described
in Section 5.3.2. The size and statistical significance of  tests the hypothesis if and by how
much temperature anomalies affect sovereign risk. Based on the gathered evidence in Section
5.2.2, I expect higher temperature anomalies leading to lower sovereign creditworthiness.
I include country fixed effects  to control for time-invariant characteristics such as geog-
raphy or culture. In addition, year-month fixed effects enter the regression and are interacted
with the region classification of a country (). This approach, suggested among others by
Dell et al. (2014), makes sure that common trends, such as shared weather patterns in each
region, are controlled for. It ensures that captured temperature shocks are idiosyncratic and
local in nature. I apply different fixed effects in the robustness section and find stable results.
Importantly, I do not include any control variables on the country level such as stock
returns or exchange rates. This decision is due to the explicit stance of the temperature
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literature against including any control variable that might be endogenous towards weather
and climate variation (Dell et al. (2014), Burke et al. (2015)).53 Given that stock returns are
subject to similar temperature-productivity effects described in Section 5.2 and also unavail-
able on a liquid frequency for all panel countries, I abstain from including them. Following
leading papers like Dell et al. (2012) and Burke et al. (2015), I only control for precipita-
tion (, also obtained from CRU) and include time-region fixed effects on the highest
possible frequency (year-month). Standard errors are clustered on the country level.
In the context of this thesis, in particular the instrumental variable approach of Chapter
2, the choice to omit certain control variables could seem contradictory. In Chapter 2, I
applied an IV approach and included a multitude of controls to rule out concerns on omitted
variables between sovereign and bank risk. Chapter 5 consciously avoids additional controls.
However, one has to keep in mind that the literature on temperature and the literature on
the sovereign-bank loop are distinct in their empirical approaches. Leading papers of the
temperature literature refer to the “bad control” chapter by Angrist & Pischke (2008), who
warn against including control variables, that could themselves be an outcome of the variable
of interest. Though this is a concern one could have for many empirical regressions, papers
like Dell et al. (2014) and Burke et al. (2015) argue that the biasing effect of a bad control
is particularly pressing in a temperature estimation. In the present case, stock returns are
driven by the economic effects of temperature variation. They could also serve as an outcome
variable instead of sovereign risk. Though the issue if a control is “bad” or not can be raised
for many papers, in this thesis, I follow the leading articles of the respective literature and
therefore exclude all biasing controls in the equations of this chapter.
Table 5.6 presents results from several versions of equation (19), including the baseline
model. Column (1) introduces the historical temperature anomaly measure and both country
and region-time fixed effects, but only on a yearly level. The temperature measure enters
negative and statistically significant, but the overall explanatory power of the estimation is
quite low. In column (2) I include precipitation on the country level and several international
control variables such as changes in the VIX, the US term spread, US corporate risk spread,
the 10-year US treasury yield and the returns of a general government bond index. The tem-
perature anomaly coefficient remains negative and statistically significant to this addition.
53In their review article on climate and crime, Hsiang et al. (2013) explicitly exclude studies that use a
potentially biasing control variable. See also the chapter “bad control” in Angrist & Pischke (2008).
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Finally, I estimate the baseline model (column (3)) in which I introduce region times year-
month fixed effects, which subsume all non-country specific controls. The explanatory power
is now substantially larger, but the temperature anomaly measure is no longer statistically
significant. This result might not be surprising, as several papers in the literature have statis-
tically insignificant base effects54 and one could hypothesize that only particularly susceptible
countries are affected by temperature increases. Precipitation is statistically insignificant in
the baseline and all following regressions.
The hypothesis that only susceptible countries respond to temperature shocks receives
confirmation in columns (4) to (6). In these estimations, I repeat the specifications of columns
(1)-(3) but replace the historical temperature anomaly with the deviation-adjusted temper-
ature measure (). As described, this version emphasizes
temperature shocks in countries with low seasonality. It enters negative and with a stable
and strongly statistically significant coefficient (1% level) in all specifications. This result
implies that rising temperature leads to a statistically significant decrease of sovereign cred-
itworthiness for countries with low seasonality. Regarding the economic size, an increase of
deviation-adjusted temperature anomalies by one standard deviation (0.574C) leads to a
0.135%-point drop in EMBI returns. This magnitude corresponds to 3.47% of the standard
deviation of EMBI returns in the estimation sample. While this effect is modest for now,
the next section will investigate the susceptibility of countries towards temperature shocks in
greater detail and identify more substantial effects.
5.5 Channels of Temperature-Sovereign Risk Connection
The previous literature established that temperature shocks can be particularly harmful for
warmer or poorer countries or affect certain economic sectors like agriculture or industrial
production (Burke et al. 2015, Dell et al. 2012). I investigate such channels with respect
to their impact on sovereign risk. Specifically, I analyze the general warmness of a country
(5.5.1), its seasonality (5.5.2), its within year weather fluctuations (5.5.3), its specialization
towards different economic sectors (5.5.4), the effect of institutions (5.5.5) and ultimately a
combination of all relevant channels (5.5.6) regarding their temperature-induced sovereign
risk impact.
54For instance, Dell et al. (2012) also obtain a statistically insignificant baseline effect.
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Table 5.6: Baseline results: temperature anomalies and sovereign risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0614** -0.0798*** -0.0118
(0.0267) (0.0269) (0.0507)
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly -0.219*** -0.233*** -0.235***
(0.0681) (0.0633) (0.0798)
Precipitation 0.197 0.223 0.110 0.0385











Constant 0.740*** 0.688*** 0.679*** 0.777*** 0.722*** 0.786***
(0.0239) (0.0539) (0.0631) (0.0284) (0.0560) (0.0552)
Observations 10,006 10,006 9,957 10,006 10,006 9,957
R-squared 0.068 0.217 0.524 0.068 0.218 0.524
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionYear FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
RegionMonthYear FE No No Yes No No Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are
monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between
monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. Deviation-
AdjustedTempAnomaly is the anomaly measure divided by a country’s 1901-1950 average of temperature
standard deviation. Precipitation is the country-specific average in 1000 mm units. ∆VIX, ∆US-TermSpread
(10-year treasury yield minus 3-month T-Bill yield), ∆US-CorporateRiskPremium (high corporate bond yield
minus investment grade corporate bond yield) and ∆US-10-YearTreasuryYield are in simple first differences,
∆GlobalGovernmentBondIndex is in natural log differences. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See
Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
Methodically, I either analyze these channels in an interaction model as follows:
∆ =1   + 2
+  +  +  +  + 
(20)
That is, the baseline estimation is repeated while  is interacted with
the channel of interest, for instance institutional quality. I expect channels that increase
the detrimental impact of temperature shocks on sovereign creditworthiness to enter with a
negative, while factors that cushion the effect of temperature on sovereign bond performance
to carry a positive coefficient sign.
Some of the analyzed channels could be endogenous towards temperature, such as the
share of agriculture on the economy. However, as shown by Nizalova & Murtazashvili (2016)
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and Bun & Harrison (2019) even if one of such channels could be endogenous in the single
term, the interacted effect with temperature anomalies can still yield a consistent estimate.
This inference holds as long as one of the variables in the interaction term is exogenously
determined. This assumption holds plausibly for temperature shocks, as countries can hardly
influence their own weather or reallocate because of it. Therefore, even if some channels could
be endogenous with respect to temperature, I argue that the interaction terms allow for an
unbiased interpretation.
I apply the interaction model for economic variables, as they have a plausibly linear effect
on the temperature-sovereign risk connection. However, some climate-related variables could
have non-linear effects that are critical to certain thresholds. For instance, Burke et al.
(2015) show that a country’s temperature has a non-linear impact on GDP growth. As
the interaction model above will only partially capture such non-linear effects, I follow the
literature (e.g. Zhang et al. (2018), Graff Zivin & Neidell (2014)) and estimate a bin-model





+  +  +  +  + 
(21)
In this way, a country is grouped into one of  (time-invariant) bins. For instance, a country
could be sorted into a bin for cold, mild or warm countries based on its average yearly
temperature. In order to avoid multicollinearity, one bin has to be omitted in the regression.
The estimated coefficient  yields the effect of a temperature anomaly increase of, for
instance, the warm country group relative to the omitted reference group, for example the
mild countries. Thereby, group-specific non-linear temperature effects are taken into account.
5.5.1 General Warmness
Figure 5.3 depicts the histogram of every sample country’s 1901-2018 temperature average.
There is considerable heterogeneity visible in the warm- and coldness between the coldest
(Russia, -4.96C) and the hottest (Senegal, 28.03C) country. To test the hypothesis if
differences in climatic profiles affect the temperature-sovereign risk connection, I construct
five bins to group every country into: very cold, cold, mild, warm and very warm.
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Figure 5.3: Histogram of average temperature (1901-2018) of panel countries
I start by grouping according to percentiles: Countries equal to or below the 20th per-
centile of average annual temperature (from 1901-2018) are classified as “very cold”. Countries
in the 21st to the 40th percentile of the sample-wide annual temperature distribution are clas-
sified as “cold” and so on. Using this data-driven procedure, I make sure that every bin has
the same number of countries.
One drawback of this method is that the differences at the end of the distribution are
less sharp. “Warm” countries have an average temperature of 24.36C while “very warm”
countries have only marginally hotter climate averaging 26.25C. Therefore, for a second
procedure, I group according to 5C-intervals: “Very cold” includes countries with mean
1901-2018 temperatures below 10C, “cold” ranges between 10C and 15C, “mild” between
15C and 20C, “warm” between 20C and 25C and “very warm” above 25C. With this
procedure, the number of countries in each bin varies. Table 5.7 shows the members of each
bin and their mean temperature for both classifications.
I proceed by estimating both bin classifications according to equation (21). I omit the
“cold” bin to avoid multicollinearity.55 Table 5.8 reports the results and Figures 5.4 and
5.5 depict the coefficients. I find that the interaction of the “very warm” category and
temperature anomalies is both times negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
As in Burke et al. (2015), warmer countries seem to suffer more from temperature increases
55I only interact with the unadjusted historical temperature anomaly variable, as the deviation-adjusted
temperature variable already captures countries with low seasonality and warm climate.
200
Chapter 5
Table 5.7: Countries in each percentile- or 5C-interval-defined climatic bin
Percentile-defined climatic bins Very Cold Cold Mild Warm Very Warm
Belarus Argentina Angola Brazil Belize
Chile Azerbaijan Bolivia Colombia Ghana
China Croatia Ecuador Costa Rica Indonesia
Georgia Hungary Iraq Dominican
Republic
Ivory Coast
Kazakhstan Lebanon Jordan Egypt Malaysia
Latvia Morocco Mexico El Salvador Nigeria
Lithuania Romania Namibia Gabon Panama




Russia Turkey Tunisia Jamaica Venezuela
Ukraine Uruguay Zambia Vietnam
Average 1901-2018
annual temperature 5.198
C 13.439C 20.666C 24.362C 26.256C
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C 11.938C 18.087C 22.657C 25.986C
than milder tempered countries. For both models, the effect of “very warm” countries holds
at least at the 10% level of statistical significance with respect to the cold but also the mild
and very cold category and for the 5C-interval model even towards the “warm” category
(see Figures A.5.1 and A.5.2).
Independent of the base category, summing the interaction coefficient of “very warm”
countries and the single term coefficient of historical temperature anomalies gives the total
size of the effect. For “very warm” countries, I find that a rise in historical temperature
anomalies by 1C, i.e. the estimated global temperature increase since the pre-industrial age,
leads to a decline in EMBI returns by 0.432%-points in the percentile- and by 0.464%-points
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in the 5C-interval model. These effects correspond to 11.1% or 11.9% of the EMBI returns’
standard deviation in the sample. Consequently, for affected countries, a 2C warming sce-
nario could lead to falling sovereign creditworthiness in an amount of roughly 25% of the
recent EMBI standard deviation, although this effect is out-of-sample and subject to climate-
related uncertainty. One drawback of the EMBI growth data is that, as a financial market
return variable, I cannot attach a dollar value to these effects. Still, the magnitude in terms
of percentage points and standard deviation shares is quite substantial. The effect implies
sharply rising sovereign borrowing costs for sovereigns that are susceptible to climate change.





VeryColdCountry (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0731
(0.0802)
ColdCountry (percentile; base category)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0
(0)
MildCountry (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0639
(0.114)
WarmCountry (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.224
(0.174)
VeryWarmCountry (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.491**
(0.233)
VeryColdCountry ( 10C)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0492
(0.110)
ColdCountry (> 10 &  15C; base category)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0
(0)
MildCountry (> 15 &  20C)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.207
(0.124)
WarmCountry (> 20 &  25C)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.125
(0.155)






Country FE Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes
Total “very warm” Country Effect -0.432 -0.464
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are
monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between
monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. Each country
is grouped into a bin either according to percentiles or 5C-intervals (see Table 5.7 for respective countries).
One bin is omitted due to multicollinearity (base category). Single terms of the bins are subsumed by time
fixed effects. Total “very warm” country effect is the sum of the VeryWarmCountry interaction and the
single term of HistoricalTempAnomaly. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level,
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5
for variable definitions and sources.
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Figure 5.4: Coefficients estimated in Table 5.8 for climatic bins according to percentiles of
average temperature
Figure 5.5: Coefficients estimated in Table 5.8 for climatic bins according to 5C-intervals of
average temperature
5.5.2 Seasonality
The negative and statistically significant effects of deviation-adjusted temperature anomaly
(Table 5.6, columns (4)-(6)) gave already some confirmation that lower seasonality makes a
country more susceptible to temperature socks. The evidence from the recent section corrob-
orates this finding, as countries that are warmer on average tend to have lower seasonality (a
country’s mean temperature and temperature standard deviation correlate at -0.89).
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To test the effects of seasonality on temperature-induced sovereign risk more formally, I
group each country into one of five seasonality bins. I again sort according to the quantiles
(i.e. five percentile groups) of monthly temperature standard deviation (1901-2018) with the
grouping shown in Table A.5.1. Table 5.9 and the depicted coefficients in Figure 5.6 con-
firm the previous results: The coefficient for countries with very low seasonality is negative
and statistically significant in its interaction with temperature anomalies. The size is nearly
identical to that of the warmest country group in the previous section. In addition, countries
in the neighboring group of low seasonality have a negative and statistically significant coef-
ficient at the 10% level. In sum, this evidence suggests that hotter countries where seasons
hardly vary in terms of warmness are more sensitive towards rising temperature anomalies
with respect to their sovereign creditworthiness.





VeryLow Temp-StdDev (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.441**
(0.199)
Low Temp-StdDev (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.493*
(0.281)
Normal Temp-StdDev (percentile; base category)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0
(0)
High Temp-StdDev (percentile)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0502
(0.113)








This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are
monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between
monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. Each country
is grouped into a bin according to percentiles (see Table A.5.1) of monthly temperature standard deviation
from 1901-2018 (Temp-StdDev). One bin is omitted due to multicollinearity (base category). Single terms
of the bins are subsumed by time fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country
level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table
A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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Figure 5.6: Coefficients estimated in Table 5.9 for bins according to percentiles of monthly
temperature standard deviation (1901-2018)
5.5.3 Month and Season Effects
Temperature fluctuations in the previous literature are often on a yearly frequency. I can,
instead, exploit the monthly variation in my data to investigate if temperature shocks are
different during warmer or colder months. Such a differentiated impact could be plausible:
For instance, a warmer summer month could be associated with droughts or declining labor
productivity due to extreme heat. On the other hand, a warmer than usual winter month
might be beneficial for the economy, as the milder weather lowers heating costs or makes
seasonal business cycle fluctuations less severe, for example in the construction sector.
To test these hypotheses, I first re-scale the months of countries in the southern hemisphere
to the northern hemisphere classification (that is, the temperature anomaly in Argentina in
January is assumed to take place in an adjusted July, February becomes August and so on).
I then construct a dummy for each of these adjusted months and repeat the baseline regres-
sion by interacting each month with the historical temperature anomaly variable. To avoid
multicollinearity, I omit the month of May as it usually approaches the annual temperature
average. However, results are not critical towards this choice.
Column (1) in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.7 show the results of this exercise. There seems
to be no pattern that would confirm the hypothesis of more severe temperature shocks in
summer months. Some months approach statistical significance at the 10% level, however,
such findings are not stable and in general sensitive to the omitted base category. For instance,
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in column (2) I omit December to see potential summer-effects more directly, which leads to
changes in signs and significance levels for several coefficients.
Lastly, I interact temperature anomaly shocks with the respective season. This specifica-
tion does not require a re-scaling of months in southern hemisphere countries (e.g. summer is
June-August in northern and December-February in southern hemisphere). Choosing autumn
as a base, column (3) of Table 5.10 and Figure 5.8 demonstrate once again that there seem
to be no statistically significant effects during certain seasons regarding the temperature-
sovereign risk connection. These results lead to the conclusion that overall country warmness
rather than within year temperature variation is what matters for the temperature sensitivity
of a country’s sovereign creditworthiness.
Figure 5.7: Coefficients estimated in Table 5.10 column (1) for month effects (adjusted for
southern hemisphere)
Figure 5.8: Coefficients estimated in Table 5.10 column (3) for season effects
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Table 5.10: Channels of temperature-sovereign risk connection: month and season effects
(1) (2) (3)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0939 0.0890 -0.00309
(0.124) (0.106) (0.102)
January (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0155 -0.167
(0.140) (0.108)
February (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.00336 -0.179
(0.146) (0.137)
March (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0532 -0.130
(0.190) (0.136)
April (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0325 -0.215
(0.176) (0.181)
May (adjusted; base category in (1))  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0 -0.183
(0) (0.173)
June (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0704 -0.112
(0.273) (0.220)
July (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.347 0.165
(0.213) (0.186)
August (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.210 0.0271
(0.204) (0.160)
September (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.105 -0.0779
(0.243) (0.238)
October (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.309 0.127
(0.186) (0.159)
November (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0798 -0.263**
(0.173) (0.109)
December (adjusted; base category in (2))  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.183 0
(0.173) (0)
Spring  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0766
(0.0935)
Summer  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.129
(0.134)
Autumn (base category)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0
(0)
Winter  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0175
(0.0998)
Precipitation 0.362 0.362 0.439
(0.477) (0.477) (0.437)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,957
R-squared 0.525 0.525 0.524
Single Terms Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are
monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between
monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. In columns
(1) and (2), months in the southern hemisphere are adjusted to northern hemisphere scaling (January
becomes July and so on). One month or season is omitted due to multicollinearity (base category). The
single terms of months or seasons are included in the regression but left out in the table to save space. See
Table A.5.2 for the full results. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***,
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for
variable definitions and sources.
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5.5.4 Economic Sector Specialization
In the following, I investigate if countries that are specialized in certain economic sectors
are more susceptible to temperature deviating positively from its historical average. For in-
stance, Auffhammer & Schlenker (2014) summarize empirical studies on the tight relationship
between agricultural production, weather outcomes and climate change. Furthermore, the
literature linking temperature and labor productivity typically finds critical effects in man-
ufacturing sectors (Cachon et al. 2012, Zhang et al. 2018). Lastly, countries specialized in
fossil-fuel sectors could see their creditworthiness deteriorate because these industries might
no longer have viable business models as climate change intensifies (ECB 2019).
To test the statistical effects of these channels, I interact the temperature anomaly variable
with measures for sector specialization as described in equation (20). Though pure tempera-
ture anomalies are the primary interest of this specification, I also run the regressions using
the deviation-adjusted anomaly measure to emphasize countries with lower seasonality and
warmer weather.
Table 5.11 shows the results for agricultural ((1)-(2)), manufacturing ((3)-(4)) and services
((5)-(6)) specialization, all measured by their share on GDP. Negative interaction effects
would indicate that higher specialization in a sector leads to more detrimental temperature
impacts on sovereign creditworthiness. However, while some coefficients of the interactions
with temperature anomaly are negative in sign, none of them are statistically significant
at conventional levels. Table 5.25 in the robustness section repeats these interactions with
different scaling, for instance the employment instead of the GDP share, but the results
stay statistically insignificant. Overall, the gathered evidence does not suggest that countries
which are specialized in a certain economic sector are more (or less) susceptible to temperature
increases with respect to their sovereign solvency.
Lastly, I interact with total share of oil, gas, coal, mineral and forest rents in relation
to GDP (ResourceRentsToGDP) ((7)-(8)). However, there are once again no statistically
significant interaction effects for either one of the temperature anomaly variables. Of course,
it could still be the case that fossil industries captured in the resource-rent variable will come
under stronger pressure in future years and thereby endanger the creditworthiness of their
sovereign. Still, such effects seem to be either weak during my estimation period or not
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The subsequent section investigates if the quality of a country’s institutions differentiates the
effect of temperature increases on sovereign risk. Better institutions make sure that countries
have a stable political and business environment, low corruption, accountable political leaders
and a government that can mobilize investments, provide common goods and respond to
market failures or natural disasters. All these factors matter in the context of climate change,
for instance if droughts or floods lead to physical damages that require swift government
intervention, or if distributional consequences of temperature-induced costs and losses need
to be managed efficiently. In sum, better institutional quality could make a country more
resilient to the various challenges global warming poses for emerging economies.
In order to test the hypothesis of institutions driving the temperature-sovereign connec-
tion, I interact both temperature anomaly versions with a range of institutional measures.
My main interest lies once again in the raw temperature anomaly measure as it proxies global
warming directly and is more straightforward to interpret, but I will also post results for the
deviation-adjusted version. The first set of interactions are with the World Bank’s institu-
tional measures for the quality of a country’s rule of law (Table 5.12, columns (1)-(2)) and its
control of corruption (columns (3)-(4)) which capture most of all business and legal aspects
of institutions. I continue with interactions measuring the impact of political rights (columns
(5)-(6)) and civil liberties (columns (7)-(8)) by Freedom House to see if free elections, free-
dom of speech and other politically- and societal-related aspects play a role. Next, I analyze
the amount of income redistribution from before to after taxes (Table 5.13, columns (1)-(2))
from Solt (2019) to see if more equitable countries that redistribute a larger share of their in-
come, thereby potentially taxing elites and lowering poverty, react differently to temperature
shocks. Lastly, I use the Polity2 index (columns (3)-(4)) and its components from the Center
for Systemic Peace that show which governments are more democratic (columns (5)-(6)) and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Simply put, I find strong and robust evidence for all of these channels. Interactions with
institutional variables for which higher values indicate better quality (rule of law, control
of corruption, income redistribution, polity2, democratic governments) enter with positive,
while measures which are indexed so that higher values imply lower quality (civil liberties,
political rights, authoritarian governments) carry negative signs in all cases. For the pure
temperature anomaly measure, all interactions are at statistical significance levels of 1%
or 5%. In the case of the deviation-adjusted measure, the coefficients are slightly weaker
in their statistical significance but significant at conventional levels except for the income
redistribution interaction.
Concerning economic sizes, having a value in the rule of law index (which ranges between
0 and 100) at the 10th percentile (15.35) leads to a marginal temperature anomaly effect of
-0.148 (= 0209 + 000396  1535) which is statistically significant at the 5% level. At this
index level, a 1C increase in temperatures leads to a reduction in EMBI returns by -0.148%-
points which is 3.8% of EMBI return standard deviation. While this effect is of a smaller
magnitude compared to the “very warm” country coefficient, it still captures a non-negligible
variation in EMBI returns. In contrast, having a rule of law index at the 90th percentile
(69.23) leads to marginal temperature effect of 0.0654 that is statistically insignificant.
I expand the analysis to investigate if the results also hold for climate-related institutions.
To this end, I draw data from the Notre Dame Global Adaption Initiative, which publishes
the Notre Dame Global Adaption Index (ND-GAIN). This index takes both the climate-
related adaptive readiness of a country as well as its physical and institutional vulnerability
towards global warming into account. For instance, the index has a readiness component that
covers the economic, governance and social-related institutions of a country that can provide
resilience towards damages from climate change. The vulnerability component measures
physical and topographical exposure risks and the dependency on climate-sensitive sectors.
Theoretically, both the readiness and vulnerability component could affect sovereign risk in
its interaction with rising temperatures.
Column (1) of Table 5.14 reports the results of the overall ND-GAIN interacted with
temperature anomalies. I obtain a positive coefficient that is statistically significant closely
before the 5% level, indicating that countries with stronger climate-related institutions suffer
significantly less from rising temperature than less well-prepared countries. Results for the
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interaction between ND-GAIN and the deviation-adjusted temperature are similarly posi-
tive and significant just before the 5% level of statistical significance, suggesting again that
countries with lower ND-GAIN scores suffer significant negative temperature shocks on their
sovereign creditworthiness level.
Interactions with the readiness component (columns (3)-(4)) and the vulnerability com-
ponent (columns (5)-(6)) of the ND-GAIN index reveal that the readiness part is driving the
results. The corresponding interactions are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level, while the vulnerability interactions are statistically insignificant. This finding is in line
with previous results, as the vulnerability component measures the dependency on climate-
vulnerable sectors, which were shown to be largely unrelated to the temperature-sovereign
risk relationship in the previous section. On the other hand, the readiness component cap-
tures climate-related governance factors that correlate positively with the previous measures
of institutional quality. The high statistical significance could suggest that climate-related in-
stitutional features, like disaster protection or frameworks to support investments in adaptive
capacities are crucial to deal with rising temperatures.
In sum, this section provides robust evidence that institutions likely influence the con-
nection between rising temperature and sovereign creditworthiness. Countries with lower
institutional quality, both in a traditional and in a climate-related context, have so far been
hit significantly harder by temperature deviating from its historical levels. This result could
suggest that better institutions can make a country more resilient towards the physical dam-
ages from climate change. As future global warming will lead to growing damages, transition
costs and distributional issues, having stronger institutions to manage these challenges could
be a viable strategy in the adaption process towards climate change.
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Table 5.14: Channels of temperature-sovereign risk connection: climate-related institutional
quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.703* -0.506*** 0.144
(0.354) (0.179) (0.359)
































Precipitation 0.301 0.193 0.291 0.174 0.362 0.180
(0.373) (0.390) (0.372) (0.395) (0.366) (0.381)
Observations 9,842 9,842 9,842 9,842 9,842 9,842
R-squared 0.510 0.511 0.510 0.511 0.510 0.510
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI
are monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference
between monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month.
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly is the anomaly measure divided by a country’s 1901-1950 average of
temperature standard deviation. The Notre Dame Global Adaption Index (ND-GAIN) ((1)-(2)), the
readiness component of the ND-GAIN ((3)-(4)) and vulnerability component of the ND-GAIN ((5)-(6))
are used as interaction variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***,
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for
variable definitions and sources.
5.5.6 Combining relevant Channels
A channel that could be related to the impact of institutional quality is economic development.
Therefore, I interact temperature anomalies with a country’s GDP per capita. Column (1) in
Table 5.15 confirms that the level of economic development matters, in that poorer countries’
215
Chapter 5
sovereign creditworthiness is statistically significantly stronger damaged by a temperature
shock than those of economically more developed countries.
However, it could be the case that poorer countries have larger susceptibility to rising
temperatures because they tend to have worse institutions. It could also be the other way
around, and the effect of worse institutions only works through the associated lower level of
economic development. More broadly, the vulnerability of the warmest countries uncovered
in Section 5.5.1 could also be interrelated with institutions and development. For instance,
Easterly & Levine (2003) show that countries in tropical climate zones tend to develop worse
institutions which lowers their economic progress (see also Sachs (2001)). Indeed, annual
average temperatures and the rule of law index correlate negatively in the sample (-0.165),
indicating that warmer countries tend to have worse institutions.
A possible if not perfect way to test which channels ultimately matter for the temperature-
sovereign connection is to combine all relevant interactions in a single model. I start by
adding the interaction of temperature anomalies and the rule of law index, as one of the
institutional variables, to the model with interacted GDP per capita (column (2)). While
the interaction coefficient for rule of law remains statistically significant and of similar size
than in Table 5.12, the GDP per capita interaction with temperature decreases in size and
becomes statistically insignificant. This finding provides some confirmation that the effect of
lower economic development on the temperature-sovereign relationship is mostly driven by
the fact that poorer countries tend to have worse institutions.
In column (3), I add the deviation-adjusted temperature variable to the specification of
column (2) to capture temperature shocks in warmer and less seasonal countries. The variable
remains negative and statistically significant in column (3), but the interacted rule of law
coefficient also stays stable and significant. GDP per capita remains statistically insignificant.
This result suggests that, even after controlling for temperature shocks in warmer countries,
institutional quality can still cushion the impact of a temperature shock to a significant
degree. This finding is confirmed in column (4) in which I replace the deviation-adjusted
temperature measure with the five bins representing very cold, cold, mild, warm and very
warm countries according to 5C-intervals. Leaving out the cold country bin, I find that both
the interaction of temperature anomaly with the very warm country bin and with the rule of
law index continue to stay statistically significant and similar in size than before.
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While the long-run effects of climate on institutional development are difficult to en-
tangle and beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that the impact of institutions on the
temperature-sovereign connection continues to hold even after controlling for the warmness
of a country shows that the institution-channel does not work purely through the climate-
channel. In that sense, policy makers, independent of the warmness of their country, have an
incentive to improve institutional quality, as it can cushion the impact of rising temperatures
on their sovereign risk level.
Table 5.15: Channels of temperature-sovereign risk connection: combining relevant channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.145* -0.233*** -0.151* -0.137
(0.0764) (0.0845) (0.0893) (0.137)
GDPPerCapita -5.83e-05 -4.19e-05 -4.04e-05 -3.57e-05











RuleOfLaw -0.00315 -0.00235 -0.00414
(0.00477) (0.00474) (0.00467)
























Precipitation 0.194 0.267 0.0751 0.0683
(0.367) (0.375) (0.387) (0.392)
Observations 9,957 9,688 9,688 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.502 0.502 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI
are monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference
between monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month.
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly is the anomaly measure divided by a country’s 1901-1950 average of
temperature standard deviation. GDP per capita ((1)-(4)), rule of law ((2)-(4)) and country warmness
((4)) are used as interaction variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level,
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5




5.6.1 Changing the Fixed Effects Specification
In order to conduct robustness checks, I repeat those specifications that yielded the most
decisive results in the previous sections. These include the deviation-adjusted temperature
variable (Table 5.6, column (6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using
5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the interaction with institutional characteristics
from which I choose the rule of law index (Table 5.12, column (1)). For the bin-regression, I
omit the “cold” country category because it provides a distinctive comparison group to the
“very warm” country group. However, Figures A.5.1 and A.5.2 show that the general effect
also holds for omitting other groups. More importantly, I am interested in the total effect of
the “very warm” country group interaction, which is independent of the omitted bin.
I start by changing the fixed effects setting for each of these three specifications. First, I
deconstruct the interaction of region and year-month fixed effects and instead only include
year-month time effects, thus omitting the regional component (Table 5.16, columns (1)-(3)).
Second, I re-include the region times month-year effects and in addition interact the country
fixed effects with a year time fixed effect (columns (4)-(6)). Though I am not aware of a
paper in the relevant literature using such a country-year effect, the interaction controls for
time-fixed differences between countries within each year. Lastly, I control for region times
month-year and additional country times quarter fixed effects (columns (7)-(9)). The latter
interaction absorbs seasonal differences that vary over each quarter.
In sum, the main results of the paper stay intact for each of these modifications. Dropping
the region fixed effects only marginally changes the coefficients. The country by year fixed
effects, in contrast, reduce the statistical significance of the deviation-adjusted temperature
anomaly to the 10% level, and also lower the total effect of very warm countries from -0.464
in the baseline to -0.320 in column (5). Still, this specification is unusual in the literature
and the overall direction of the results is the same as before. Interacting the country with















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.6.2 Changing the Dependent Variable
Next, I test if the main results hold when using a different dependent variable. All specifica-
tions so far used monthly returns of the EMBI index. A natural alternative for this measure
are differences in the EMBI spread instead of the index level.
Table 5.17 repeats the three main regressions using monthly first differences of EMBI
spreads as the dependent variable (columns (1)-(3)). All results continue to stay statistically
significant if on somewhat lower levels. The coefficient signs are now reversed as rising EMBI
spread changes indicate lower sovereign creditworthiness. Regarding the economic magnitude,
an increase of 1C of the anomaly measure in “very warm” countries leads to a 9.62 basis-
point increase in EMBI spread changes. This effect is 11.98% of the overall EMBI spread
change standard deviation (80.34) and thus extremely close to the 11.9% obtained for the
EMBI index returns.
In order to investigate the validity of the results for a different variable than the EMBIs,
I collect sovereign CDS data. However, this data is only available since roughly 2008 and
only for 37 of the 54 panel countries. With these limitations in mind, I construct changes
in the CDS spread the same way as with the EMBI spread, i.e. I take first differences,
set zero returns to missing and winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentile. I use CDS spread
changes as a new dependent variable in columns (4)-(5). I do not estimate the regression
using the temperature bin interactions because the grouping process is significantly biased
due to the lower number of countries The interaction with the rule of law index is negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level, which corroborates the previous results. The
deviation-adjusted measure enters positively but is not statistically significant. However,
the imprecise estimation could likely be due to the lower number of observations, since the
coefficient size is still large. An increase of deviation-adjusted temperature by one standard
deviation of the estimation sample (0.627) increases CDS changes by 5.19 points which is
7.3% of the CDS standard deviation (71.05).
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Table 5.17: Robustness tests: changing dependent variable











































Precipitation -14.57* -13.10 -15.86* 19.17 15.03
(8.247) (8.715) (8.030) (18.99) (15.71)
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,491 4,277 4,277
R-squared 0.463 0.464 0.456 0.349 0.351
Number of Countries 54 54 54 37 37
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column
(6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2))
and the interaction with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). Columns
(1)-(3) use the first difference of the EMBI spread, and columns (4)-(5) the first difference of the CDS
spread as a new dependent variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level,
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5
for variable definitions and sources.
5.6.3 Changing the Lag Structure
Dell et al. (2012) include up to ten years of lagged temperature shocks into one of their
specifications. Though their effects appear to be driven by contemporaneous temperature
fluctuations, I also extend my model with twelve months of lagged temperature anomalies.
However, columns (1)-(3) in Table 5.18 reveal that, similar to Dell et al. (2012), contempo-
raneous shocks are driving the results. In column (1), the current level of deviation-adjusted
temperature remains negative and statistically significant while all its lags are statistically in-
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significant and without a clear trend. In column (2), I interact every temperature bin-category
with the temperature anomaly variable and each of its twelve legs (yielding 52 interaction
terms). Table 5.18 only shows the interaction of the “very warm” category and contempora-
neous temperature to save space. Full results are in Table A.5.3. The “very warm” country
bin still has a negative and significant interaction effect, though the statistical significance is
slightly lower likely because of the numerous additional interactions. Lagged interactions are
again quite noisy and in almost all cases not statistically significant. Column (3) interacts
the rule of law index with the twelve lags of temperature anomaly but the non-lagged version
remains the only significant coefficient.
5.6.4 Changing the Historical Temperature Average Period
All main specifications have used 1901-1950 as a historical period to build temperature av-
erages over, from which deviations were calculated. I chose 1950 because it is long enough
to ensure a representable average (compared to 1930 or 1940) but with sufficient distance to
global temperatures starting to increase more measurably (such as 1960 or 1970).
In Tables 5.19 and 5.20, I repeat all three main estimations using 1930, 1940, 1960 or
1970 as endpoints for the historical average period. All coefficients of interest hardly change
as a consequence of these adjusted average periods, including the total effect of temperature
anomalies in “very warm” countries.
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HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00369**
(0.00139)


























L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00118
(0.00144)
L2.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00171
(0.00144)
L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00102
(0.00130)
L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.000323
(0.00108)
L5.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.000594
(0.00195)
L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00290*
(0.00153)
L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00241
(0.00174)
L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00219
(0.00158)
L9.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00121
(0.00151)
L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.000187
(0.00134)
L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 6.45e-05
(0.00207)
L12.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00113
(0.00147)
Observations 9,842 9,842 9,688
R-squared 0.511 0.514 0.503
Country FE, Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes
Lag and Single Terms Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)),
the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the
interaction with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). Estimation for
column (2) includes all other bin-category interactions (“cold” country as base category). Estimations for
columns (2) and (3) also include all lagged single terms and interactions of HistoricalTempAnomaly. See
Table A.5.3 for full results. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable
definitions and sources. 223
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Table 5.19: Robustness tests: changing historical average period (1930, 1940)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly (1930) -0.213***
(0.0720)
























































Precipitation 0.0281 -0.0191 0.267 0.0423 0.0147 0.276
(0.380) (0.403) (0.375) (0.377) (0.395) (0.374)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,688 9,957 9,957 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.502 0.524 0.524 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total “very warm” Country Effect -0.452 -0.453
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)), the
bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the interaction
with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). Historical temperature averages are
calculated from 1901 to 1930 or 1940 instead of 1950, as shown in the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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Table 5.20: Robustness tests: changing historical average period (1960, 1970)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly (1960) -0.244***
(0.0825)
























































Precipitation 0.0384 0.0154 0.272 0.0467 0.0178 0.272
(0.375) (0.390) (0.374) (0.376) (0.389) (0.373)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,688 9,957 9,957 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.502 0.524 0.524 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total “very warm” Country Effect -0.461 -0.477
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)), the
bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the interaction
with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). Historical temperature averages are
calculated from 1901 to 1960 or 1970 instead of 1950, as shown in the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
225
Chapter 5
5.6.5 Dropping Countries with lower Data Coverage and larger Landmass
In the main specification, I included all countries with liquid EMBI return data of at least six
years. I chose this criterion to manage the trade-off between having a large panel and suffi-
cient observations for each country in the sample. In columns (1)-(3) of Table 5.21, I set the
inclusion criterion to ten years (120 months) of liquid EMBI return data. 15 countries in the
original sample are affected by this requirement (Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Namibia, Romania, Senegal,
Zambia). I drop these countries and repeat the three main regressions. The number of obser-
vations only decreases slightly as a result of this adjustment, and all the main effects retain
their statistical significance. The effect of temperature increases in the warmest countries
even rises somewhat, in both magnitude and significance.
One further concern I address deals with countries covering a huge landmass. Nations
like Russia or China could have several climate zones which makes their temperature average
only a rough measure for weather fluctuations. Therefore, I drop the ten countries with
the largest landmass from my sample (Russia, China, Brazil, India, Argentina, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, Indonesia, Mongolia, Peru) and repeat the main regressions. Columns (4)-(6) reveal
that the number of observations now decreases more notably. However, the main results
remain broadly intact. Deviation-adjusted temperature shocks even increase, as does the
interacted effect of institutions and temperature anomalies. The “very warm” country bin is
now marginally insignificant just before the 10% level, perhaps because of the lower number
of observations or the changing number of countries in each bin. Nevertheless, the total effect
of this group still has the same size as in the main regression (-0.443).
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Table 5.21: Robustness tests: dropping countries with lower data coverage and larger land-
mass
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly -0.239*** -0.315***
(0.0861) (0.108)
HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0994 -0.184* -0.0587 -0.336***







































Precipitation 0.0319 -0.0355 0.322 -0.0579 -0.0419 0.0934
(0.418) (0.445) (0.414) (0.522) (0.539) (0.523)
Observations 8,746 8,746 8,477 7,641 7,641 7,550
R-squared 0.529 0.529 0.505 0.524 0.524 0.509
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 39 39 39 44 44 44
Total “very warm” Country Effect -0.543 -0.443
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)),
the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the
interaction with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). In columns (1)-(3), all
countries with ∆EMBI data of fewer than ten years are dropped. In columns (4)-(6), the ten countries with
the largest landmass are dropped. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable
definitions and sources.
5.6.6 Other Temperature Anomaly Measures
I construct one further measure to detect weather anomaly shocks. This variable is inspired
by the fact that not only increases of temperature levels but also of variability are verified
as one of the detrimental impacts of climate change (Bathiany et al. 2018). I take the
standard deviation of monthly temperature over 12-month rolling windows for every country.
This variable captures the volatility of weather over the previous year. I subtract from this
measure a country’s temperature standard deviation from 1901 to 1950. In this way, similar
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to the historical temperature anomaly measure, I capture deviations of temperature volatility
above its pre-global warming average (HistoricalDeviationAnomaly).
Table 5.22 presents the results for this variable. The historical change in temperature
standard deviation is negative and statistically significant as a single variable (column (1)).
Its size is similar to the deviation-adjusted temperature shocks, which suggests that peri-
ods of more volatile weather can hurt sovereign creditworthiness. However, the interaction
coefficients of the variable with both institutional quality and the warmest countries are
statistically insignificant (columns (2)-(3)). Though the point estimates are actually compa-
rable to the main regressions or even larger, the effects are imprecisely estimated. This result
could suggest that more volatile weather hurts all countries’ sovereign bond performance,
independent of their climate zone or institutional framework.
Table 5.22: Robustness tests: other temperature anomaly measures
(1) (2) (3)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI




























Precipitation 0.209 0.214 0.310
(0.361) (0.358) (0.363)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column
(6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2))
and the interaction with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). Histori-
calDeviationAnomaly is a country’s standard deviation of temperature over the (rolling) past 12 months
minus its 1901-1950 standard deviation of temperature. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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5.6.7 Analyzing Debt Sustainability
Analyzing the sovereign creditworthiness of emerging economies raises the issue of debt sus-
tainability. Therefore, I interact both temperature variables with measures for debt to GDP
((1)-(2)), the number of years since the last sovereign debt restructuring ((3)-(4)) and the
primary net lending of the government scaled to GDP ((5)-(6)) in Table 5.23. Debt to GDP is
available for 53 and primary lending for 42 of the panel countries.56 However, all interactions
yield statistically insignificant coefficients, suggesting that temperature shocks do not work
primarily through government debt characteristics in their impact on sovereign risk.
5.6.8 Testing for Transition Risks
Though it is, as described in Section 5.2, extremely difficult to differentiate between phys-
ical and transition risks in the temperature literature, I conduct a test that could possibly
detect transition risks. To this end, I use the Paris Climate Agreement, which was sealed in
December 2015, as a transition shock. With the Paris Agreement, almost all countries in the
world agreed to limit global warming to well below 2C. If temperature increases also fea-
ture a transition risk component, it could be the case that temperature shocks have stronger
impacts on sovereign creditworthiness since the Paris Agreement, because investors are more
sensitive towards climate issues.
To test this channel, I interact the three main regressions as well as raw temperature
anomalies with a time dummy for the Paris Agreement that is 1 after December 2015. For
the temperature anomaly and the deviation-adjusted temperature measure, the Paris dummy
does not differentiate the impact of these variables, as the interaction effects are statistically
insignificant (Table 5.24, columns (1)-(2)). The results are similar for “very warm” coun-
tries and institutions (columns (3)-(4)): The double interaction of temperature and rule of
law remains statistically significant and comparable to previous results, whereas the triple
interaction with the Paris dummy is small and statistically insignificant. Although this is no
56For the years since the last debt restructuring, I use the database by Laeven & Valencia (2018) and
calculate the number of years since the last sovereign debt restructuring event, including those before the
start of my estimation in 1994. A value of zero indicates debt restructuring in the current year. Overall,
32 of my panel countries negotiated at least one sovereign debt restructuring. For the countries without any




definitive result, it could suggest that temperature shocks are first and foremost a physical
risk source, which is largely independent of climate agreements or transition risks.
Table 5.23: Robustness tests: analyzing debt sustainability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI


































Precipitation 0.571 0.301 0.222 0.0236 0.387 0.175
(0.377) (0.387) (0.362) (0.372) (0.549) (0.567)
Observations 9,327 9,327 9,957 9,957 7,745 7,745
R-squared 0.509 0.510 0.525 0.525 0.523 0.523
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionMonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are monthly
natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between monthly temperature
of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly is the
anomaly measure divided by a country’s 1901-1950 average of temperature standard deviation. The debt to GDP
ratio ((1)-(2)), number of years since the last sovereign debt restructuring (with maximum value of 36 for countries
without any restructuring) ((3)-(4)) and government primary net lending ((5)-(6)) are used as interaction variables.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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Table 5.24: Robustness tests: Paris Agreement as transition shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.00387 0.0963 -0.211**
(0.0608) (0.147) (0.104)




DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly  PostParis 0.0522
(0.0843)
HistoricalTempAnomaly  VeryWarmCountry -0.608**
(0.257)
VeryWarmCountry  PostParis -0.335
(0.430)




HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00415***
(0.00146)
RuleOfLaw  PostParis 0.00255
(0.00374)
HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw  PostParis -0.00113
(0.00207)
Precipitation 0.224 0.0364 0.0261 0.274
(0.363) (0.376) (0.398) (0.374)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,957 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Bin Terms Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the temperature anomaly measure (Table 5.6, column (3)), the
deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of
countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the interaction with institutional characteristics (rule
of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). PostParis is a dummy with value 1 after the Paris Climate Agreement
in December 2015. Estimation in column (3) also includes all other bin categories (cold as base category) and
respective interactions, see Table A.5.4 for full results. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. See
Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
5.6.9 Changing Economic Sector Specialization Measures
Table 5.11 suggested that being specialized in certain economic sectors does not seem to
make a country respond differently to temperature shocks with respect to their sovereign
creditworthiness. One reason for this result could be in the way I measured sector special-
ization. Table 5.25 repeats the interactions with different scaling than a sector’s GDP share.
However, scaling the sectors by employment share or the agricultural sector by land share
also yields statistically insignificant results, in line with the main section.57
57There is no data series for the employment share in manufacturing, but I expect industrial sector em-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I extend the literature on temperature fluctuations to finance, specifically the sovereign debt
performance of emerging economies. To this end, I collect monthly temperature data since
1901 for 54 emerging markets. For each country, I calculate the temperature deviation of
every month from this month’s 1901-1950 temperature average. I run my main empirical
analysis from 1994m1 to 2018m12, up until this temperature anomaly is on average 0.84C,
reflecting past climate change trends. In line with previous literature, I argue that rising
temperature deviations approximate physical weather and climate damages.
I regress Emerging-Market-Bond-Index returns on temperature anomalies while control-
ling for established country, time and region fixed-effects. My main result is that the effects of
temperature anomalies on the cost of sovereign debt critically hinge on conditioning factors.
Temperature deviations lower sovereign bond performance (i.e. increase sovereign risk) sig-
nificantly for countries that are (i) warmer on average, (ii) less seasonal, (iii) and have lower
institutional quality, both in terms of traditional- and climate-related metrics. Importantly,
the effects of institutional quality and the warmness of a country on the temperature-sovereign
risk connection hold simultaneously, which implies that stronger institutions can improve the
resilience of a country towards climate change, independent of its climatic profile.
The economic effects of temperature increases are more than noteworthy. According to
my analysis if a country with an average annual temperature above 25C faces a 1C increase
in monthly temperature compared to its historical mean, its EMBI returns are lowered by
0.464 percentage points on average. This effect corresponds to 11.9% of the EMBI returns’
overall standard deviation. Hence, a 2C global warming scenario could lower EMBI returns
of affected countries by roughly a quarter of their overall standard deviation.
This magnitude suggests that, in the absence of climate-adaption strategies, affected
countries likely face considerable increases in their sovereign borrowing costs if temperatures
continue to rise due to climate change. These results also raise distributional questions: As
of 2017, the countries in my panel were responsible for just 36.6% of accumulated historical
global CO2 emissions but posed 66.2% of the global population. Policy action to limit the
degree of global warming and to build adaptive capacities through stronger institutional
frameworks are therefore called for.
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A.5 Appendix to Chapter 5
Figure A.5.1: Coefficients of climatic bins according to percentiles of average temperature
with different reference groups
234
Chapter 5
Figure A.5.2: Coefficients of climatic bins according to according to 5C-intervals of average
temperature with different reference groups
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Brazil Angola Argentina Croatia Azerbaijan
Colombia Belize Chile Hungary Belarus




El Salvador Gabon Mexico Lebanon Iraq
Indonesia Ghana Morocco Lithuania Kazakhstan
Malaysia Guatemala Namibia Pakistan Mongolia
Panama Ivory Coast South
Africa
Poland Romania
Peru Jamaica Uruguay Serbia Russia
Philippines Nigeria Vietnam Tunisia Ukraine
Venezuela Senegal Zambia Turkey
Monthly temperature
standard deviation 1901-2018 0.681
C 1.52C 4.07C 7.50C 10.36C
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HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0939 0.0890 -0.00309
(0.124) (0.106) (0.102)
January (adjusted) 0.124 0.124
(0.291) (0.291)
January (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0155 -0.167
(0.140) (0.108)
February (adjusted) 0.401 0.401
(0.253) (0.253)
February (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.00336 -0.179
(0.146) (0.137)
March (adjusted) 0.175 0.175
(0.223) (0.223)
March (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0532 -0.130
(0.190) (0.136)
April (adjusted) 0.317 0.317
(0.266) (0.266)
April (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0325 -0.215
(0.176) (0.181)
May (adjusted; base category in (1)) 0 0.399*
(0) (0.206)
May (adjusted; base category in (1))  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0 -0.183
(0) (0.173)
June (adjusted) 0.414* 0.414*
(0.247) (0.247)
June (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0704 -0.112
(0.273) (0.220)
July (adjusted) 0 0
(0) (0)
July (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.347 0.165
(0.213) (0.186)
August (adjusted) 0 0
(0) (0)
August (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.210 0.0271
(0.204) (0.160)
September (adjusted) 0 0
(0) (0)
September (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.105 -0.0779
(0.243) (0.238)
October (adjusted) 0 0
(0) (0)
October (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.309 0.127
(0.186) (0.159)
November (adjusted) -0.399* 0
(0.206) (0)
November (adjusted)  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0798 -0.263**
(0.173) (0.109)
December (adjusted; base category in (2)) 0 0
(0) (0)






















Winter  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0175
(0.0998)
Precipitation 0.362 0.362 0.439
(0.477) (0.477) (0.437)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,957
R-squared 0.525 0.525 0.524
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes
This table shows OLS estimation results of a panel of 54 countries from 1994m1 to 2018m12. ∆EMBI are
monthly natural log returns of a country’s EMBI index. HistoricalTempAnomaly is the difference between
monthly temperature of a country and its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month. In columns
(1) and (2), months in the southern hemisphere are adjusted to northern hemisphere scaling (January
becomes July and so on). One month or season is omitted due to multicollinearity (base category). The
table shows the same results as Table 5.10, but the single terms of months or seasons are included in the
depiction. Zero values indicate that the respective month is subsumed by fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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VeryColdCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0360
(0.104)
VeryColdCountry  L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0699
(0.0536)




VeryColdCountry  L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.00932
(0.0813)
VeryColdCountry  L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0206
(0.0488)
VeryColdCountry  L5.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0442
(0.0795)
VeryColdCountry  L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0653
(0.0524)
VeryColdCountry  L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0104
(0.133)
VeryColdCountry  L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0462
(0.0473)
VeryColdCountry  L9.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0489
(0.0691)
VeryColdCountry  L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0980
(0.0804)
VeryColdCountry  L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0672
(0.0997)






MildCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.203
(0.128)
MildCountry  L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0628
(0.125)
MildCountry  L2.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.225**
(0.0842)
MildCountry  L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0705
(0.0899)
MildCountry  L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.161**
(0.0631)
MildCountry  L5.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0497
(0.0883)
MildCountry  L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0143
(0.121)
MildCountry  L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.226
(0.218)
MildCountry  L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0434
(0.150)
MildCountry  L9.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0139
(0.112)
MildCountry  L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0476
(0.105)
MildCountry  L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0121
(0.116)
MildCountry  L12.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.230
(0.146)
WarmCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0649
(0.134)
WarmCountry  L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.193**
(0.0870)
WarmCountry  L2.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0483
(0.0657)
WarmCountry  L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0816
(0.139)
WarmCountry  L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0401
(0.0805)




WarmCountry  L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.235*
(0.123)
WarmCountry  L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0614
(0.179)
WarmCountry  L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.163***
(0.0514)
WarmCountry  L9.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.294**
(0.111)
WarmCountry  L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0381
(0.151)
WarmCountry  L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0926
(0.158)
WarmCountry  L12.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.000692
(0.140)
VeryWarmCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.569*
(0.297)
VeryWarmCountry  L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0300
(0.220)
VeryWarmCountry  L2.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0725
(0.256)
VeryWarmCountry  L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.00305
(0.220)
VeryWarmCountry  L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.314
(0.206)
VeryWarmCountry  L5.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.248*
(0.139)
VeryWarmCountry  L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.184
(0.216)
VeryWarmCountry  L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0338
(0.192)
VeryWarmCountry  L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0179
(0.265)
VeryWarmCountry  L9.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.0618
(0.128)
VeryWarmCountry  L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly 0.148
(0.255)
VeryWarmCountry  L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0950
(0.177)




HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00369**
(0.00139)
L1.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00118
(0.00144)
L2.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00171
(0.00144)
L3.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00102
(0.00130)
L4.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.000323
(0.00108)
L5.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.000594
(0.00195)
L6.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00290*
(0.00153)
L7.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw -0.00241
(0.00174)
L8.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00219
(0.00158)




L10.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.000187
(0.00134)
L11.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 6.45e-05
(0.00207)
L12.HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00113
(0.00147)
Precipitation 0.364 0.291 0.282
(0.404) (0.396) (0.391)
Observations 9,842 9,842 9,688
R-squared 0.511 0.514 0.503
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column
(6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2))
and the interaction with institutional characteristics (rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). The
table shows the same results as Table 5.18, but the depiction for column (2) includes all other (lagged)
bin-category interactions (“cold” country as base category). Estimations for columns (2) and (3) also show
all lagged single terms and interactions of HistoricalTempAnomaly. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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Table A.5.4: Robustness tests: Paris Agreement as transition shock (full table)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI ∆EMBI
HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.00387 0.0963 -0.211**
(0.0608) (0.147) (0.104)




DeviationAdjustedTempAnomaly  PostParis 0.0522
(0.0843)
VeryColdCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0585
(0.135)
VeryColdCountry  PostParis -0.0934
(0.321)
VeryColdCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly  PostParis 0.0414
(0.138)
ColdCountry (base category)  HistoricalTempAnomaly 0
(0)
MildCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.224
(0.153)
MildCountry  PostParis -0.223
(0.408)
MildCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly  PostParis 0.0957
(0.194)
WarmCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.0939
(0.182)
WarmCountry  PostParis 0.229
(0.391)
WarmCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly  PostParis -0.168
(0.206)
VeryWarmCountry  HistoricalTempAnomaly -0.608**
(0.257)
VeryWarmCountry  PostParis -0.335
(0.430)




HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw 0.00415***
(0.00146)
RuleOfLaw  PostParis 0.00255
(0.00374)
HistoricalTempAnomaly  RuleOfLaw  PostParis -0.00113
(0.00207)
Precipitation 0.224 0.0364 0.0261 0.274
(0.363) (0.376) (0.398) (0.374)
Observations 9,957 9,957 9,957 9,688
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.502
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region MonthYear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness checks for the temperature anomaly measure (Table 5.6, column (3)), the
deviation-adjusted temperature variable (Table 5.6, column (6)), the bin-regression analyzing the warmness
of countries using 5C-intervals (Table 5.8, column (2)) and the interaction with institutional characteristics
(rule of law index, Table 5.12, column (1)). PostParis is a dummy with value 1 after the Paris Climate
Agreement in December 2015. Estimation in column (3) also shows all other bin categories (cold as base
category) and respective interactions that were not shown in Table 5.24. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the country level, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. See Table A.5.5 for variable definitions and sources.
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Table A.5.5: Description and sources of variables
Variable Description Source
Variables in Baseline Regression (Section 5.4)




Difference between monthly temperature of a country and
its 1901-1950 temperature average of the same month
Climatic Research
Unit, see





HistoricalTempAnomaly divided by a country’s 1901-1950
standard deviation of monthly temperature
Climatic Research
Unit, see
Harris et al. (2020)
Precipitation Precipitation in units of 1000 mm per month
Climatic Research
Unit, see
Harris et al. (2020)
∆VIX Monthly first difference in VIX volatility index(winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile) CBOE
∆US-CorporateRisk
Premium
Monthly first difference in spread between the S&P US high
yield corporate bond index and the corresponding investment




Monthly first difference in the yield of the 10-year US
Treasury bond (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile) Datastream
∆US-TermSpread
Monthly first difference in spread between 10-year US
Treasury yield and 3-month US T-Bill yield (winsorized





Monthly change in natural logarithm of Bank Of America
Merrill Lynch Global Government Index (winsorized at 1st
and 99th percentile)
Merrill Lynch
Variables in Interaction and Bin Regressions (Section 5.5)
Very cold, cold, mild,
warm, very warm
country (percentile)
Countries are grouped into a bin according to percentile
distribution of average annual temperature (1901-2018),
1st-20th (very cold), 21st-40th (cold) percentile and so on
Very cold, cold, mild,
warm, very warm
country (5C-interval)
Countries are grouped into a bin according to 5C-intervals
 10C (very cold), > 10 &  15C (cold), > 15 &  20C
(mild), > 20 &  25C (warm), > 25C (very warm)





Countries are grouped into a bin according to percentile
distribution of monthly temperature standard deviation
(1901-2018), 1st-20th (very low), 21st-40th (low)
percentile and so on
Spring Dummy, 1 in months March-May for northern and September-November for southern hemisphere countries
Summer Dummy, 1 in months June-August for northern and December-February for southern hemisphere countries
Autumn Dummy, 1 in months September-November for northern andMarch-May for southern hemisphere countries
Winter Dummy, 1 in months December-February for northern and June-August for southern hemisphere countries
Agriculture to GDP Value added of agriculture (% of gross domestic product) World Bank
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Manufacturing to GDP Value added of manufacturing (% of gross domestic product) World Bank
Services to GDP Value added of services (% of gross domestic product) World Bank
Resource Rents to GDP Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft),mineral rents, and forest rents (% of gross domestic product) World Bank
Rule of Law Rule of law rank (the extend of which agents have confidencein and abide by the rules of society; linearly interpolated) World Bank
Control of Corruption
Control of corruption rank (the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the
state by elites and private interests; linearly interpolated)
World Bank
Civil Liberties
Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide
range of civil liberties. Countries and territories with a
rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties
Freedom House
Political Rights
Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide
range of political rights, including free and fair elections.
Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or
no political rights
Freedom House
Income Redistribution Absolute income redistribution (market incomeinequality minus net-income inequality) Solt (2019)





Scale that ranges from 0 (not democratic) to +10
(strongly democratic) government (standardized





Scale that ranges from 0 (not authoritarian) to +10
(strongly authoritarian) government (standardized




Notre Dame Global Adaption Index; ND-GAIN brings
together over 74 variables to form 45 core indicators to




Readiness component of ND-GAIN; measures readiness
by considering a country’s ability to leverage investments




Vulnerability component of ND-GAIN; measures propensity
or predisposition of human societies to be negatively
impacted by climate hazards
Notre Dame Global
Adaption Initiative
GDP per Capita Gross domestic product per capita in constant2010-US-dollar prices World Bank
Variables in Robustness Tests (Section 5.6)
∆EMBI Spread Monthly first difference in Emerging Market Bond Spread(Global) (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile) J.P. Morgan





Difference between a country’s 12-month rolling temperature




Harris et al. (2020)




Number of years since last sovereign debt restructuring.







Government primary net lending/borrowing (% of gross
domestic product) IMF Fiscal Monitor
Post Paris Dummy that is 1 after Paris Agreement (December 2015)
Agriculture Land Share Agricultural land (% of total land area) World Bank
Agriculture
Employment Share Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) World Bank
Industrial Employment
Share Employment in industry (% of total employment) World Bank
Services Employment
Share Employment in services (% of total employment) World Bank
Further data used
Natural Disasters
Date of drought, earthquake, epidemic, heat wave, flood,
impact, insect infestation, landslide, mass movement, storm,
volcanic activity, wildfire (total deaths, damage and affected




Stock Returns Natural log returns of stock market index MSCI, S&P
GDP Growth Quarterly natural log change of GDP in constant,seasonally-adjusted 2015 US-Dollar prices Oxford Economics
Accumulated CO2
Emissions






Population Total population of every country and the world in 2017 World Bank
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